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

THE

LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

BY

EDWARD SEARCH, Esq;

Juvat integros accedere fontes.
LUCRET.

VOLUME I. PART II.

HUMAN NATURE.

The proper Study of Mankind is Man.
POPE's Essay on Man.

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THE

LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

VOL. I. PART II.

CHAP. XV.

COMPOSITION OF MOTIVES.

IF one were ſet to take an account of any of thoſe vaſt woods in America ſcarce ever trodden by human foot, he could not be expected to proceed with much regularity at firſt: he muſt follow wherever he ſhould find an opening, and his obſervations upon the firſt trial would direct him to take another method of proceeding in making a ſecond: when he had examined one quarter, he muſt return back to where he ſet out in order to examine another, and would often find occaſion to take freſh notices of things that he thought he had ſufficiently obſerved before. So in this my inveſtigation of that wilderneſs the human mind, I am forced to work my paſſage where I find it practicable; for I have no preconcerted plan nor any favourite

vourite point which I am determined to make good at all events: and tho' not without ſome general idea of the end to which my enquiries will lead me, yet have I not a full proſpect of the track they will take. I am not to be conſidered as a profeſſor inſtructing others in the ſcience he is compleatly maſter of, but as a learner ſeeking after an improvement of my own knowledge: therefore ſtrike into whatever turnings appear moſt likely to advance me forward on my way, and after having purſued them a while, ſometimes diſcover a neceſſity of returning back to take a fuller review of ſubjects I had conſidered before. This is at preſent my caſe with reſpect to Motives and that vivifying ingredient which gives them their vigour and activity, Satisfaction, which I thought to have diſmiſſed long ago, but now find myſelf unable to proceed further without taking them under examination afreſh. If I do not perform my work with the regularity I wiſh, yet as charity covers a multitude of ſins, ſo I hope an earneſt deſire of producing ſomething that carries the appearance of benefit, will cover a multitude of defects in the performance. But becauſe I would not neglect method where I can attain it, ſhall divide what I have next to offer under four general heads: the compoſition of motives, the ſeveral ſpecies of them, their pro-

production, and the cauſes introducing them to operate. We have obſerved before that motives, ſtrictly ſuch, are always ſomething actually preſent in the thought, but they uſually retain the name while remaining in the repoſitory of our ideas and not directly occurring to view; and I have diſtinguiſhed them by the figurative expreſſion of motives operating in the ſcale or lying dormant in the box. Under the firſt head I ſhall conſider them in their active ſtate, under the two next in their quieſcent, and the fourth will relate to their paſſage from the box into the ſcale.

2. By the compoſition of motives I mean the matter whereof they are made, which conſiſts of three principal parts: ſome action apprehended poſſible, ſome conſequence, perception or end to be attained, which we have heretofore ſtiled the Vehicle, and the ſatisfaction expected therein. Hence it appears that motives always contain a judgement of the action being poſſible, of its producing the effect, and of the ſatisfactorineſs of that effect.

Were you privately to unlock the doors of a priſon unknown to thoſe within, they would never try to get out ſo long as they remained perſuaded their endeavours would prove ineffectual. Indeed a bare poſſibility

of ſucceeding will often ſuffice to ſet us at work: you ſhall ſee men endeavouring to open doors that they believe to be made faſt, but then it is with an apprehenſion of ſome chance that they may find means of opening them. Sometimes impatience will raiſe a temporary perſuaſion, which the mind eagerly admits againſt evidence becauſe it ſooths her uneaſineſs for a moment; while this laſts, it will make men ſtrive to puſh through ſtone walls, but the inſtant it ſubſides they give over their efforts. Nor can you inſtance any one action of our lives wherein there is not a momentary apprehenſion, either well or ill grounded, either ſuggeſted by underſtanding or fancy, of ſomething we can do. This ſeems a ſtrong argument againſt Hartley's vibratiuncles, ſince in every exertion of our activity, there muſt be a perception in the mind of its efficacy. Or if his doctrine were true, it would be of moſt pernicious conſequence to prevail amongſt mankind: for were it poſſible once totally to baniſh all opinion of power, nobody would ever ſtir a finger to help themſelves. We ſee this now and then exemplified in perſons deeply affected with hypochondriac diſorders, who while they fancy themſelves under an utter inability of action, you can never bring them to move either

either hand or foot, until by ſome ſudden alarm or pungent ſmart you can diſſipate their ideas and turn imagination into her ordinary channels.

3. But the practicability of an action alone will not incite us to undertake it, for we have many ways wherein we might exert our power continually occurring to our thoughts, which yet we forbear to purſue: and when we do act, it is not meerly for the ſake of acting, but for ſome end conceived attainable thereby, which our judgement or our fancy recommends. And this end I take to be always ſome perception the mind deſires to have: if we put ſugar into our mouths, it is for the ſweetneſs of the taſte; if we aim at things uſefull, it is for the thought of having them in our poſſeſſion; if at things laudable, it is for the conſciouſneſs of having acted right. Even when we go abroad meerly upon being tired of ſitting, or while away the time in ſome trifling amuſement, it is either to remove the uneaſineſs of indolence, or for the ſenſation our exerciſe will give us, or for ſome engagement we expect to find in what we do. Nor can one well conceive a man to make any movement without a notion at the inſtant of ſomething to be effected thereby.

4. Neither will the idea of action and its event ſuffice without an expectance of ſatiſfaction in the attainment: for we purſue and reject the ſame things at times according as we find ourſelves in the humour. It is not barely the taſte nor the ſight nor the reflection of objects, but the ſatisfaction expected therein that urges us to purſue them: thoſe who have not a palate for ſweet things, will never be tempted by the ſweetneſs of ſugar, nor will a man take pains to obtain things uſefull, if he have no concern for the future, nor things laudable, if he have no reliſh in the conſciouſneſs of having performed them. But as we cannot procure ſatisfaction without the application of ſomething ſatisfactory, therefore other perceptions are regarded only as the vehicle neceſſary for conveyance, but that alone gives weight to the motive. If we ſearch throughout all the actions of men, we ſhall find them always preferring that wherein they for the preſent apprehend the greateſt ſatisfaction: even when they forego pleaſures, or ſubmit to pains, or undergo labours, they do it for the ſake of ſomething they conceive to be more ſatisfactory; and when they neglect the known greater good for ſome paltry appetite, it is becauſe they find more ſatisfaction in preſent gratification than in the proſpect of diſtant advantage.

Nor

Nor if we conſider the matter rightly, is this denied by thoſe who aſcribe the greateſt power of ſelf-moving to the mind: for tho' they contend for her having the privilege of annexing the idea of Beſt to whatever object ſhe pleaſes, yet they admit that this idea ſo annexed influences the active powers to purſue it.

5. For the moſt part we proceed upon ſome deſign more or leſs remote, and then our motive contains ſeveral ends of action one within another; underſtanding retaining the principal purpoſe in view, and imagination ſuggeſting the means from time to time in their proper order. Thus a motive appears to be a very complicated idea containing a variety of judgements together with the ſubjects whereon they are paſſed. Beſides this we cannot go on currently without ideal cauſes to conduct us on our way, nor inſtruments to aſſiſt us, of which we muſt have a competent idea or we ſhall miſtake in the uſe of them. But by long cuſtom and familiarity our compounds coaleſce into one idea, and ſo, as I may ſay, take up no more room in the mind than if they were ſingle and uniform: and by habituating ourſelves to fix our notice upon a variety of objects in the ſcenes paſſing before us, ſuch of them as may ſerve to prompt or

ſhape

ſhape our actions, occur at one glance and as it were in one complex; which gives us our readineſs and dexterity in all thoſe exerciſes of our powers to which we have been frequently accuſtomed.

CHAP. XVI.

Species of Motives.

Satisfaction is always one and the ſame in kind howmuchſoever it may vary in degree, for it is that ſtate the mind is thrown into upon the application of things agreable; and whatever poſſeſſes that quality in equal degree, whether meats and drinks or diverſion or gain or acquiſition of power or reflection on paſt performances, fills it with the ſame content and complacence: wherefore the various ſpecies of motives muſt be diſtinguiſhed by the variety of vehicles containing ſatisfaction.

Innumerable are the ways men find at different times to ſatisfy themſelves; to enumerate them all would be endleſs and needleſs: therefore I ſhall endeavour, what is uſually practiſed in ſuch caſes, to diſtinguiſh them into claſſes, and I think them reducible to theſe

theſe four, Pleaſure, Uſe, Honour and Neceſſity. For I cannot recollect anything we undertake unleſs it be either for ſome amuſement we hope to find in it, or for ſome ſervice we expect it will do us, or for the credit that will redound from it in the eſtimation of others or ourſelves, or becauſe compelled thereto by the urgency of our ſituation. Sometimes two or more of theſe join forces to move us, and ſometimes we have them all four in view at once: a man on beſpeaking a ſuit of cloaths, may do it becauſe his old ones are worn out and he muſt have ſomething to put upon his back, he may chooſe his piece of cloth for the cloſeneſs and ſtrength that will render it moſt ſerviceable, he directs the cut and make ſo as to appear faſhionable, and perhaps orders a dab of gold or ſilver lace to pleaſe his own fancy.

2. There is another diviſion running thro' all the claſſes abovementioned, which diſtinguiſhes them into motives of reaſon and motives of fancy: the one giving birth to our conſiderate and the other to our inadvertent actions. And both of theſe for the moſt part find room to operate without interrupting each other: when two perſons walk together to ſome place on buſineſs, they may ſwing their arms or whiſtle or diſcourſe or practiſe

ſome

ſome other little amuſement, which neither retards nor forwards them on their way. Nor are we ſcarce ever ſo totally engaged in the proſecution of any deſign as not to make many motions that do not directly tend to the furtherance of it. Or fancy may alter the ſhape of our actions without turning them aſide from their purpoſe: a man may go on tiptoe for a whim and make as much ſpeed that way for a while as he deſires, but when he finds it grow tireſome he will return to his ordinary gait.

Our larger undertakings contain many ends ſubordinate to one another and all conducive to the principal; each of which in turn wholly occupies the thought, but the principal all along lies dormant in the mind ready to operate as occaſion ſhall offer. Thus a traveller, going on a long journey, has the next baiting place for the object of his purſuit during every particular ſtage: but if anything happens ſuggeſting an alteration or addition to his plan, then the main purpoſe of his journey preſently occurs and weighs with him in his deliberations. Moſt of us have a few leading aims that ſhape the general courſe of our lives, ſuch as the attainment of ſome art or ſcience, advancement of our fortune, engagement to a profeſſion or favourite diverſion: and theſe branch out into diviſions which

which again contain inferior views; like the governors of provinces or generals of armies, who have their ſubaltern officers commanding the private men. In ſome perſons there is one predominant purpoſe, uſually ſtiled the ruling paſſion, as wealth, power or fame, that like Aaron's ſerpent ſwallows up all the reſt and will ſuffer nothing to weigh that does not co-incide with its intereſts.

3. We obſerved a little while ago how underſtanding and imagination influence each other: there are few of our purpoſes to be attained at a ſingle ſtroke, but judgement recommends the thing to be done, and the trains of imagination, or that habitual expertneſs we have acquired in works of the like nature, ſucceſſively ſuggeſts the means of performing it; which muſt be looked upon as ideal cauſes, having no ſatisfaction of their own, but taking a tincture of that belonging to the deſign they tend to promote.

On the other hand imagination often ſets underſtanding at work. How many people employ all their ſagacity and contrivance to compaſs ſome ſudden whim they take into their heads without ever conſidering whether it be worth the while! And indeed in our moſt prudent proceedings we generally ſet out on ſome motive ariſing involuntarily to our view: for when ſenſe, appetite or a train of reflection

reflection inſtigates to an undertaking, and nothing occurs to render the expedience of it doubtfull, what has underſtanding to do but concert proper meaſures for compleating it?

4. Wherefore as the motives depoſited in our imagination bear ſo great a ſway in our proceedings, it is well worth the pains to examine what kinds of them we are capable of, in order to ſtore up ſuch as may ſerve us beſt and moſt effectually: but this is no eaſy matter as well by reaſon of their ſmalneſs as of their obſcurity. The ſatisfactions urging to our by-motions, while attention fixes on ſomething elſe, are of the evaneſcent kind, as Hartley calls them, by an epithet taken from the mathematicians, who term thoſe angles evaneſcent that lie between a perpendicular and the foot of an hyperbola: yet theſe little angles are ſufficient to begin an opening between the two lines, and ſo are the little ſatisfactions ſufficient to produce ſudden and ſhort actions and afford us that complacence we feel in the common tranſactions of life. But there are other ſatisfactions, which tho' ſtrong enough of themſelves to ſtrike the eye, yet are covered from our ſight whenever we endeavour to look upon them by other objects intervening. When we attempt to recollect the inducements of our conduct, there commonly occurs, inſtead of them, ſpecious

cious reaſons ſerving to juſtify it to ourſelves or the world. How many people aſcribe their actions to diſintereſtedneſs or benevolence or virtue, when they were prompted by fear or reſentment or profit or reputation? They fancy themſelves poſſeſſed of thoſe motives, but really have no ſuch thing in their compoſition, or have them ſo feeble as never to weigh againſt any thing elſe lying in counterbalance. For it muſt be noted that when we reflect on our paſt behaviour, we have not in view before us that ſtate of mind we were actually in at the time of acting, which is gone and over, but its repreſentative idea; and our ideas being perpetually upon the float, leave room for another repreſentation to ſlip in, ſuch aims as bear an unfavourable aſpect hiding themſelves or taking ſhelter under others more reputable. Which renders it extremely difficult to diſcover what real motives we have belonging to us, without continually keeping a watchfull eye and fixing our attention upon them at the very inſtant of their operating.

5. The want of knowing what motives lie in the ſtorehouſe of imagination, has probably given riſe to the notion of an arbitrary power which ſome attribute to the Will: for being acquainted only with the motives of underſtanding and thoſe ſtrong inſtigations of paſſion

ſion which can eſcape nobody's obſervation, and yet finding that thoſe incitements do not operate with equal effect upon all occaſions, but ſometimes one prevails and ſometimes the other, they can aſſign no cauſe of the difference beſides an inherent authority in the Will to determine its own motions. But if one could diſcern all the various turns imagination is apt to take, it might not be difficult from thence to account for the turns of volition: and whenever the dictates of reaſon appear to act with more or leſs weight than was expected, one might always diſcover ſome ſecret inclination or wilfulneſs or perſuaſion or moral ſenſe at bottom that caſts the balance. Therefore I ſhall endeavour, as far as I am able, to trace out the minute and obſcure motives, as well as the more obſervable, when I come to conſider each of my four claſſes particularly.

CHAP. XVII.

Production of Motives.

FOR reaſons before given, it ſeems probable there is ſome particular organ or fibre, which I have called the ſpring, that affects us with ſatisfaction and uneaſineſs. Whether

Whether there be a ſeveral ſpring for either, or that one affects us differently according to its different motions, I ſhall not pretend to determine: but this ſpring never plays unleſs touched by ſome of thoſe organs which excite our other perceptions. Hence proceeds the neceſſity of a vehicle, becauſe we cannot obtain ſatisfaction without the miniſtry of ſome idea that ſhall prove ſatisfactory, nor fall under uneaſineſs without the feeling or thought of ſomething that ſhall render us uneaſy.

But in what manner ſoever our ideas operate either way, certain it is that nature in the formation of our bodies firſt gives them their reſpective qualities: for many ſenſations from our birth give us pain and others afford us pleaſure, and thoſe ſenſations are not of our own procuring, but excited in us by external objects wherewith volition has no concern. Therefore nature does not furniſh us with motives, which muſt be worked out by experience of what hurts or delights us: for we can have no inducement for action before we know what to chooſe or reject. Our ſenſes each of them reſpectively convey pleaſure from certain objects and pain from others, but thoſe ſenſations do not diſcover the means of procuring them, therefore they cannot generate a motive; which muſt ariſe from the remembrance of what exerciſes of

our power have uſed to bring the objects to our organs or to remove them. Even appetite, as given by nature, is no more than a pleaſing or irkſome feel according to the ſeveral degrees of its intenſeneſs, nor does it grow into deſire until we have learned what will ſatisfy it. One may obſerve that little children when uneaſy through hunger or ſleepineſs, do not know what is the matter with them, and are ſo far from being moved by appetite towards the gratification of it, that they fight againſt their victuals and other methods of relief when applied to them.

We have obſerved before that every motive contains a judgement, and that the firſt judgement we ever paſſed muſt preceed the firſt act we ever performed. How we attain this firſt judgement, whether by participation of the mother's ideas or by the mental organs being thrown mechanically into a modification that ſhall excite a perception of judgement, I am not able to explain: but thus much we may conclude for certain, that little children come into the world with a general notion of action, though they know very little how to apply their powers for particular purpoſes. When anything affects them with pleaſure or pain they put themſelves into violent agitations, throwing about their arms and legs and working with every muſcle

muſcle of their body: and at other times you ſee them very full of motion continually while awake. By thus perpetually exerting their powers they light upon ſuch motions as happen to relieve them in their wants or pleaſe them with the ſenſation they feel in the exerciſe: the idea of thoſe motions and their effect in time ſinking into their reflection, urges them to repeat the like upon other occaſions, and thus inſtructed by accident they gradually riſe to the more perfect management of their limbs and organs.

2. As motives have their foundation in the knowledge of things ſatisfactory or the contrary, of courſe they will follow the quality found in certain ſenſations of affecting us either way, and conſequently will depend upon that which gives them their reſpective qualities. Therefore many of our propenſities and averſions and our appetites may be termed natural although not innate; becauſe unavoidably faln into by experience of thoſe properties of affecting us which nature has given to ſeveral ſenſations. But the matter of our compoſition whereon our ſenſations depend being extremely ſoft and pliable, is ſuſceptible of change from alterations in the groſſer parts of our frame: therefore nature does not entirely preſerve the texture ſhe had given us originally, but in the growth of our

bodies brings other wheels of the machine to catch the ſpring of ſatisfaction. Children, boys, young men and old, have their different ſources of enjoyment, and it has been obſerved of our taſtes that they vary every ſeven years. Cuſtom likewiſe, commonly ſtiled a ſecond nature, varies the poſition of our mechaniſm ſo as to produce an affection from the ſame touches different from that they produced originally. What parts of our fleſh are tenderer at firſt than the ſoles of our feet? yet continual uſe brings them to be callous, and enables them to bear our weight without trouble. Bitters or tobacco offend the taſte or ſmell of thoſe who never tried them before; but uſe reconciles men to them, then renders them pleaſant, and afterwards indifferent again. Nor have particular accidents or the diſpoſitions of our body leſs effect to change the quality of objects: a ſurfeit will give an antipathy to things we were fond of before; a fever makes us nauſeate our ordinary food; fulneſs, emptineſs or drowſineſs, renders thoſe motions of our limbs irkſome that uſed to delight us. Nature has ſo conſtructed our muſcles that they remove from one ſpring to the other in the courſe of their play: after long ſitting we find our legs ſtiff, a few ſteps make their movement pleaſant, a long walk renders it laborious and a longer fatigues us.

The

The ſame is notorious with reſpect to the other ſenſes, wherein wearineſs takes the name of ſatiety: uncouth motions or ſenſations we find troubleſome, familiar ones generally agreable, but continued too long they become tireſome; whence comes the obſervation that variety makes the pleaſure of life. As the ſources of our enjoyment vary we quickly perceive it, and our motives vary accordingly: for thoſe objects we conceive in our preſent circumſtances agreable, move us to purſue them.

3. It may be preſumed that nature gives our mental organs an aptneſs to affect us agreably with their motion, though this quality cannot operate till there have been a competent number of trains worked in the imagination to give them play: for I think we may perceive an amuſement in every eaſy motion of our thoughts though upon matters indifferent, when they are not ſtrained by intenſe application, nor ſtopped by difficulties, nor run upon melancholy ſubjects; and ſo we may in every motion of our limbs and exerciſe of our ſenſes, unleſs prevented by ſome ſuch hindrances as thoſe above mentioned, or by the notice being drawn off upon ſomething elſe.

But imagination derives moſt of her affecting quality from ſenſation: for the firſt

ideas of reflection being only ſenſations repeated though in a fainter degree, they return with ſome portion of the ſatisfaction accompanying them at their firſt entrance. For the remembrance of paſt enjoyments generally fills us with delight, if it be not deſtroyed by another reflection of their being to be had no more; and this delight encreaſes upon the proſpect of their being repeated, for whatever we apprehend will pleaſe us when attained, gives actual pleaſure in the approach towards it. Which adds ſtrength to our motives or rather gives them their whole vigour, for preſent ſatisfaction being our conſtant purſuit, nothing remote could ever move us if it did not afford an immediate enjoyment in the expectation, or there were no uneaſineſs in the thought of miſſing it.

4. Thus far our motives may be ſtiled natural, for though nature does not directly infuſe them, ſhe ſupplies us with ſenſations that cannot fail to attract our notice, and thereby informs us what to chooſe and what to refuſe. But we receive a conſiderable acceſſion to our ſtock of motives from other ſources. Our ſituation and circumſtances in life and variety of accidents falling out, furniſh us with many; our intercourſe among mankind with many more, ſome of them thrown

thrown upon us deſignedly by education and inſtruction and others formed inſenſibly by cuſtom and example; ſome we fall into by habit without intending it, and others we work out for ourſelves by our own care and induſtry. But the principal ſupply of our ſtores comes from Tranſlation: upon which though perhaps I may not have a great deal to ſay, yet becauſe we ſhall find frequent occaſion to mention it hereafter, therefore I ſhall make a chapter of it by itſelf.

CHAP. XVIII.

TRANSLATION.

WE have taken notice in the chapter on judgement (§ 38) of the transferrable nature of aſſent, and how it paſſes from the premiſſes to the concluſion: I do not mean while we retain the whole proceſs of argumentation in view, for then aſſent does not adhere directly to the point concluded on, but only connects with it remotely by the intervening evidence. But daily experience teſtifies that conviction will often remain after the grounds of it have ſlipped out of our thought: whenever we reflect on the thing

proved, there occurs a judgement of its being true, united in the ſame aſſemblage without aid of any proof to ſupport it; and this many times after the proofs are ſo far gone out of our memory that we cannot poſſibly recall them. By this channel we are ſupplied with many truths commonly reputed ſelf evident, becauſe though we know them aſſuredly for truths, we cannot diſcover how we came by that knowledge. In like manner we have ſtore of propenſities generally eſteemed natural, becauſe we cannot readily trace them to any other origin than that quality of affecting us aſſigned by nature to certain ideas. But having ſhown how tranſlation prevails in ſatisfaction as well as aſſent, there will appear reaſon to conclude that we derive our inclinations and moral ſenſes through the ſame channel as our knowledge, without having them interwoven originally into our conſtitution.

As every motive contains an opinion of the object moving us being ſatisfactory, whatever appears conducive to procure it we muſt neceſſarily judge expedient: but this does not compleat the tranſlation, for there requires ſomething more to transfer ſatisfaction than aſſent. If a man wiſhes to ſee ſome fine houſe and gardens but the way lies along very dirty roads, the circumſtance of ſlouching through mire

mire does not immediately become a motive of action with him: but if he had frequent occaſion to ride along bad roads upon very deſirable errands, though he might never come to like the exerciſe, they would grow much more tolerable to him than he found them at firſt. For the perpetual tendency of meaſures to what will pleaſe us greatly, alters their quality of affecting us and in many caſes renders them pleaſant of themſelves: and when this happens they become motives, the tranſlation being perfectly made.

2. Imagination is not ſo ſcanty but that it can exhibit ſeveral objects to our notice at once, and this I may ſay in longitude as well as latitude, preſenting a chain of cauſes and effects lying beyond one another. As few of our deſires can be accompliſhed by a ſingle effort, there occurs together with the object of our wiſhes ſeveral means tending ſucceſſively to compaſs it; which means have no ſatisfaction of their own, but take a tincture from that whereto they conduce: under this proſpect the object lying at the end of the line only is our motive; but as whatever we apprehend will pleaſe gives actual pleaſure in the approach, therefore we purſue the intermediate ſteps for the ſatisfaction of that approach.

But

But the line of our purſuit frequently runs to a greater length than imagination has room to contain, and ſome of the means neceſſary to attain our end require our whole attention to compaſs them; in this caſe ſo much of the line as lies beyond thoſe means drops out of our thought for a time, but leaves that tincture of ſatisfaction it had given them behind: the means then become motives for the preſent, for our motive upon every occaſion is always that furtheſt point we have in view at the inſtant of acting; whatever inducements we might have had to fix upon that point are not motives while abſent from our thought. Thus if a man, being to ride a long journey, wants to buy a horſe which he does not know readily where to procure, the enquiries neceſſary to be made, and ſteps to be taken for that purpoſe, occupy him entirely until he has gotten one to his liking; all this while the acquiſition of a horſe actuates his motions, and he will aſſign that for his motive to anybody who ſhall aſk why he beſtirs himſelf, unleſs they recal another idea into his head by aſking further what he wants the horſe for. But theſe are only temporary motives which borrow ſatisfaction for a time from another hand and have it not of their own property, there-

therefore are not to be reckoned among our ſtock of motives repoſited in the ſtorehouſe.

But many times it happens that we find the ſame means conducive to our enjoyments of various kinds and upon repeated occaſions, which gives them the tincture ſo often that at laſt it becomes their natural colour: they then move us of themſelves, without needing any further inducement to recommend them; and then the tranſlation is perfectly compleated. Sometimes they receive their quality by one ſtrong impreſſion: a burnt child dreads the fire, and ſome perſons having received hurt by a ſword can never endure the ſight of one afterwards. But oftner the quality comes gradually by uſe: boys are driven by fear to their leſſons until they take a liking to them, and many find amuſement in profeſſions they firſt entred into much againſt the grain. Nor is it uncommon for this quality to adhere ſo ſtrongly that no change of circumſtances can diſengage it: old people retain a fondneſs for their youthfull ſports after they have loſt all ſenſation of pleaſure in the exerciſe; and your hard ſtudents continue to plod on without proſpect of any good to come of it and after it appears manifeſtly prejudicial to their health.

3. Tranſlation takes place ſolely in the mental organs, yet ſeems to bear ſome reſemblance

blance in the manner of it with thoſe changes made in our bodies by cuſtom. Sailors bring their hands to a hardneſs by continually handling the ropes, ſo that they loſe a great deal of the ſenſibility belonging to them. Nature perhaps at firſt deſigned us for quadrupeds, but the continual cares of our nurſes enure us to an erect poſture, ſo that we ſhould now find it extremely troubleſome to go upon all four. In theſe caſes there is an alteration made in the texture of our fleſh or diſpoſition of our muſcles, whereby the ſame motions and objects give us different ſenſations from what they formerly did. In like manner when inclination paſſes from the end to the means, though there be no change in the groſſer parts nor difference of ſenſation effected, yet we may ſuppoſe ſome variation in the poſture of our internal organs, thoſe which did not affect us at all before, being brought to faſten on the ſpring of ſatisfaction by frequent application thereto.

But in what manner ſoever tranſlation be effected, nobody can deny that we often acquire a liking to things from their having frequently promoted our other deſires, where no alteration in our muſcles or animal oeconomy can be ſuſpected. I need inſtance only in one very common propenſity, whoſe derivation from prior inclinations will not be con-

controverted. Every body will acknowledge that the value of money ariſes ſolely from the uſe of it: if we had not found it commanding the pleaſures and conveniences of life, we ſhould never have thought it worth our regard. Nature gave us no ſuch deſire, but we are forced to take pains in teaching children to be carefull, and thoſe with whom ſuch pains have proved unſucceſsfull cannot reſt till they get rid of their money, or as we ſay, it burns in their pockets. Nevertheleſs the continual experience we find of money ſupplying our wants and fancies gives it a general eſtimation among mankind, ſo that the deſire of gain becomes a powerfull motive of action. Few of us being ſuggeſted an acquiſition of fortune by ſome honeſt, creditable and eaſy method, but would feel an immediate pleaſure in the purſuit without looking forward to the many pretty things he could purchaſe: nor would he be thought a prudent man who ſhould heſitate to receive a ſum until he could find out ſome particular uſes whereto he might apply it. And in ſome perſons the love of riches riſes to ſuch an exorbitant pitch as to overwhelm all thoſe deſires which firſt made them valuable: a covetous man will deny himſelf the pleaſures, the conveniences, even the neceſſaries of life for the ſake of hoarding up his pelf, and

ſeems

ſeems to retain no other motive in his ſtorehouſe than that of dying worth a plumb. What ſhall we ſay then? is there a different ſtructure of parts between the miſer, the generous oeconomiſt, and the ſpendthrift? Their organs of ſenſation continue the ſame, there is no hardneſs of fleſh, no ſtiffneſs or flexibility of muſcles, in the one more than the other: but their imagination has received a different caſt, and the mental organs, exhibiting their ideas of reflection, been made to communicate differently with the ſpring of ſatisfaction. For though the niggard may poſſibly be prevailed on to do a generous deed once in his life, yet even then he feels a ſecret reluctance in parting with his caſh: which reluctance is involuntary, therefore forced upon him by the act of ſome other agent diſtinct from himſelf, for we may ſuppoſe he would give cheerfully if he could; but this agent can be none other than the internal and finer parts of his mechaniſm, which being differently connected affect him in a different manner from what they would another perſon.

One might produce many other inſtances to ſhow that our motives generate one another, that the children ſurvive after their parents are dead and forgotten, and ſometimes like the vipers brood deſtroy thoſe that gave

gave them birth. Many of theſe deſcendant motives gain the credit of being coeval with ourſelves, and that even among the conſiderate and ſtudious: they are currently reputed to have been, like Melchizedech, without father or mother, becauſe we find no mention in our records of any they had. But upon a ſtrict and impartial ſcrutiny it may be not impoſſible to trace out their origin, and perhaps make it appear that all the motives actuating us in our riper years, except ſenſations of pleaſure and pain or our natural and acquired appetites, are of the tranſlated kind. Through this channel we derive moſt of our taſtes, inclinations, ſentiments, moral ſenſes, checks of conſcience, obligations, impulſes of fancy, attachments to profeſſions, fondneſs for diverſions, regard to reputation, views of prudence, virtues and vices, and in general all thoſe purſuits whether of diſtant or preſent aims that render the occupations of men different from the amuſements of children.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

SYMPATHY.

THIS title may perhaps give occaſion to expect a diſſertation upon thoſe ſympathetic cures ſpoken of by Sir Kenelm Digby, who tells you that wounds have been healed by applying ſalves and plaiſters to the inſtrument that made them. Or of that ſimilitude ſuppoſed to be in the conſtitution of two perſons, ſo that any good or evil befalling one of them, ſhall inſtantly affect the other at a great diſtance by means of certain cognate effluvia paſſing to and fro between them. But I deal in no ſuch wonders, common experience is my guide, and that muſt have informed every body how much we continually ſympathize with the ſentiments and affections of the company among whom we converſe. As this quality contributes greatly to introduce our motives into act and by frequently introducing them to produce new ones, it ſeems properly to claim a place between thoſe two ſubjects.

2. We are not long in the world from our firſt entrance before we perceive that our pleaſures

pleaſures and pains depend much upon the actions of thoſe about us: on a little further progreſs we diſcover that their actions follow their diſpoſitions of mind, and afterwards learn to diſtinguiſh thoſe diſpoſitions by certain marks of them in their looks and geſtures. This makes children perpetually attentive to the motions and countenance of perſons into whoſe hands they fall: nor does there want another cauſe to render them more ſo, for having but few ſtores in their own imagination, they catch the ideas of other people to ſupply themſelves with employment. And in our advanced years we cannot well carry on any buſineſs or argument or enjoy the pleaſures of converſation without entring into the thoughts and notions of one another. When we arrive at the uſe of underſtanding, the judgement of others weighs with us as a juſt and natural evidence inducing us to judge accordingly, but we have ſeen how the judgement of expedience frequently reiterated transfers ſatisfactions upon the meaſures ſo conceived expedient: and we purpoſely imitate the ways and manners of our teachers or other perſons whom we eſteem more expert and knowing in any matter than ourſelves. Thus we acquire much of our ſympathy by inadvertent notice, and add more by deſign and induſtry: until cuſtom in both ways has

worked out trains wherein imagination learns to run involuntarily and mechanically. This appears moſt evident in compaſſion, for we cannot help ſympathizing with diſtreſs tho' we feel it painfull to ourſelves and know it can afford no relief to the party ſuffering.

3. But we catch our other affections too from the proſpect of them exhibited before us: a ſprightly countenance makes us cheerfull; and a face of melancholy damps our ſpirits; we purſue other people's hopes, and take alarm at their terrors; we grow to love things we perceive them fond of, and contract averſions from their diſlike. Nor is immediate ſenſation the only thing that can work this effect upon us; for we find the ſame produced by ſtories of accidents befalling perſons at a diſtance; we receive impreſſion from facts recorded in hiſtory and feel ourſelves affected with the affections of thoſe who have been dead a thouſand years ago. Nay we find ourſelves intereſted in imaginary ſcenes, partaking the pleaſures and pains of fictitious characters in a play or a novel. And as we take a tincture of the affections, ſo we imbibe the opinions and inſenſibly adopt the views of thoſe with whom we have continual intercourſe, which gives example the prevalence over precept and enables evil communications to corrupt good manners. Even ſenſation

tions may undergo a change by the effect we ſee them have upon others: we may get a reliſh to a diſh upon obſerving the company eat eagerly of it, and nauſeate a joint of meat becauſe ſomebody at table fancies it to have an unſavoury ſmell. How many people take their taſte of muſic from the applauſes of connoiſſeurs? How hideous does a once admired pattern of ſilk become in the ladies eyes upon being grown out of faſhion? What change do imbibed notions make in the ears of great ſcholars, as we have remarked in Chap. XIII, § 2; ſo that they cannot diſtinguiſh between a long ſound and a ſhort, a vowel and a conſonant? None can have avoided obſerving how apt we are to mimick the geſtures, fall into the habits, and copy the imperfections we ſee continually before us: and it has been obſerved a thouſand times that laughing and yawning generally go round the company. We participate in ſome meaſure the ideas of all men, but more with thoſe of whom we have a good opinion or frequent converſe than with ſtrangers: for the judgement of the former carries greater weight upon us for our eſtimation of their perſons, and that of the latter makes up by repetition for what it wanted in ſtrength.

4. But were we to give a full latitude to ſympathy, we ſhould whiffle about with eve-

ry wind nor could ever keep ſteddy to one tenour of conduct, becauſe we ſhould perpetually meet with ſomebody or other leading us by their example to ſwerve from it. This teaches us a reſerve and caution againſt taking impreſſions too haſtily, and confines our propenſity to imitation within due bounds. Yet where there are not urgent reaſons to the contrary I do not ſee why we may not let ſympathy take its courſe, as it gives an eaſier flow to our thoughts, renders us more ſociable, and aſſiſts us in making many improvements.

There are ſome who carry this reſerve to extremities, ſo far as to throw their mind into a diſpoſition contrary to that they ſee exhibited: This temper whoever pleaſes may call Antipathy, as being the oppoſite to Sympathy. It generally takes its riſe or terminates in ill nature, rendring the poſſeſſors moroſe, contemptuous and intractable: they repine at others ſucceſſes, and rejoice at the ſight of diſappointment; if you talk ſeriouſly to them they fall to joking, and if you would make them merry they put on a more than ordinary ſolemnity of countenance. There are thoſe who affect this contrariety of humour towards mankind in general, but it is more uſually practiſed with reſpect only to ſuch againſt whom we have conceived ſome

great prejudice. And indeed if ever allowable, it is ſo when we fall under a neceſſity of conſorting with perſons of whoſe errors or evil principles we have juſt cauſe for ſuſpicion, to prevent our taking contagion from them. Yet ſome ſituations render us all ſo unapt for imitation that we rather take diſguſt at the expreſſion of affections not tallying with our own: in our ſeaſons of jollity we cannot endure a melancholy aſpect, and when under affliction any levity diſturbs us. But this proceeds rather from the force of ſympathy than otherwiſe, for that perpetually urges the mind to aſſimilate her trains to patterns ſhe cannot follow under her preſent circumſtances.

CHAP. XX.

Introduction of Motives.

Sensation firſt moves us to action in order to continue it if pleaſant or remove it if painfull: thus the taſte of victuals urges children to take more of them into their mouths, and the ſmart of a pin to catch away their hands from it. When they have gotten competent ſtores of reflection, theſe too affect

them in like manner with ſenſation and ſometimes overpower it: for you may draw off a child's notice from any little pain or craving of appetite by diverting it with playthings. As imagination becomes worked into trains, the notice, being put into one by ſome particular object, will run on to other ideas very different from thoſe the object exhibited. Nor does imagination fail to ſuggeſt fancies of her own motion without any object to introduce them; of what kind they ſhall be depends greatly upon conſtitution, the preſent ſtate of our animal ſpirits or diſpoſition of mind, inclining us either to ſeriouſneſs or gaiety, buſineſs or diverſion. Habits too attract the notice to follow them inadvertently by that eaſe there is in giving way to the little tranſient deſires they preſent rather than reſtraining them. And when experience has brought us acquainted with the properties of things external, and the command we have over the ideas of our mind, which knowledge gives us the uſe of our underſtanding, we can then procure motives for ourſelves; either by application of ſuch objects as will raiſe any particular deſire, or by putting reflection upon the hunt for ſomething that will pleaſe us, or ſuggeſting inducements to ſtrengthen us in our purpoſe, or by

by reſolution to baniſh ſome intruding ideas and fix our whole attention upon others.

2. Thus there are three cauſes contributing to introduce motives into the ſcale: the action of the mind, impulſe of external objects, and mechanical play of our organs; and theſe three mutually influence one another. The mind operates two ways, either by deſign or inadvertently: for when ſhe turns her notice upon an idea, tho' with no other view than for the preſent amuſement it affords, this occaſions it to lead in a train of its aſſociates, and often awakens a deſire that would have lain dormant without ſuch attention. Therefore if we have any hurtfull inclination belonging to us, it is very dangerous to let our thoughts run upon objects relative thereto; for we may raiſe a diſturber we did not expect nor can quiet again whenever we pleaſe: and perhaps deſire ſcarce ever riſes to any high pitch unleſs aſſiſted by ſome action of the mind tending to foment it. But when the mind acts with deſign, nevertheleſs ſhe has that deſign ſuggeſted by ſomething happening to her from without or by the ſpontaneous working of imagination; to which ſources ſhe muſt have recourſe in ſearch for motives of her conduct or gathering encouragements to ſupport her in an undertaking. Even in the moſt arbitrary exerciſes of her

power, as when ſhe endeavours to attain her purpoſe by dint of reſolution, ſhe uſes ſome inſtrument to do her work. A man that holds his hand near a roaſting fire muſt have ſome reaſon for ſo doing, either to cure a burn under the notion of fire driving out fire, or to try how long he can hold it there, or for ſome other purpoſe which appears ſatisfactory at the time or elſe it would never have put him upon the attempt: this ſatisfactory purpoſe then he ſtrives to retain in full vigour without ſuffering it to fluctuate or fade, and withdraws his notice from that uneaſineſs the ſmart of the fire would throw upon him. Herein he acts upon the mental eye much in the ſame manner as we do upon the bodily, when we wink againſt a glaring light or ſtretch our nerves to obſerve ſome obſcure object that cannot be diſcerned without ſtraining: or as we do upon the organs of hearing, when of two perſons talking to us at once we diſregard the one and attend wholly to the other. And in all caſes of reſolution we may perceive the like method practiſed: we do not annex the idea of Beſt to what had it not before, but among oppoſite ſubjects whereto that idea is already annexed, we hold one under contemplation and exclude the reſt or ſtrengthen it with other conſiderations from whence that idea may be transferred.

Things

Things external are made to operate upon us either by natural cauſes, or the ſituation we ſtand in, or the company we conſort with: but what effect they ſhall produce in us depends greatly upon the caſt of our imagination. For we have obſerved before that the ſame objects affect people variouſly, exciting different judgements and ſuggeſting different motives in one from what they do in another; nor does the mind want a power many times of applying or removing objects, and of encreaſing or diminiſhing in ſome meaſure the impreſſion of thoſe before her by an operation upon her organs.

In like manner the ſpontaneous courſes of our ideas, although depending chiefly upon habit and running into thoſe trains of thought to which we have been accuſtomed, yet may be diverted by objects occurring, or drawn aſide by the force of ſympathy, or controuled by the power of the mind ſo as to take another track than they would have followed of their own accord.

3. If we examine our proceedings carefully, we ſhall find in all of them a mixture of volition and machinery, and perhaps the latter bearing a greater ſhare than the former. We never enter upon an undertaking without ſome purpoſe ſtarting up in our thoughts, or recommended by the preſent occaſion as expedient

pedient or agreable; we chooſe the meaſures for accompliſhing it from among the ſtores preſented by our underſtanding; and though we perform the work by our own activity, yet our manner of proceeding is ſuch as former practice has made ready to us, and the minute ſteps neceſſary for compleating it riſe mechanically in our imagination. Our latent motives, which bear ſo great a ſway in the behaviour of moſt men, cannot owe their appearance to the mind, becauſe they eſcape her obſervation when ſhe would diſcover them: and our minute motives prompting us to inadvertent actions, which are far more numerous than commonly ſuppoſed, muſt take riſe from ſome other ſpring, becauſe the mind perceives them not the moment before they operate nor remembers them the moment after. Nor are the groſſer parts of our machine without their influence upon our actions: the natural temperament of our conſtitution, the accidental condition of our humours, the briſk or ſlow circulation of our animal ſpirits, the circumſtances of health or ſickneſs, freſhneſs or wearineſs, fulneſs or emptineſs, render the mind alert or unapt for exerciſe, turn imagination into different trains, excite deſires of various kinds, and in great meaſure model the ſhape of our behaviour.

4. What

4. What is the particular ſtructure of our machine, how the ſeveral parts of it communicate, or in what manner they operate upon one another, we cannot pretend to deſcribe, and therefore muſt expreſs ourſelves by figures. Sometimes we talk of characters imprinted or traces engraven in the memory, ſometimes of roads and tracks worn in the imagination, of weights hanging in the balance, ſprings impelling to action, wheels reſembling thoſe of clock-work, images ſtriking upon the mental eye, or ſtreams and currents running in various channels. Thoſe expreſſions, if intended for a phyſical account of our interiour frame, could not all be admitted, as being inconſiſtent with one another: but when we ſpeak figuratively of a matter we cannot deſcribe directly, we may vary our images without inconſiſtency, for the ſame will not anſwer in every caſe, therefore it is allowable to take any that ſhall afford the greateſt reſemblance according to the preſent occaſion for which we want to apply it.

But if we may gueſs at the internal texture of our machine by the groſſer parts of it diſcoverable upon diſſection, they will lead us to imagine that our ideas are conveyed by a multitude of little tubes affecting us variouſly according to the motions excited in them or according

cording to the courſes of ſome ſubtile fluid they contain: or ſhould we, with Doctor Hartley, ſuppoſe the nerves to be ſolid capilaments and the buſineſs performed by an ether ſurrounding them on the outſide, this will amount to the ſame thing; becauſe a number of theſe ſmall ſtrings placed cloſe together will form tubes of the interſtices between them, which may ſerve as channels for the foreſaid ether to paſs along. Therefore if I were to compare the human machine to any of our contrivances of art, I ſhould chooſe for my foundation a large Organ; wherein the bellows anſwer to the animal circulation, the pipes to the organs of ſenſation and reflection, and the organiſt to the mind. But the organiſt here does not make all the muſic: for the pipes are ſo contrived as to ſound with the ſtriking of things external upon them, or by the meer working of the bellows, which plays as it were by clockwork without a blower. Yet is this but an imperfect repreſentation of the natural machine: to make our compariſon more compleat we muſt ſuppoſe other ſets of pipes for conveying objects of the other ſenſes; beſides innumerable ſmaller ones returning an echo to the larger and new modulating the ſounds or lights received from them, which ſupplies us with our ideas of reflection. Theſe little veſſels

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are ſo ſoft and flexible that they will change their form and run into various contextures with one another, whereon depend our inclinations and ſtores of knowledge: for as a pipe will give a different ſound according to the length or other dimenſions it conſiſts of, ſo objects affect us differently according to the diſpoſition of the channels through which they paſs. Nor muſt we omit the many conveyances neceſſary for diſtributing the alimentary juices, which ſerve like oil to moiſten and ſupple the works or to repair the waſte made by continual uſe. Add to this a multitude of other pipes which dilate and ſhorten upon inflation and thereby draw certain ſtrings faſtened to their extremities: from whence proceeds muſcular motion and the power of acting upon the ſeveral parts of our machine as well the groſſer as the finer. And all this infinite variety of works, ſo complicated with one another and yet ſo exactly diſpoſed as not to interfere with each other in their play, Nature has ſtowed within the narrow compaſs of a human body: which if an artiſt were to endeavour to imitate by conſtructing an engine that ſhould perform thoſe few of the human movements that art can imitate, it would require an immenſe fabric to contain every thing neceſſary for executing his purpoſe. But the moſt wonderfull circumſtance

ſtance of all is, that our organiſt ſits in utter darkneſs with reſpect to the neareſt parts of his inſtrument which are to be the immediate ſubjects of his action, having no notice of anything but what comes to him through his pipes: he knows not the ſituation of his keys, on which hand lies the baſe or the treble, nevertheleſs after a competent practice in his trade he acquires ſuch an unaccountable expertneſs that he never touches the wrong key, but takes his meaſures exactly without perceiving what they are, and upon an idea only of ſome remote conſequence they will produce.

5. Since there is ſo cloſe a connection between the parts of our machine acted upon by the mind and thoſe moved by the animal circulation, it follows that each muſt have an influence upon the other. Our vital ſpirits, according as they ſtand diſpoſed, force a particular kind of ideas upon the mind, and the latter in every exertion of her power cauſes an alteration in the courſes of the former: ſometimes deſignedly, but oftner as a natural conſequence of ſomething elſe ſhe intends. He that runs means only to arrive the ſooner at the place whither he would go, but beſides this he quickens his pulſe, heats his fleſh and puts himſelf out of breath, effects which he did not think of nor perhaps ſhould have

have enſued had it been at his option to have helped them. The like happens on other exerciſes of our activity, which propagate a motion to the ſeveral parts of our body correſponding reſpectively with the organs employed in thoſe exerciſes; and theſe parts, by frequently receiving ſuch motions, become diſpoſed to fall into them again mechanically or upon the ſlighteſt touch, and thereby excite the ſame ideas that generated them. From hence ariſe our habits, which though learned at firſt by ſingle but perhaps inadvertent acts of the mind, yet recur upon us afterwards involuntarily. Hence likewiſe ſpring the paſſions, which I take to be only a ſtronger ſort of habits acquired early in our childhood, when the matter of our compoſition being tender and pliable may be worked eaſily into new channels wherein the animal ſpirits may flow more copiouſly. For I do not imagine that nature gave us paſſions, ſhe may indeed have made each man more ſuſceptible of one ſort than another, but they are brought into form by the action of the mind bending her notice continually to particular ſets of objects. Juſt as nature may have prepared one man for a dancer by giving him ſtrength and ſuppleneſs in his joints, or another for a ſinger by giving him a clear and

ſonorous

ſonorous voice: but tis art and practice that inveſt them with the reſpective faculties of dancing or ſinging.

CHAP. XXI.

PASSIONS.

WE have taken notice that children on their firſt entrance into the world have a general notion of action, though they know not in what manner to apply it: therefore when anything affects them ſtrongly, they ſtrain every nerve and exert all their little powers of motion. But as they grow acquainted with the uſes of thoſe powers, they confine their efforts to ſome particular quarter: yet their knowledge for a long while being very imperfect, they ſtill employ more exertion than neceſſary, ſtriving to attain that by vehemence which they want ſkill to accompliſh by management. Theſe efforts made upon the organs of reflection as well as thoſe of motion, being frequently repeated upon the ſame parts, widen the paſſages communicating with the vital circulation, which thereby more readily admit the animal

mal ſpirits and take in a [illegible] they were capable of in [illegible] Whence proceeds the [illegible] of paſſion, which will [illegible] to enter the mind beſides [illegible] caſt, nor can be put out [illegible] the ferment ſubſides or [illegible] is no room to doubt [illegible] being concerned, when we [illegible] generally viſible upon the [illegible] and the countenance. [illegible] work out the paſſions by our [illegible] not indeed with a deliberate [illegible] infant mind is ſcarce capable [illegible] when ſhe lays the foundation [illegible] by that inadvertent notice [illegible] upon ſtriking objects.

The paſſions ſeem to [illegible] provinces in the ſeveral [illegible] what alterations they [illegible] it belongs to the painter, [illegible] anatomiſt to aſcertain, [illegible] give the mental organs [illegible] for whatever, as lying [illegible] any ſcience yet attained [illegible] So there remains only [illegible] what ideas give riſe to [illegible] hang upon the mind during [illegible] nor ſhall I attempt a [illegible]

upon them all, but offer ſuch few obſervations as may occur concerning the principal.

2. Immediate ſatisfaction being the point that conſtantly attracts our notice and gives influence to all our other ideas, we muſt look there as the moſt likely place to find the ſource of our paſſions. Whatever preſent action in our power promiſes ſatisfaction prompts the mind to purſue it, and this ſtate of mind we call deſire: for I take deſire to be nothing elſe but the proſpect of ſome agreable perception, together with ſome preſent act apprehended productive thereof: this therefore is the ſpring that begins to ſet us in motion and actuates us inceſſantly in every exerciſe of our powers, for we never ſtir a fibre but for the ſake of ſomething we deſire to have produced thereby; and Mr. Locke declares himſelf of the ſame opinion, where he ſays deſire is always the thing that determines the Will. But this common deſire is not a paſſion being too gentle to deſerve that name: otherwiſe we could never poſſeſs our minds in tranquillity, becauſe there is ſcarce a moment in our waking hours wherein we are not urged to ſomething either momentous or trifling. But when the purpoſe we aim at does not enſue upon our firſt endeavours, the mind redoubles her efforts under an apprehenſion that a ſtronger exertion may ſuc-

ſucceed where a weaker did not: for it has been commonly remarked that difficulties lying in the way of deſire, like water thrown upon coals, if not enough to extinguiſh it make it burn with a fiercer flame. After having frequently practiſed exertions of this ſort, the ſpirits get a habit of riſing in a ferment, which will let no other idea intrude beſides that of the engaging object; and then deſire takes the form of a paſſion. I know that ſtrong ſenſations and cravings of appetite will raiſe violent commotions in the earlieſt times of life before any habit can be acquired: but ſenſe and appetite have always been diſtinguiſhed from paſſion, wherein the organs of reflection bear a principal ſhare, and ideas hang longer and make deeper impreſſion upon the mind than ſenſation could have enabled them to do, which additional force they muſt have derived from habit.

But an objection may be ſtarted againſt my making the proſpect of means tending towards an attainable ſatisfaction to conſtitute deſire, becauſe it is very well known that men too often ſet their hearts upon things they ſee no poſſibility of obtaining. This I acknowledge to be fact, nevertheleſs even in theſe caſes there is ſomething the mind apprehends to be feaſible: for when the object of deſire lies

any thing remote, every ſtep leading to it, nay the very thought of an approach towards it, ſooths the mind with a momentary ſatisfaction, which thought may be in our power tho' the object itſelf confeſſedly is not: for we have ſeen that perſuaſion does not always follow conviction, and as by reading a poem or a novel, ſo by an operation upon our mental organs, we may ſometimes raiſe a temporary perſuaſion of things we know to be falſe. Beſides, the holding an object in our thoughts is one means towards attaining it, becauſe that may ſuggeſt expedients which did not preſently occur, and becauſe the ſtrength of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a ſtronger exertion of our powers. Theſe cauſes I conceive make people dwell upon whatever appears with an engaging aſpect, and keeps them ſtill hankering after things they have found unattainable. For preſent ſatisfaction being the point continually in view, they flatter themſelves with a fond imagination of making advances towards the obtaining of their wiſhes where underſtanding can give them no ſuch proſpect, overlooking that diſappointment which muſt neceſſarily enſue. The mind has a ſtrange knack of deceiving herſelf with reſpect to the ſucceſs of her meaſures, when the taking them promiſes ſome little amuſement for the next ſucceeding moment.

moment. If the idea of ſomething attainable were not part of the eſſence of deſire, there would be no difference between deſire and the contemplation of any thing agreable, which is contrary to experience. I ſuppoſe moſt of us would think it very agreable to fly about in the air like a ſtork or an eagle; methinks it would be mighty pretty to glide along with ſuch an eaſy motion, to tranſport ourſelves ſuddenly from place to place, to ſoar in the upper regions having an extenſive proſpect of lands and ſeas below and varying our ſcenes at pleaſure; yet we never fix our deſires upon ſuch amuſement, but what hinders us, unleſs that we cannot raiſe even a deluſive imagination of any thing practicable towards the attainment of it? But ſhould ſome Dedalus invent a plauſible ſcheme for making wings, we ſhould probably find ourſelves very deſirous of having a pair tho' we ſold our coaches for the purchaſe: and if after many fruitleſs attempts we were convinced the thing was impracticable, we might ſtill continue to ruminate upon it for a time and pleaſe ourſelves with hunting after better expedients upon a bare poſſibility tho' without any hope of finding them.

3. All that has been ſaid above concerning ſatisfaction may be applied with a little alteration to uneaſineſs, which urges us to fly

from it in the ſame manner as the other attracts us towards it. Wherefore the ſchoolmen reckon another paſſion oppoſite to deſire, which they call Flight or Avoidance, and has ſome impending evil for its object: but ſince whatever appears hurtfull we always deſire to avoid, ſince the very eſcape from miſchief affords a ſenſible ſatisfaction, and ſince nature has ſo befriended us that we never want for amuſement whenever we can keep clear of all diſagreable perceptions, there ſeems little need of diſtinguiſhing between the avoidance of evil and deſire of good, the latter being always implied in the former: and the leſs becauſe it would require ſome nicety and labour of thought to make ſuch diſtinction.

But there is another diſtinction which though ſomewhat nice, we have found occaſion to take notice of before and may find the like again hereafter, I mean, the making want a ſeparate ſpecies of deſire. For when the mind is moved by ſome object and exerts herſelf ſtrenuouſly in ſearching for ſome means of advancing towards it, but none offer or ſuch only as appear ineffectual upon their preſenting themſelves, this ſtate of mind I call Want: and may be compared to the gnawings of an empty ſtomach whoſe ſides grind againſt one another as having nothing to work

work upon. Therefore genuine deſire finding continual iſſue for its efforts proves the ſource of all our enjoyments, but want always torments us with uneaſineſs. Whenever incompatible deſires aſſail us together one of them at leaſt muſt degenerate into want, if it ſtill continue to ſollicit and be not quite overwhelmed by its antagoniſt wholly engroſſing our attention. But though want throws the mind into ſuch a diſagreable ſituation, yet it may be expedient to endure it ſometimes for the ſake of a greater future advantage: for many very uſefull deſires not vigorous enough at firſt to ſurmount all oppoſition and therefore meeting with continual diſappointment, yet by being ſtill kept alive and put often to ſtruggle with a ſuperior adverſary, may in time acquire ſtrength to overthrow him. Content I take to be nothing elſe but the privation of want, which though indifferent in itſelf yet a contented ſtate is always a happy ſtate in conſequence, becauſe as obſerved juſt now we never fail of finding matter for amuſement whenever we can keep clear of all diſagreable perceptions.

4. Deſire, as we learn from Mr. Locke, obtains a place in all the other paſſions, and we may ſay they are only deſire under ſo many different forms. As this derives its ori-

ginal from the expectance of ſatisfaction to come, ſo the actual poſſeſſion of ſatisfaction throws the mind into a ſtate of enjoyment. But poſſeſſion does not always put an end to deſire but many times excites it, putting the mind upon ſtretching her mental optics to obtain a ſtronger view of the object that pleaſes her, and upon opening the paſſages of the animal ſpirits to admit a larger current that may heighten and prolong the delightfull ſenſation: when this is done with any conſiderable degree of exertion it produces the paſſion of joy. I think we may pronounce the province of this paſſion extends over the whole ſyſtem of veſſels concerned in exhibiting ideas or performing voluntary motion, and that it quickens the circulation of ſpirits throughout all their paſſages in general, whereas ſome other paſſions pour them more copiouſly upon particular quarters: for we find people very briſk and active in ſeaſons of joy, breaking out continually into wanton and extravagant ſallies unleſs reſtrained by decency and reflection. Sometimes Joy has been known to riſe ſo high as to produce great diſorders in the body and even extinguiſh life, too great a redundancy of ſpirits cauſing ſuffocation, like a ſtrong wind blowing againſt one's mouth and noſtrils which hinders the play of our lungs: but

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theſe tranſports rarely happen, nor perhaps ever unleſs when the channels have been emptied before by ſome oppoſite ſtagnating paſſion, as grief or fear or want. The ſight of an only child given over for loſt, a pardon brought to a malefactor under the gallows, or a ſum of money poured into the lap of a man in utmoſt diſtreſs, may have proved fatal: but then the pleaſure comes accompanied with an idea of deliverance from ſomething very irkſome before, which gives it a double force. As joy introduces a pleaſurable ſituation of mind, it would deſerve encouraging whenever we could, if it were not for ſome pernicious conſequences attending it: for it confines our views within the preſent to the neglect of our future intereſts, it diſturbs the operation of reaſon, ſhutting our eyes againſt the lights ſhe would offer and turning a deaf ear againſt her remonſtrances; for the mind, perfectly ſatisfied with her preſent condition, cares for nothing elſe but rejects every other idea that might interrupt or abate her enjoyment.

5. As the expectance of ſatisfaction dependent upon our endeavours to procure it cauſes deſire, ſo the like expectance from external cauſes when no endeavours of our own appear neceſſary gives birth to Hope. Tis true we often find it incumbent upon us to do

do ſomething ourſelves for accompliſhing our hopes, but then ſo far as our own activity extends belongs to deſire, hope relates only to that ſucceſs of our meaſures which is not in our power: for no man is ſaid to hope that his hunger will be appeaſed by eating when he has victuals ſet before him and there is nothing requiſite beſides his own act to aſſwage his cravings. It is commonly reckoned that hope muſt contain a mixture of fear, and perhaps this is generally the caſe conſidering the uncertainty of events for the moſt part: but ſometimes we have the proſpect of a diſtant good to befall us without any doubt of its arrival, and I know not what better name than hope can be given to this ſituation of mind; therefore ſee no impropriety in the expreſſion of a ſure and certain hope. I am not quite ſatisfied that hope ought to be ranked among the paſſions, as being gentle in its own nature and never raiſing emotions unleſs by means of other paſſions generated from it. For as a man reckons the reverſion of an eſtate among his valuable effects and eſteems the gaining a title to ſuch reverſion an acceſſion of fortune, ſo the aſſurance of future good affords a preſent pleaſure: and if the mind exults in the contemplation of that pleaſure or feels an extraordinary flow of ſpirits ariſe upon it, this

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we may call a ſpecies of joy. On the other hand if the promiſe of diſtant enjoyment does not inſtantly ſatisfy, but begets an eager impatience of poſſeſſing it before the time, then Hope aſſumes the form of Want.

6. The old philoſophers, as we may gather from Cicero, could not ſettle among themſelves whether to define anger a fervour of mind or a deſire of revenge; which ſeems to me juſt as wiſe a diſpute as if they had contended whether Chryſippus were an animal or a man, the one being implied within the other and differing no otherwiſe than as genus and ſpecies: for cuſtom has appropriated the name of Anger to that particular fervour ariſing in the mind upon thought of a ſuppoſed injury. But there are fervours occaſioned by other cauſes; any preſſing pain or uneaſineſs ſets the mind a ſtruggling to throw it off, and difficulties not apprehended unſurmountable ſtir up an earneſtneſs of reſolution to maſter them: therefore it is common when we ſee people go about anything in a great hurry and flutter, to admoniſh them not to put themſelves in a paſſion. And I conceive it is this view of difficulty that gives riſe to the violence of anger, for as the party upon whom we would wreak vengeance will naturally oppoſe it with all his might, a more than ordinary exertion becomes

comes neceſſary in order to ſurmount that oppoſition; and the mind, having found this to be conſtantly the caſe, gets a habit of eagerneſs and vehemence in everything ſhe does either tending or preparatory to revenge. Whatever may be thought of other paſſions this cannot be born with us, for there are ſeveral things to be learned before we come to the idea of anger: nature makes us concerned originally only with our own pleaſures or pains, we feel not and conſequently regard not what happens to other people, until having received hurt from them and found that our retaliating the like prevails upon them to deſiſt from offending us, we thence learn the expedience of exerting ourſelves upon ſuch occaſions. Thus the deſire of revenge is not a natural but a tranſlated deſire, we firſt look upon it as a means of procuring eaſe to ourſelves and ſecurity from injury, but having often beheld it in this light, the end at length drops out of ſight, and deſire according to the uſual proceſs of tranſlation, reſts upon the means, which thenceforward become an end whereon our views will terminate. We may reckon at leaſt four ſtages in our progreſs to the paſſion of anger: our experience of damage brought upon us by others, of our power to give them diſpleaſure, of the effects of ſuch diſ-

pleaſure

pleaſure to make them alter their meaſures, and of the oppoſition we muſt expect againſt the exerciſe of that power. But having by theſe gradations once brought ſatisfaction to connect immediately with revenge, it becomes a motive of action which we purſue many times by ways not at all conducive to the end that firſt rendred it recommendable. For men ſometimes vent their wrath upon inanimate beings although incapable of puniſhment or of mending their manners thereupon: and in violent tranſports of rage beat their heads againſt a wall or otherwiſe puniſh themſelves, thereby bringing on that hurt which it was originally the purpoſe of anger to remove. Though anger raiſes a mighty flood of ſpirits, it does not like joy diffuſe them equally throughout the whole ſyſtem, but forces them in torrents upon the veſſels concerned in action, producing ſudden violent ſtarts of motion, ſpreading a heat to the outward parts, and ſhowing more apparent ſigns of diſorder than any other paſſion: for which reaſon I ſuppoſe it has generally engroſſed the name from the reſt, for when we call a man paſſionate we mean that he is prone to take offence and quick to reſent, not that he is apt to fear or hope or grieve or fall into any other emotion. We may ſafely rank this among the uneaſy paſ-

ſions,

of that ſpecies we
genuine deſire: for
been ſaid that revenge
does not come until
having been glutted; but
bilities, how ſtrong aſſurance
of ſucceeding, there al-
reitleſs impatience which like
hunger never ceaſes to torment
removed.

When danger threatens and appears
or the means of avoiding it do not
diſcover themſelves; this fills the mind
fear, which proceeds upon two views;
collecting a fund of ſpirits to be ready
when any method of deliverance ſhall
offer, the other of benumbing or deadening
the notice ſo that when the miſchief comes
it may affect us the leſs ſenſibly: both which
are effected by the ſame means, to wit,
withdrawing the animal ſpirits from the or-
gans of reflection and motion; becauſe the
ſtrength of our perceptions and vigour of our
actions depending upon the quantity of ſpirits
employed therein, if we can withold them
from flowing upon the mental organs we
ſcarce feel the pungency of evil befalling us,
and if we forbear to ſpend them in fruitleſs
endeavours we ſhall have the greater ſupply
ready to ſerve us when they may prove effec-
tual.

tual. Therefore fear overwhelms with confuſion, and though people will ſtare wiſtfully at a frightfull object, they diſcern little of what they ſtare at, their ideas being duller than uſual: and if the terror riſe to a very high degree it totally ſtupifies the ſenſes and cauſes a fainting. Fear is obſerved to chill the limbs crowding the whole maſs of blood upon the heart, and as the vital ſpirits have their circulation too we may preſume it gathers them all to ſome veſſel which performs the ſame office with reſpect to them as the heart does to the blood. But that there is a mighty fund of ſpirits collected ſomewhere, appears manifeſt from the uncommon force they operate with when breaking forth into action. Fear adds wings to our ſpeed, none fight ſo furiouſly as cowards driven to deſpair, and people in a fright have been known to exert double the ſtrength they could muſter up at other times with their utmoſt reſolution. I have been credibly informed of a man ſo lame with the gout that he could ſtir neither hand nor foot, who on hearing a ſudden outcry of fire in the next houſe, ſtarted up out of bed and ran to the window; but upon finding the danger over, his ſtrength immediately left him and he was forced to be carried back again. Children and other animals ſhow no ſigns of fear at

their

their firſt coming into life, nor can they be ſuppoſed capable of any before they have an apprehenſion of danger, which muſt come by experience of things hurtfull: indeed they learn very ſoon to take fright at hideous objects, but then it is not till they can diſcern the difference between them and others whereto they have been ſome time familiarized.

8. Shame ſeems to be a ſpecies of fear, having for its object the evil of diſgrace: like other fears it fills with confuſion and darkens the ideas; it operates rather by deadening the notice than collecting ſpirits for future exertion, therefore ſeems to be occupied chiefly in driving them from the organs of reflection whoſe ſeat probably lies in the head, and diſcharging them upon the next adjacent parts, which may account for the bluſhings wherewith it overſpreads the countenance. Shame indeed often proves a powerful incentive to action, but at ſuch times it takes the form of deſire, urging us to do ſomething either for reinſtating ourſelves in credit again, which we look upon as an attainable good, or for preventing the cenſure that might otherwiſe happen, which we conſider as an avoidable evil: here is not properly ſhame until the conſciouſneſs of diſgrace actually comes or the miſchief is apprehended irremediable, which throws

throws the mind into a ſtate of want wherein ſhe exerts herſelf in endeavours to ſtifle the uneaſy reflection and withdraw her notice from it as much as poſſible. This is one of the lateſt formed among our paſſions, for little children appear to have no notion of it a conſiderable time: it is ſo far from being infuſed by nature that it derives wholly from our intercourſe with mankind, nor would ever come to a perſon who from his birth ſhould be ſecluded from all ſociety; before we become ſuſceptible of it we muſt have gotten ſome uſe of language, without which we cannot well be made ſenſible of the eſtimation ſet by others upon any thing we do. And tho' after having arrived at maturer reflection, we take ſhame to ourſelves for follies that can be known to nobody elſe, yet are we taught this practice by cenſures we have found others paſs upon us or we have paſſed upon them. For as anger, although beginning on hurts received from other perſons, will at length ſometimes turn upon ourſelves, ſo having got a habit of blaming what we have ſeen blamable elſewhere, we fall into the like train of thinking with reſpect to our own miſcarriages. There is another emotion of mind, the oppoſite to ſhame, that deſerves to be ranked among the paſſions with better reaſon than Avoidance, the oppoſite to deſire:

for commendation agitates the ſpirits and ſtimulates to action no leſs than diſgrace. Nor let it be ſaid that the one allures only as implying a removal from the other, for though we ſometimes ſtand ſo circumſtanced as that we muſt either attain the one or incur the other according as we exert ourſelves in ſomething or let it alone, yet this is not always the caſe; for perſons already in good credit will beſtir themſelves ſtrongly to encreaſe it, where there is no danger of cenſure falling upon them if they were to forbear their endeavours. But I ſhall have occaſion to conſider this principle more particularly when I come to my four claſſes of motives, of which I have made Honour to be one.

9. But of all the paſsions there is none more difficult to be accounted for than grief, which keeps the mind intent upon a troubleſome idea that one would think ſhe ſhould endeavour moſt ſtrenuouſly to throw off. It ſeems to contradict the conſtant experience of ſatisfaction being the point the mind every moment purſues, when we find her ſtrangely courting uneaſineſs and dwelling upon an object that affords her nothing but torment. I conceive the mind led originally into this abſurd procedure by the ſame view that draws her into that ſituation we have termed want: for as we have obſerved under that article, the holding

holding an evil in our thoughts is one ſtep towards removing it, becauſe they may ſuggeſt expedients which did not preſently occur, and becauſe the ſtrength of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a ſtronger exertion of our powers. Therefore you find it commonly uſed as an argument to diſſuade men from ſorrow, That it can do no good and that the miſchief is irremediable: which ſhows the general opinion that when men afflict themſelves they do it under a deluſive perſuaſion of receiving benefit thereby, and that if we can get them out of this notion they will reſt contented. On the other hand we endeavour to encreaſe their vexation at evils brought upon them by their own miſconduct, becauſe there it may do ſervice by withholding them from committing the like for the future. And our aptneſs to vex ourſelves encreaſes not a little by our intercourſe with mankind: for complaint procuring us the comfort and aſſiſtance of others, and our complaints riſing in proportion to the preſſure we feel, we get a habit of adding to that preſſure in order to obtain the ſurer and [illegible] relief. For which reaſon children [illegible]e fretfull for being humoured, their [illegible]ſs having proved a means of getting.

Thus the mind having [illegible]tion of evil and the en-

creaſing her ſenſibility of its preſſure expedient, deſire, as is uſual in the like caſes, becomes tranſlated to the means, and her view terminates upon afflicting herſelf as much as poſsible without proſpect of any further end to be attained thereby. When ſhe has often turned the ſpirits into this train they will take it afterwards mechanically: for I can admit the doctrine of Hartley's German friend Stahl with reſpect to the mental organs, that motions in them which were voluntary at firſt may grow to be automatic; and when this is the caſe they will pour in one ſet of ideas forcibly to the excluſion of all others. Therefore you ſee people under great affliction taſteleſs of enjoyments they were fond of before, incapable of buſineſs, and unable to think of anything but the ſubject of their grievance: nor can you extricate them from their diſtreſs, until by ſome amuſement or engagement or danger or pain, you can turn their ſpirits into another channel. Nor can it be doubted that there is an earneſtneſs of want in all heavy ſorrow, a want to get rid of the uneaſineſs how improper means ſoever may be employed for that purpoſe, a want to undo what has been done and to alter paſt events, which being palpably impoſſible the mind works without any ſubject to work upon, and worries herſelf with empty ſtrugglings: but

if

if anything flatters with the promiſe of a momentary relief, we ſee how ſtrongly ſhe exerts herſelf, as in cryings, exclamations, ſtampings, tearing the hair and beating the breaſt, which draw off her attention elſewhere for a while and thereby ſuſpend her uneaſineſs.

10. Though we always find Love and Hatred upon the liſt, I take them to be not ſo much paſſions in themſelves as the aptneſs of certain objects to excite paſſions in us: for a man may be ſaid to love what he has not in his thoughts, if we conceive him generally looking upon it with complacence, but he cannot be ſaid to hope or fear or rejoice in a thing whereof there is no idea preſent before him. Beſides, the beloved object may give occaſion to oppoſite and incompatible paſſions without making an alteration in our love: which ſhows it to be ſomething diſtinct from them, ſince it can ſubſiſt entire under all their various forms without loſing its eſſence. Therefore I apprehend love to be a diſpoſition of mind to receive pleaſure from certain things, which diſpoſition nature never gave us, but we acquire it by experience of what has been uſed to pleaſe us: and the idea of this effect being aſſociated with that of the things themſelves, the bare contemplation of them affords us delight. But as our plea-

ſures are of very various kinds ſo are the affections they generate: for the love of eating, of hunting, of money, of power, of reputation, of virtue, of a miſtreſs, a friend, a child or a wife, though all called by one common name of love, yet operate differently and form diſpoſitions ſpreading into very different branches, howmuchſoever the roots may be ſimilar. I ſhall not ſtay to examine all the ſeveral kinds of love the human breaſt is capable of, but confine myſelf to thoſe which faſten upon our own ſpecies.

Under the helpleſs condition wherein we are born we ſtand indebted to the care of others for the continual ſupply of our wants, and the ſatisfaction received in ſuch ſupply communicates a portion of itſelf to our idea of the perſon adminiſtring it; therefore a child's firſt love is its nurſe. But this love is of an imperfect nature, being the ſame in kind with that we entertain for things inanimate, which we conſider only as inſtruments of our pleaſure: for though the child will cry if you turn nurſe out of the room, it feels the ſame emotion if you take away its rattle. But after having a little enlarged our acquaintance and found that everybody will not, like nurſe, give us the ſame aſſiduous tendance upon all occaſions, but are more or leſs willing to oblige us according as they are at eaſe in them-

themſelves or as we can oblige them, then are we ready to do and wiſh them pleaſure that they may be the more ready to humour us. Yet this is not perfect love, which will ſuffer no advantage of our own to ſtand immediately in view. In further proceſs of time if we find our enjoyments ariſing chiefly from the converſation or intercourſe of one or a few perſons, we practiſe the like method of engaging them to ſerve us ſo frequently until this end ſlips out of view, and ſatisfaction, as we have before remarked in caſes of tranſlation, adheres immediately to the thought of doing them kindneſs. Then it is that love becomes perſonal, and then arrives at its higheſt ſtate of refinement, wherein it may be defined the pleaſure of pleaſing: for I cannot conceive a purer love than that which makes us feel a ſenſible delight in gratifying another, and in every thing that happens conducive to his gratification, without thought of any other benefit redounding thereffom to ourſelves except that very delight. And this delight is of two ſorts, which may be diſtinguiſhed into Love and Fondneſs; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without doing a diſſervice, and even to forbear a preſent compliance for the ſake of a real advantage.

Thus the moſt reſplendent love ſprings originally from our concern for ourſelves and our own deſires, like a roſe growing from a dunghill: wherefore Cupid, that is, Deſire, was ſuppoſed the god of love, and nothing nouriſhes it ſo much as reciprocal kindneſs and a return of good offices, or rather a ready compliance with our humours; for we are more inclined to love thoſe who humour us than thoſe who do us good. But as flowers retain no ſcent of the dirty ground from whence they ſprung, ſo genuine love, although encreaſed by acts of kindneſs, carries always a retroſpect to thoſe that are paſt and does not look forward in expectance of having them continued. But though the natural progreſs of love be through expedience, yet our converſe in ſociety generally ſhortens the way, for ſeeing other people love upon receiving good offices, we catch the like diſpoſition by ſympathy from them without needing to travel the uſual road. For ſympathy takes a nearer compaſs to arrive at its end than tranſlation, and we ſometimes contract a liking to things or perſons meerly upon finding others fond of them, with no other inducement than the force of example. For the ſame reaſon romances tend greatly to infuſe that whining love wherewith they abound, by keeping the mind

mind continually converſant in imagination among perſons who talk and act with an amorous extravagance.

11. The ſtrongeſt connections of love are reckoned to be thoſe of friendſhip, of the ſexes, and of parents towards their children. Friendſhip we know proceeds from long intimacy, mutual intereſts and ſimilitude of temper, which leads friends into the ſame courſes of action and methods of diverſion, whereby they continually aſſiſt in promoting their common ſchemes and enhancing their common pleaſures, until each others company becomes almoſt neceſſary. Nor is it hard to gueſs at the ſource of that propenſity between the ſexes, which has been always aſſigned as the peculiar province for Cupid to reign in, for he does not pretend to interfere in the affairs of friendſhip or parental fondneſs. The love lighted by this deſire too commonly burns with the groſſeſt flame, and is rather of the inſtrumental kind than the perſonal; men looking upon the beloved object as a means of gratifying their pleaſures rather than as amiable in itſelf. Such love, when deſire happens to abate, changes inſtantly into averſion, as was the caſe of Amnon with reſpect to Tamar: and theſe accidents happening oftner than were to be wiſhed, gave occaſion to that ſevere remark

of the poet, Two things in marriage happy are allow'd, A wife in wedding ſheets and in a ſhroud. And though there may be for the preſent a deſire of pleaſing, this is only a borrowed not a tranſlated ſatisfaction, which we have obſerved in a former chapter reſts for a while upon means apprehended neceſſary for a further end we have in view. Nor perhaps is there the true pleaſure of pleaſing until by cohabitation, by communication of intereſts and partnerſhip in amuſements of all kinds, by thoſe gracefull acts, as Milton calls them, thoſe thouſand decencies that daily flow from all her words and actions mixt with love and ſweet compliance which declare unfeigned union of mind, we have joined a thorough friendſhip to love: or at leaſt unleſs the proſpect of ſuch intercourſe occupy the imagination as much as any other idea. If any one would know whether he poſſeſſes the genuine pleaſure of pleaſing, let him conſider whether he could at any time forego his deareſt pleaſures when he perceives them hurtfull, or unſeaſonable, or diſguſtfull to the party beloved: for if he could not, his paſſion is to pleaſe himſelf and not another. Love has been uſually eſteemed productive of our greateſt pleaſures and our greateſt pains, and which ſort of fruits it ſhall bring forth depends greatly upon the object of our

choice: if the diſpoſition and qualities of that be ſuch as may add friendſhip to love, we ſhall reap a plentifull crop of enjoyment; if the contrary, it will yield continual vexation and diſappointment; if neither, our life will become inſipid and tedious.

Parental affection has been currently aſcribed to inſtinct, and is the only ſpecies of it that I remember ever ſuppoſed belonging to mankind: but if there were a ſenſe of inſtinct infuſed by nature, nobody need remain in doubt concerning the genuineneſs of their offspring. Huſbands would have a ſure and ready teſt to try the fidelity of their wives, for they need only ſet their children in a circle before them, and by looking round upon each, conſidering how powerfully inſtinct operates, they would feel an emotion by which they might eaſily diſtinguiſh their own from thoſe of the gallant: but I never heard of a diſcovery made this way, therefore we muſt ſeek for ſome other origin of this ſuppoſed inſtinct. I ſhall not trouble myſelf to examine how it might ariſe in a ſtate of nature, though I think it might be accounted for there without having recourſe to a ſecret impulſe: but as we live in ſociety we ſee the care of parents ſo univerſal that we derive the like quality by ſympathy from others; the notion of children being our own

fleſh

and blood throws a part of our ſelf-love upon them; we have in view upon our entering into wedlock the proſpect of amuſements and comforts expected from them; and receive congratulations from every quarter upon their birth. All theſe cauſes make us look upon them as a valuable poſſeſſion and begin our concern for them: therefore fathers who bring children into the world clandeſtinely and unlawfully, wanting theſe ſources, feel leſs tenderneſs for them and many times none at all. The regard we thus entertain at firſt for our children urges us continually to provide for their welfare and gratification, and every exerciſe of our cares encreaſes our affection: therefore we ſee people more afflicted for the loſs of a child when grown up than of a new-born babe. For continual tendance alone from whatever inducement firſt undertaken, ſuffices to create a habit of loving. How often do nurſes, though hired to the taſk, ſhow as evident ſigns of inſtinct towards their charge as the parents themſelves? and how many women feel a kind of parental fondneſs for the birds, the puppies and the kittens they have bred up.

12. It has been noted before that anger ſometimes vents itſelf upon inanimate beings, and imagination on other occaſions perſonifies them, prompting us to behave towards them

them as though they were capable of receiving benefit or damage, pleaſure or pain. We retain a kind of perſonal love for the towns, the countries, the places which have been the ſcenes of our enjoyment, after having been long removed from them and never likely to ſee them again: we ſtill wiſh them well, rejoice to hear of their flouriſhing, and if any calamity befals them expreſs our ſorrow by tender exclamations in the manner we ſhould do upon loſing a friend.

Love peculiarly ſo called muſt always center in a ſingle object, becauſe that thorough co-incidence of intereſts and participation of pleaſures, neceſſary to render it perfect, cannot obtain between more than two perſons. Friendſhip may take in a little larger compaſs, but can extend only to a few choſen objects: the friendſhips recorded in hiſtory have always run in pairs, as between Theſeus and Perithous, Oreſtes and Pylades, Scipio and Lelius, Cicero and Atticus. Yet I do not ſee why there may not be a ſincere and hearty love, ardent enough to be reckoned a paſſion, between more than one friend as well as a parental fondneſs for ſeveral children, which we know is often the caſe, and I can confirm upon my own experience: for I have more than one, and had I twenty, if I know my own heart, I could never ſee any ſignal good

or evil befall any of them without feeling a ſtrong emotion of ſoul. But love in a gentler degree may diffuſe itſelf to multitudes, to the whole human ſpecies, to every thing capable of being the better for it. A good natured man can reliſh the pleaſure of pleaſing; whatever ſubject ſhall afford him an opportuity of enjoying it, he will be ready to oblige upon every occaſion, he rejoices in the enjoyments of others and makes their ſucceſſes become his own: but this pleaſure does not riſe to a paſſion ſo as to render him uneaſy whenever the means of gratifying it are wanting.

13. Hatred derives in like manner from the contrary ſources to thoſe of love, being produced by ſome hurt or diſpleaſure received, or the apprehenſion of an aptneſs in certain objects to bring them upon us. It may be catched by ſympathy as well as infuſed by tranſlation, for we are often drawn to deteſt meerly by the ſtrong expreſſions of abhorrence we ſee in thoſe we converſe with. I cannot ſubſcribe to the notion that men are born enemies to one another, or that nature has given us any conſtitutional averſions; for I apprehend we are born with a total indifference to all things, until experience teaches us to make a difference between one thing and another upon ſeeing the manner in which they

they affect us. Sometimes hatred becomes perſonal, and then may be ſtiled the pleaſure of diſpleaſing: under this diſpoſition men deſire and wiſh hurt to their enemy as an ultimate end without any proſpect of benefit or effecting a ſecurity from danger to themſelves. Generally when people have taken a violent diſtaſte to one or two perſons, they behave with more than ordinary civility to the reſt of the world: but there are thoſe in whom the pleaſure of diſpleaſing extends to all mankind, they take delight in croſſing and vexing, and rejoice at the ſight of miſchief or diſappointment on what quarter ſoever it ſhall appear. On the contrary there are other tempers to whom nothing is ſo hatefull as hatred itſelf, therefore they never give it admittance or at leaſt do not ſuffer it to become perſonal: and though the ſight of deteſtable qualities has an aptitude to transfer an odium upon the poſſeſſor, yet they find means to ſeparate the offender from the offence, and can do him all kind of good offices conſiſtent with the general good or a neceſſary regard to their own lawful intereſts. We have ſhown before in the proper place how tranſlation ariſes from the narrowneſs of our imagination, which when any purpoſe requires a number of ſteps to compleat it, cannot retain the whole line in view, and as it

loſes

loſes ſight of the further parts deſire reſts upon thoſe remaining: therefore the proneneſs to animoſities argues a narrow mind, which having found the doing hurt to others ſometimes expedient, forgets that expedience and confines its views to the means which that had rendered deſirable. But whoever poſſeſſes a large and open underſtanding, if the giving diſpleaſure appears at any time neceſſary, will hold that neceſſity in view, which draws his averſion aſide from the perſon and carries it forward to thoſe miſchiefs which cannot be prevented without giving ſuch diſpleaſure.

14. Deſpair, envy, jealouſy, contempt, vexation, peeviſhneſs, aſtoniſhment and the like, are not diſtinct paſſions, but branches or mixtures of thoſe already deſcribed, and therefore need no further notice. But there is one ſituation of mind, cauſing great emotions both in her and the body, that deſerves particular conſideration, as having been of late much recommended for uſes whereto it ſeems not properly applicable: which is, that ſpecies of joy called Mirth expreſſing itſelf frequently in laughter. This has been commonly held by our moderns to ariſe from contempt upon a compariſon of ourſelves with ſomething apprehended greatly our inferiour. I ſhall not urge that we make ourſelves merry with

with compoſitions of meer matter, which cannot come into competition with any ſuppoſed excellencies of our own; becauſe I know very well and have obſerved juſt now that imagination often perſonifies things inanimate, conceiving them at firſt glance as poſſeſsing the qualities and ſentiments of men, or as repreſentations of the human affections, or as evidences of blunders in the contrivers of them. But if we conſult experience for inſtances of contempt and laughter, we ſhall find either of them often appearing without the other. If a man going to take up ſomething ſhining upon the ground diſcovers it to be a pin, if upon being offered a bribe he rejects it with ſcorn, if he ſees a child endeavour to ſtop his paſſage, will he burſt into laughter upon the occaſion? Contempt and ſcorn are gloomy ſituations of mind, and the proud who deal moſt largely in them are the moſt ſolemn and ſtateſieſt of mortals: beſides that a deſpicable object contemplated ever ſo long will appear equally ſo, but a diverting one cannot keep up your merriment for ever. On the other hand, your merry giggling people love beſt to conſort among their equals, to put themſelves upon a par with the company, and are leaſt ſupercilious or diſpoſed to draw compariſons between themſelves and others. The ſudden appearance of an intimate friend

ſpreads a ſmile over the countenance; the ſight of an exquiſite dainty, the unexpected offer of an advantageous ſcheme, ſets the voluptuous, the covetous and the ambitious chuckling, and would produce a downright laughter if men had not been habituated to reſtrain themſelves by the rules of decorum; but the ſituation of mind they then ſtand in ſeems the fartheſt imaginable from a ſtate of contempt. Succeſs of all kinds, if it does not immediately ſhake the ſides, yet renders us more ſuſceptible of mirth upon any little trifling occaſion happening to excite it. Who are ſo eaſily ſet a laughing as young children? but what idea of ſuperiority can they be ſuppoſed to have? They laugh before they are capable of caſting back a reflection upon their own qualifications, much leſs of comparing them with thoſe of other people. They laugh upon the ſight of nurſe, or mamma; begin, little child, ſays Virgil, to ſhow you know your mamma by your ſmiles: but if they make any compariſons they muſt conſider nurſe and mamma as their ſuperiours and governours. That exultation the mind feels upon an opinion of ſuperiority is a very tranſlated ſatisfaction derived through many ſtages: ſhe muſt have learned the tendency of things to gratify her deſires, the propenſity of other people to get them away for miniſtring to their

their own, the conteſt enſuing upon ſuch occaſions, the advantage of greater powers towards obtaining victory, and the reflection of poſſeſſing ſuch advantages as of an immediate good; by all which gradations ſatisfaction muſt have been transferred to the thought of ſuperiority; a proceſs too long to be gone through in the firſt ſtages of life, wherein the proneneſs to laughter appears evident.

15. Mirth I conceive occaſioned by a ſudden influx of ſpirits generally if not always turned from ſome other channel to which they have been drawn by an earneſt attention: and therefore perhaps it is that to make merry is called to divert, as being a diverſion of the ſpirits out of the courſe they have been ſtrongly thrown into before. For that attention gathers a conſiderable fund of them appears manifeſt from the fatigue and waſting it brings on if continued long, and when ſome pleaſurable idea opens the ſluices at once, it lets in ſo large a flood that reflection cannot employ them all, having no other buſineſs for them than to contemplate that idea, and the ſuperfluity overflows upon the muſcles cauſing the convulſions of laughter. Thus there ſeems to be three cauſes concurring to excite laughter when not produced mechanically, as by tickling, by fits of hyſterics or the like: viz. a ſtretch of attention

spread [illegible] ...ddeness of such re-
sight [illegible] ...f employment for the
offer [illegible] ...ed upon the mind. Wit
[illegible] ...n and is commonly said to
[illegible] ..., that on the grave side en-
[illegible] ...tion, which upon turning the
[illegible] ...ly lets go its hold: the most di-
[illegible] ...mour is that which raises your ex-
[illegible] ...of something very serious, and then
[illegible] ...aking the jest cuts it short with an
[illegible] ...ry different from what you expected.
[illegible] ...et is it always necessary there should be
[illegible] ...g preparation to introduce a joke, ima-
gination being extremely agile and quick in
her motions, can fix a strong attention upon
one object and turn it off upon another in a
moment: therefore a short expression, a sin-
gle gesture, an arch look, a comical figure,
will suffice to create mirth. We learn from
Mr. Locke that wit lies in putting ideas to-
gether wherein can be found any resemblance
or congruity; to which I may add by way of
comment, that the resemblance must be
pointed out between things usually esteemed
the most discordant, and which contemplated
separately would lead the mind into the most
opposite trains of thinking: for the quick
transition of thought or fluctuation between
such distant ideas is what causes your merri-
ment. And the like changeable situation of
mind

mind occaſions our laughter at the follies and blunders we ſee committed: for every blunder implies a deliberate endeavour to attain ſome purpoſe by means not conducive thereto, and the ſight or thought of earneſtneſs and expectation, in the perſons ſo labouring, fills our own imagination by ſympathy with the like ideas, which are immediately diſſipated upon the reflection of their being ineffectual and nugatory. But I have ſaid the relaxation muſt be ſudden, and employment wanting for the ſpirits let looſe thereby: therefore if the relator of a merry ſtory manages ſo ill that you ſee beforehand how it will end, you loſe half your pleaſure. For the ſame reaſon a ſtory often repeated becomes inſipid, and a jeſt may be worn threadbare: becauſe when you know what is coming, attention cannot run into another channel from whence it might be ſuddenly diverted. Nor will all kinds of joyfull ideas how unexpected ſoever provoke us to laughter: the news of an eſtate or ſome extraordinary ſucceſs befalling us, leads in a train of advantages and pleaſures attendant thereupon, which fill imagination with a variety of ideas and find abundant employment for thought, ſo there is no redundancy of ſpirits to run over upon the riſible nerves: but a jeſt preſents one pleaſurable idea without further conſequences,

which occupies the mind alone and requires no pains to retain it or keep out other ideas, but leaves the ſpirits at liberty to ruſh into whatever quarter their own impulſe ſhall carry them.

16. If laughter ſometimes accompanies a thought of ſuperiority, it is owing to that vanity which too often teaches men a habit of exulting at the ſight of folly or infirmity: for the vain having an immoderate fondneſs for pre-eminence without either abilities or application to raiſe themſelves above the common level, feel a ſudden joy on beholding anything below it. And this aptneſs to mirth upon ſuch occaſions, whatever they may think of it, redounds very little to their honour, as implying a ſecret conſciouſneſs of wanting merit in themſelves: for it ſhows that inſtances of their ſuperiority come ſeldom and unexpected, carrying ſomething of novelty and ſurprize, without which they could not inſtigate to laughter. A good natured man can ſmile at indiſcretions without caſting back reflections upon himſelf, and whenever ſuch reflection does occur I believe it is moſt commonly an after thought, not ſo often the cauſe of mirth as the conſequence: vanity running on to a compariſon of our own ſuppoſed perfections, which muſt rather abate the emotion than encreaſe it, by find-

finding other employ for the ſpirits. And we find in fact that it does make ſuch abatement, every one ſees the difference between a hearty laugh of real joy and a ſcornfull ſneer or a grin expreſſing a claim to ſuperiority: the laugh of contempt is a forced laugh ſhowing ſigns of gladneſs in the countenance but not making the heart merry, and encouraged not ſo much to pleaſe ourſelves as to vex another.

Contempt being ſo apt to ſhow itſelf in deriſion, hence the making a thing appear deſpicable and ſilly has been called rendering it ridiculous. But ridiculous, although derived from the latin word ſtanding for laughter, does not always imply a quality of exciting even that affected laugh which is the expreſſion of contempt: you ſhall ſee men with a very grave countenance go about to demonſtrate the ridiculouſneſs of a thing without ever raiſing mirth in themſelves or expecting to raiſe it in others: therefore ridiculous is not ſynonimous with comical or diverting, but rather coincides with abſurd or fooliſh, and tends more to provoke your ſpleen than your laughter.

17. Upon this view of the nature and eſſence of wit and ridicule, it ſeems ſurprizing to hear them recommended as methods proper for the diſcovery of truth, and offered

as the ſureſt teſt and touchſtone to try the ſoundneſs of an opinion. For they tend to alarm the paſſions, they fill the mind with one ſingle idea barring her attention againſt all others, and produce their effects by their manner of placing objects, one ſetting them in a diverting and the other in an offenſive light. Whereas reaſon requires a calm and diſpaſſionate ſituation of mind to form her judgements aright, ſhe wants the whole attention to look round upon every circumſtance, and places her objects in all the lights wherein they are capable of ſtanding. But the moſt ſurprizing thing is to find the greateſt ſtreſs laid upon jeſt and deriſion by thoſe who make the loudeſt pretences to freedom of thought: for liberty conſiſts in a thorough exemption from all influence and conſtraint whatſoever, which may as well be thrown upon us by the allurements of wit and ſtings of ridicule as by any other impulſe: for they caſt a prejudice upon the mind that cramps and confines it within the narrow point of view they hold their objects in; and he that lies liable to be laughed out of his ſentiments is no more maſter of his thoughts than if he were driven by the force of authority or example.

It has been alledged in ſupport of theſe methods of arguing, that diſputants of all kinds

kinds are obſerved to employ them, if they have talents that way and fit opportunities offer for exerting them. But I deſire it may be remembered there are two ſorts of argumentation, one by way of rhetoric and the other by that of logic: the former addreſſes the imagination, aims at working a perſuaſion there, and endeavours to intereſt the paſſions: the latter appeals directly to the underſtanding, propoſes only conviction and rejects all kind of artifice. Therefore when we have fully ſatisfied ourſelves of any matter upon a full and fair examination, and are only to perſuade others who will not hear reaſon, being hindered by ſome prejudice or paſſion, it is allowable to uſe any contrivances likely to remove thoſe obſtacles: but when the buſineſs is to enquire into ſome doubtful point, and ſuch are all to be eſteemed during a debate with any ſincere and judicious antagoniſt, none of the arts of perſuaſion ought to find admittance. I can allow jeſt and taunt to be uſefull engines of oratory, but can by no means think them proper inſtruments for reaſon to work with: nor do we ever find them employed in the ſciences, where underſtanding alone is concerned. Where is there purer, cloſer or clearer reaſoning than in the mathematics, but what room do they afford for merriment? Who ever demonſtrated a problem

blem in Euclid by ridicule? or where will you find a joke in Sir Iſaac Newton's principia? The five mechanical powers, the properties of fluids, the courſes of the planets, were not diſcovered nor explained by ſallies of humour and raillery: and though the cycles and epicycles of the antients are now become ridiculous by being grown out of faſhion, they were firſt overthrown by ſerious argumentation from the phenomena of nature. Divination, aſtrology, magic and the philoſophers ſtone, afford an ample field for humour and raillery, yet I believe no man who held them upon principle, was ever beat out of his notions by thoſe weapons without ſome ſolid argument convincing to his underſtanding.

18. Violence and turbulence conſtitute the eſſence of paſſion: the ſame emotions of ſoul when too gentle to deſerve that name are ſtiled Affections. It is not eaſy to aſcertain the preciſe limits between paſſion and affection, the difference lying only in degree, nor indeed are they always accurately diſtinguiſhed either in diſcourſe or writing; but ſtrictly ſpeaking paſſion is that which cauſes perturbation and diſorder of ſpirits, throwing its own ſet of ideas forcibly upon the mind, and not leaving her maſter of her own motions; a ſituation very dangerous, as laying us open

to

to every miſchief while the exerciſe of underſtanding by which alone we might help ourſelves remains ſuſpended. Therefore paſſion may be ſtiled the fever of the mind, which diſturbs and weakens and cannot continue long or return often without pernicious conſequences: but affection, like the ſteddy beating of the pulſe, actuates and invigorates and keeps the mind continually alive. For we are every moment while awake purſuing or avoiding ſomething or other; and indeed it is neceſſary we ſhould be ſo, for were it poſſible to remain totally unaffected and unconcerned with anything, there would be no buſineſs for volition to do, but we muſt lie like logs to receive whatever chance ſhould throw upon us. Tis our affections that lay the foundation of prudence by prompting us to look forward to the future, that multiply our enjoyments beyond thoſe of ſenſation or appetite, and find work for underſtanding by ſuggeſting objects to contrive and provide for. Nor are any of them unſerviceable if properly directed and kept within due moderation: chearfulneſs preſerves health and renders the common ſcenes of life pleaſurable: hope was eſteemed of old, as we learn from the fable of Pandora's box, a ſalve to aſſwage the ſmart of all evils, and ſupplies the place of enjoyments when we have none actually in

our

our power: caution helps to preſerve the good things we have and ſecure us againſt dangers: ſenſibility of the difference between good and bad uſage urges us to apply the proper means for preventing injuries: decency keeps the world in order, nor could ſociety or good manners ſubſiſt without it: reflection on croſs accidents teaches us to provide againſt the like for the future: good nature and obligingneſs double our pleaſures by making thoſe of other people our own, and are the channels through which the benefits of ſociety are chiefly conveyed: diſlike to things or perſons obnoxious ſecures us againſt catching contagion or receiving miſchief from them: deſire, if not boiſterous, furniſhes us with conſtant employment, and gives a glee to every thing we undertake: and want, not riſing to impatience, ſpurs us up to induſtry and vigilance and holds us ſteddy in purſuit of uſefull aims not preſently attainable.

19. I ſaid at the end of the laſt chapter that the paſſions were only a ſtronger ſort of habits acquired early in our childhood: from whence of courſe it follows that habits muſt be feebler paſſions learned later, when the organs being grown tough become leſs ſuſceptible of new forms, but having once taken them are leſs eaſy to be thrown out of

of them again. The force of paſſion ſeems to proceed from the wideneſs of the channels and that vigorous pulſation wherewith they drive on the ſpirits contained in them: that of habit from the ſtifneſs of their coats which will not readily cloſe ſo as to turn the ſpirits from their accuſtomed track. Therefore paſſion does its work by vehemence and impetuoſity, bearing down all oppoſition; it can only be maſtered by a ſtrong reſolution and that not without difficulty, but if you can ſtop the torrent it leaves you quiet. But habit prevails by perſeverance and importunity, it does not bear you down by force but ſteals upon you imperceptibly, or teazes and tires you into a compliance; it is eaſily reſtrained at any time with a little attention, but the moment you take off your eye it recoils again, and when grown inveterate is extremely difficult to be totally eradicated. Our little motives are moſtly introduced and the manner of our proceeding ſhaped by habit: tis that gives us dexterity and readineſs in every thing we do, and renders our thoughts and motions eaſy. We ſee how aukward and troubleſome it is to conſort with company or purſue a method of conduct or perform any work very different from what we have been uſed to. The tenour of our lives and ſucceſs of our endeavours depends more upon habit than

than judgement: for what avails the knowing what is proper to be done without an expertneſs and readineſs to compaſs it? wherefore we cannot employ our underſtanding better than by enuring ourſelves to ſuch ways and practices as may prove beneficial, and carefully guarding againſt any others encroaching upon us: for if underſtanding can gain over habit to her ſervice, it will do her work more compleatly and effectually and pleaſantly than ſhe could herſelf. Paſſion grows feeble with age, but habit gathers ſtrength: old people can relinquiſh any fancy that comes into their heads without much trouble, but none are harder to be put out of their ways; and in thoſe few deſires they have remaining they ſhow leſs of the eagerneſs of paſſion than the ſtubborneſs of habit. But we take notice of their attachments to money, to command and ſome other objects, and ſtile them paſſions becauſe they are few and engroſs their whole attention for want of a competitor, not becauſe of any violence or impetuoſity we diſcern in them. But as paſſion, affection and habit, muſt have ſome matter to work upon, and the ſubjects giving riſe to them or recommended by them to our purſuit are infinitely various, it would be endleſs and perplexing to particularize them all: therefore I ſhall attempt to reduce them

under

under a few general heads, and can think of none more proper than thoſe four claſſes into which I had before propoſed to diſtinguiſh our motives of action.

CHAP. XXII.

PLEASURE.

TO Pleaſure I might have joined Pain or Trouble in the title of this chapter, but they being each of them reſpectively a ſpecies of ſatisfaction or uneaſineſs, may be treated of in the ſame manner, that is, both under the former. For as the one by repelling actuates us to almoſt the ſame motions as the other by attracting, what I ſhall obſerve concerning pleaſure will ſerve equally for its reverſe, unleſs where ſome particular occaſion may require them to be conſidered diſtinctly.

Pleaſure like other ſatisfactions when taken as a motive, muſt not be underſtood of the actual poſſeſſion but the proſpect or idea of it: for motives do not prompt us to what we have already, which were needleſs, but to attain ſomething we have not, or to preſerve the continuance of ſomething that would

would otherwiſe ſlip away from us. Yet as that idea riſes from experience of the manner wherein things have affected us, we can only get acquainted with this ſpecies of motives by examining from what ſources we derive our pleaſures.

Nature gives us at firſt none other pleaſures beſides thoſe of ſenſation and appetite, among which may be reckoned that ſoothing feel accompanying the free circulation of our blood and humours when in health and vigour, or the eaſy flow of ſpirits along the mental organs when in contemplation or purſuit of anything engaging our attention: and in theſe internal ſenſations perhaps may conſiſt all the pleaſures of imagination and reflection which we feel in ſeaſons of joy or hope or deſire or other agreable ſituations of mind. But however this be, certain it is that in proceſs of time when reflection has learnt its play it ſupplies us with a conſiderable fund of entertainment: the pleaſures of reading, of meditation, of converſation, of diverſions, of advancement in knowledge, honour or fortune, belong to the reflection rather than the ſenſes, therefore are ſtiled mental as the others are bodily pleaſures. And the former furniſh much the greater ſhare of our enjoyments in our riper years: for if any man will reflect on a day agreably ſpent, he will find much leſs

of

of it taken up in meer ſenſation than in ſome purſuit or variety of amuſement that engaged his attention. Thus our pleaſures, how much ſoever afterwards multiplied, take their riſe from ſenſation alone, all others being derivative or tranſlated from that original. To inſtance only in acquiſitions of knowledge, which is commonly held ſweet to the mind by the very frame of her conſtitution: but if it were ſo, every acceſſion of knowledge would engage every body alike, whereas in fact we find the contrary. What would the mathematician give to know the neweſt faſhions as they ſtart into vogue, or be let into all the ſcandal and tittle tattle of the town? Or what cares the beau for diſcoveries in aſtronomy, or explanations of attraction, repulſion or other ſecrets of nature? Though we all have our curioſity to a conſiderable degree, yet it leads us by various tracks to objects that we have found contributing moſt to our entertainment: not that we have always any thing further in view than to gratify our preſent curioſity, but it is the uſual courſe of tranſlation to confer a quality of pleaſing upon whatever has often adminiſtered to our other gratifications. The moſt refined pleaſures are thoſe that have paſſed through the greateſt number of tranſlations, and therefore ſtand furtheſt removed

from ſenſe: but before we depend upon them for our enjoyments we ought to be well aſſured of our having a real reliſh for them; for men often deceive themſelves in this point, affecting a fondneſs for refinements they have not; from a ſecret motive of vanity which induces them to believe themſelves poſſeſſed of anything they think will give them credit and reputation.

2. Our pleaſures, as well thoſe of the groſs as the refined kind, depend upon the conſtitution and diſpoſition of our machine: ſome can bear hot weather beſt, others cold; health and ſickneſs, vigour and wearineſs, render the ſame ſenſations and exerciſes delightfull or irkſome. In like manner the guſt of mental amuſements varies according to the caſt our imagination has been thrown into by education or cuſtom or habit, according to the humour we happen to be in, to various accidents or circumſtances befalling us, or to the ſatiety or novelty we find in them.

This variety of diſpoſition in mankind to receive pleaſure from different objects is called Taſte, becauſe like the palate it enables us to diſtinguiſh the reliſh of things, and to diſcern which of them are ſavoury, inſipid, or diſguſtfull. Taſte is uſually confounded with judgement, of which it is rather the baſis

baſis than the thing itſelf: for taſte properly denotes a ſenſibility of delight in certain objects, and therefore having experienced what has pleaſed us, we learn to judge what will pleaſe others or ourſelves another time. Nature may have laid the foundation of taſte, but the ſuperſtructure is raiſed by inſtruction or converſation or obſervation; for we never find it in children, and very rarely among perſons confined to the common laborious occupations of life. Not but that all men have their ſources of amuſement, and therefore in this ſence your mechanics and plowmen may be ſaid to have a taſte for bullbaiting or football, the finery of a Lord Mayor's ſhow or diverſions of a country fair: but taſte is moſt uſually applied to thoſe reliſhes given by the perfection of art, or good company, or an uncommon ſenſibility of imagination. Yet we ſometimes take it in a larger ſence, as when we diſtinguiſh between a groſs and a refined, a vulgar and an elegant, a falſe and a true taſte: the latter being ſuch as enables us to receive more exquiſite, or more durable pleaſures from things, or in greater variety, or as Horace calls it, more ſincere, that is, unalloyed with any diſagreable mixture. But there may be an overſqueamiſhneſs and nicety of taſte, which renders the imagination too delicate and liable to diſguſt.

from the common objects continually ſurrounding it, like a very tender ſkin that cannot bear the leaſt drop of rain or breath of air without ſuffering, and is rather to be eſteemed a weakneſs than a perfection. Therefore goodneſs of taſte ſeems to be relative, that which is ſuitable to one man being not ſo to another: what good would a fine taſte for Opera muſic do him who could not afford to go to it? or of what ſervice would a taſte for poetry, rhetoric or elegance, be to a miſſionary who muſt ſpend his time among ſavages? I conceive the beſt if not the trueſt taſte is that which gives a man the ſtrongeſt and fulleſt reliſh of objects and employments lying within his power and ſuited to his ſituation and circumſtances in life. But if one could caſt imagination into any mould one pleaſes with a wiſh, I would make the ſame diſtinction here as I have done before between deſire and want, and would wiſh to have a taſte for the fineſt productions of art without any diſtaſte of thoſe that fall greatly inferiour: for by this means I ſhould have a chance of being ſometimes exquiſitely pleaſed, but run no hazard of being ever diſguſted.

3. What is called Genius I imagine proceeds chiefly from the turn imagination has taken early in our youth: we do not diſcern when it

it begins and therefore aſcribe it to nature, but though nature may have given each of us quicker and ſtronger, or duller and weaker parts, or made ſome of our organs more lithſome and ſenſible than others, yet their aptneſs to run into this or that particular courſe of exerciſe depends upon ſome accident or lucky hit or the company we converſe with. Mr. Waller ſuppoſes that Great Julius in the mountains bred, Perhaps ſome flock or herd had led: The world's ſole ruler then had been But the beſt wreſtler on the green. Tis art and knowledge which draw forth The hidden ſeeds of native worth. A book falling into a boys hands, an adventure related or performance he ſees that happens to ſtrike his fancy, the converſation of a ſervant or a companion, may lead his imagination into particular trains of thinking, which thenceforward become eaſy to him and he cannot ſtrike into others of a different kind without trouble and uneaſineſs. If example had not at leaſt as great a ſhare as nature in the formation of genius, why ſhould we ſee different ages and countries produce their ſeveral ſorts of it peculiar to themſelves? and why ſhould men ingenious in any particular way generally ariſe together in cluſters? for we cannot ſuppoſe the time when or place

where they are born ſhould make ſuch a difference in their conſtitutions.

4. Beauty is a ſpecies of taſte: it may be defined an aptneſs of things to pleaſe immediately upon ſight, for if they pleaſe from a view of ſomething elſe introduced by them, they are not beautifull but uſefull or valuable. But this aptneſs to pleaſe is a relative term, not ſolely a quality reſiding in objects but depending equally upon the caſt of our imagination: as the aptneſs of a ſhoe depends no leſs upon the ſhape of your foot than upon its own make, for that which ſits perfectly eaſy upon one man may pinch another, or may become uneaſy by your foot being ſwoln. We find the taſte of beauty infinitely various and variable, the ſame thing appearing charming to one perſon, indifferent to another and diſguſtfull to a third; admired or neglected in the ſeveral ſtages of our lives; courted or nauſeated at different ſeaſons according to the diſpoſition of body or humour of mind we happen to be in. Therefore nothing is beautifull in itſelf; thoſe things bid faireſt for the title that are adapted to pleaſe the generality of mankind: for as the features of all men have a reſemblance in ſome reſpects howmuchſoever they may vary in others, ſo it is with the trains of our imagination. Our frame, our conſtitution, as well internal as exter-

external, our employments in life, our wants, our enjoyments, are in a great meaſure the ſame, and our daily intercourſe with one another encreaſes the ſimilitude: therefore it is no wonder that ſome objects are generally beheld in the ſame light and appear agreable to every one. Hence it is we can paſs a judgement on beauty even when not affected by it: for having obſerved what uſually pleaſes, we get a ſtandard wherewith to compare any object we behold, and if it agrees with that we pronounce it beautifull, though through ſome particularity of our own it does not hit our fancy.

One cannot eaſily diſcover that little children have any notion of beauty at all: they will turn away from the ſight of a celebrated toaſt with all her tackle trim and bravery on to hide their faces in the flabby boſom of an old wrinkled nurſe: nor do they feel anything of thoſe charms which, as Horace expreſſes it, inſpire deſires and ſteal a man away from himſelf. We find the firſt notions they get of prettineſs very different from thoſe of their maturer years. Gewgaws, tinſel, high colouring coarſely laid on, ill-ſhapen playthings and figures carrying ſcarce a half reſemblance of their originals, delight them. And though their fancy improves as they grow up, yet they ſcarce ever gain a

reliſh for the fineſt performances of art or works of nature until taught by care or led into it by example.

5. Thus our ſenſe of beauty was not born with us, but grows by time and may be moulded into almoſt any ſhape by cuſtom, converſation or accident. There ſeem to be four principal ſources from whence the efficacy of beauty derives; compoſition, ſucceſſion, tranſlation and expreſſion. The materials of a fine building do not entertain the eye until diſpoſed in their proper places: and a parcel of colours unſtriking of themſelves may hit the fancy upon being curiouſly aſſorted and interſperſed together. Symmetry, proportion and order, contribute greatly to the good look of things: but we have already ſhown in CHAP. X. that they conſiſt in the correſpondence of objects with the trains of our imagination, and the mind muſt have learned to run the proper lines of ſeparation before ſhe can diſcern any thing of order or proportion. Order enables us to take in a larger view of the ſcene before us, preſenting a more complex idea conſiſting not only of the objects themſelves but of their ſituations, connections and relations with reſpect to one another. In deformed things there is commonly one or two remarkable parts at which the eye ſticks. A lump of lead is neither hand-

handſome nor ugly, becauſe as there is no compoſition ſo neither is there a want of any, but may become either according to the mould wherein it is formed; when caſt into an ill ſhape, the continuity of parts leads the eye to expect a compoſition of which it is fruſtrated.

6. Succeſſion is another ſpring of beauty, for as ſome motions, as in riding, walking, bowling and the like, which are pleaſing at firſt, become indifferent and then irkſome by long exerciſe, ſo it is with our ideas of ſenſation and reflection, and in a much quicker tranſition; many that were ſtriking at firſt, ſoon grow inſipid and afterwards troubleſome; wherefore to prevent cloying, there muſt be a variety of objects ſucceeding each other to keep up the play. Order, ſymmetry and proportion, furniſh great ſtore of variety without multiplying the ſubjects whereon it is thrown: in the materials of a fine building, you ſee there is ſtone, there is mortar, there is timber, with a few other particulars, and that not without attention and labour; but when ſkilfully put together, they preſent a multitude of aſſemblages readily occurring to the reflection. In the ſcenes before us the notice, as has been formerly obſerved, changes continually to different ſets of objects or contemplates them in various lights,

lights, the reflections ſhifting while the ſenſations remain the ſame. Hence in a maſterly performance whether you conſider the whole or the principal members or parts of thoſe members or move the eye from one to another, there is always ſomething of compoſition or compariſon preſented, which perpetually ſupplies a fund of freſh entertainment. But meer novelty does not delight of itſelf unleſs there be an aptneſs in the imagination to take impreſſions of what it exhibits: for as a man would find it extremely uneaſy to walk backwards being an unuſual motion, ſo the mind feels an aukwardneſs and irkſomeneſs in receiving aſſemblages entirely different from any ſhe has been accuſtomed to. A ruſtic bred up among wilds and foreſts, being brought into a fine garden, would ſee more confuſion than ornament there, and though you were to point out the diſpoſition of the whole and correſpondence of the parts, you would not make him ſo ſenſible of them as to be affected therewith. Our pleaſures are generally the greater for being preceeded by pains or ſet in compariſon with them, and ſo are our leſſer amuſements of ſight and imagination: therefore an agreable object is rendered more ſo by having a foil, and a proper contraſt of lights and ſhades, embelliſhes a picture; for the notice paſſes to and fro

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ſucceſſively between the oppoſite branches of the compariſon.

7. A third ſource of beauty is tranſlation: whatever has been the occaſion of much or frequent delight, becomes agreable in our eye, ſatisfaction being transferred from the effects to the cauſe. A perſon that has delivered us out of ſome great diſtreſs or helped us in a matter we had ſtrongly at heart or gratified our deſires in many inſtances, appears the handſomer for it ever afterwards: while the ſight of him only introduces a reflection of the good he has done us, there is no alteration in his features, but by degrees the intermediate links of the chain drop off, the pleaſure at the end becomes immediately connected with the perſon, and then it is that his beauty begins; which is often ſo cloſely united with his appearance, that we ſhall like another perſon the better for reſembling him. Thus though Cupid be uſually ſtiled the ſon of Venus, we may ſay there is another of the name who is the ſon of Pleaſure and many times begets a little Venus; for the love we entertain for things upon account of the gratifications received from them, gives them charms in our eyes they had not before. Wherefore lovers think their miſtreſſes and parents their children handſomer than others do, becauſe having found continual enter-

tain-

tainment in their company they are accuſtomed to behold them with delight. So likewiſe women conceive an advantageous opinion of the favourite animals under their care, becauſe the ſatisfaction and amuſement they have found in a conſtant tendency upon them becomes transferred to the creatures themſelves. And we ſee charms that other folks cannot diſcern in a place where we have ſpent our time very agreably or found conveniences wanting elſewhere: whence the ſaying, that home is home be it never ſo homely.

8. The fourth and moſt plentifull ſource of beauty is expreſſion. The knowledge of this diſcloſes the ſecret of that commanding majeſty, that winning ſoftneſs and other graces of the countenance: for the face being a picture of the mind, whatever amiable qualities are diſcerned there give a luſtre to the features denoting them. Good nature, health, ſprightlineſs and ſence, enable and diſpoſe men to give pleaſure to others, therefore the marks of them are pleaſant to behold. The force of ſympathy has a great influence here, for whatever beſpeaks eaſe, ſatisfaction and enjoyment in the mind of the poſſeſſor, throws that of the beholder into the like agreable ſituation: therefore in our deſcription of beauty we commonly employ epithets

thets belonging to the ſentiments, as a chearfull, an innocent, a ſmart, an honeſt or a ſenſible countenance. But the language of the eyes and face requires time to be perfectly underſtood: ſome turns of feature ſeem expreſſive at firſt, but are afterwards diſcovered to have no meaning; in others we find a ſignificancy upon better acquaintance that did not ſhow itſelf before. Therefore ſome beauties ſtriking immediately upon ſight quickly fade away and cloy; others make no ſtrong impreſſion but ſteal upon the heart inſenſibly by imperceptible degrees. Beauty has the ſtrongeſt influence upon thoſe of the oppoſite ſex: women are imperfect judges of one anothers perſons becauſe they are not affected by them; they judge by rules, not by what they feel. Though there be one original cauſe of deſire between the two ſexes, many ſubordinate deſires of converſation or other intercourſe branch out from thence, which have not a viſible connection with the principal root and therefore may conſiſt with the pureſt modeſty: now an object expreſſing all the requiſites for gratification, even of thoſe leſſer deſires, without any obſtruction, abatement or diſappointment, is alluring to the ſight. And a long intercourſe of endearments and good offices of all kinds, may encreaſe the expreſſion ſo far as to render the party exhibiting it

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the moſt agreable object one can behold, ſtiled in the language of mankind above two thouſand years ago by way of eminence, the deſire of the eyes. Many works of art are eſteemed pretty meerly from their expreſſing a likeneſs with the works of nature: in artificial figures of men, birds, beaſts, inſects, trees or flowers, the eye expects no more than an exact reſemblance of the things they repreſent: wherefore there may be a beautifull copy of an ugly original. The famous ſtatue of Laocoon is admired though Laocoon himſelf would be ſhocking to the beholder: we admit pictures of ſatyrs, witches, old men with hard rugged features and grieſly beards, to hang as ornaments in our chambers, where the real originals would be deemed an eye ſore.

9. Beauty of action and ſentiment ſeem to derive wholly from tranſlation, for the good nature, complacence, innocence, chearfulneſs, patience and conſiderateneſs of others, ſo continually promote our advantage, eaſe and enjoyment in the commerce of life, that the pleaſure felt in theſe effects is transferred to the qualities producing them, which thenceforward become engaging in themſelves, ſo that we cannot help admiring them in perſons at the greateſt diſtance of place or time from whom we can reap no poſſible benefit.

But

But that we cannot help being thus moved no more proves us born with ſuch affection, than that you cannot help underſtanding a reproach caſt upon you proves you were born with a knowledge of language. But it has been uſual to ſtile acquiſitions natural that we were led into by cuſtom and experience without any care or inſtruction to convey them, for we are ſaid to ſpeak our mother tongue naturally: and in this conſtruction only we may admit our ſenſe of the amiableneſs of good qualities to be natural.

From all that has been ſaid above, it appears how little foundation there is for Plato's notion of an eſſential beauty exiſting independently of any ſubject whereto it might belong, and as that was ſuperadded to particular ſubſtances it rendered them beautifull. For not to inſiſt upon the inconceivableneſs of a quality exiſting without any ſubject to poſſeſs it, or of there being beauty before there was anything beautifull, we have found that objects however qualified pleaſe us or not according to the diſpoſition of our organs, tranſlation or reſemblance caſting a luſtre upon what had it not before; and that the ſame thing appears agreable or indifferent or loathſome in the eyes of different beholders: which if it depended ſolely upon the qualities of the object, then the oppoſite qualities of

of beauty and deformity muſt reſide at once in the ſame ſubject.

10. Among our diſtaſtes there is none ſo viſibly dependent upon imagination as that of naſtineſs: a filthy word, a nauſeous compariſon, a meer fancy of having touched ſomething loathſome, ſhall ſet our ſtomachs a kecking againſt the moſt innocent food. Nothing is naſty of itſelf, but things become ſo by being aſſorted together in unſuitable mixtures: he that ſhould gnaw his glove and paw the meat with his hands would be cried out againſt as a naſty fellow, but if he apply both to their proper places you have nothing to complain of him. Dirt in the fields, gravel upon the roads, and the carpets upon our floors are not naſty, but whoever ſhould lie down upon either would be blamed for daubing his cloaths. Naſtineſs ſeems to have no oppoſite, for cleanneſs is rather a negation of that than a contrary quality, and to make clean implies no more than to remove away filth without ſubſtituting anything elſe in its room. We often uſe Neatneſs to expreſs the middle point between beauty and deformity in objects, and Decency to denote the like in actions or ſentiments: a neat little houſe and a decent behaviour is that wherein there is nothing either to engage or offend the eye. Yet theſe middle points

points incline a little to the favourable ſide, for there is a degree of complacence in ſeeing things clean and neat and perſons behave decently about us: but this complacence perhaps is of none other kind than that which frequently ariſes upon contemplating the abſence of anything that would diſturb us.

11. Our taſtes varying as much as our faces makes us very bad judges of one anothers enjoyments, for we take for granted that everybody muſt be pleaſed with what we like ourſelves, and according to the vulgar ſaying, meaſure other peoples corn by our own buſhel. Nor are there inſtances wanting wherein we meaſure our own corn by their buſhel: when we ſee a crowd of people running to look at any ſight it raiſes our own curioſity to make one among them, and a diſh or diverſion we find others eagerly fond of ſtirs up a longing to partake of the like: but upon trial we often find our expectation diſappointed and that what may give another great delight affords us no entertainment.

Nor do we judge much better of our own pleaſures, for want of being well aware of their aptneſs to cloy upon repetition, and to change their reliſh perpetually according to our diſpoſition of body or mind or the cir-

cumſtances we happen to ſtand in: neither can we truſt even experience itſelf in this caſe, for becauſe a thing has pleaſed us once we cannot always be ſure it will do ſo again. The boy who wiſhed to be a king that he might have an officer appointed to ſwing him all day long upon a gate, took his reſolution upon the remembrance of what had given him pleaſure; for we may ſuppoſe he had often found a ſupreme delight in that innocent amuſement, but little thought that the ſame continued for hours together would prove extremely tedious and irkſome. The like miſtake prevails with many after their ceaſing to be boys, they find a vaſt delight in diverſions and fancies of ſeveral kinds, and therefore eagerly purſue them as inexhauſtible ſources of enjoyment; not conſidering that thoſe things pleaſe only in the acquiſition or by their novelty, and loſe all their poignancy upon growing familiar. Therefore it is one of the principal arts of life to find out ſuch pleaſures as are moſt durable and leaſt liable to change by an alteration of temper or circumſtances.

12. But if we make miſtakes in eſtimating pleaſures ſingly, we commit more in computting the value of a ſeries of them taken collectively: for we cannot reckon them with the ſame exactneſs practicable in our money affairs,

affairs, nor can we tell how many little amuſements are equivalent to a great one, as we can how many ſhillings go to a pound. He that keeps a regular account of his caſh may know to a ſhilling what were his receipts and what his diſburſements in any month of the laſt year, and how much they exceeded or fell ſhort of thoſe in any other month; but I defy any man to make the like entry of his enjoyments and diſquietudes: if he can tell that ſuch a day was ſpent more agreably than ſuch another, tis more than he can always do with certainty, but he can never caſt up the exact amount on the debtor and creditor ſide in any day, nor tell preciſely the proportion one bears to the other.

Therefore we are forced to take our pleaſures in the lump and eſtimate them upon view: as a man who gueſſes at a flock of ſheep by the ground they cover without being able to count them, and who will do it very imperfectly until he has gotten an expertneſs by long and carefull practice. For abſent enjoyments whether paſt or future being not actually exiſtent, we cannot hold them as it were in our hand to weigh them, but muſt judge by the repreſentative idea we have of them in our imagination; and we ordinarily determine their value by the degree of deſire we feel in ourſelves towards them. Beſides,

the mind being conſtantly attentive to the bettering her condition in the next ſucceeding moment, it is not ſtrictly ſpeaking diſtant enjoyment that ever moves her, any otherwiſe than by the deſire it raiſes of advancing towards it, the gratification of which deſire yields a preſent ſatisfaction.

13. For this reaſon intenſe pleaſures engage more with the generality of mankind than a continuance of gentler amuſements; for the latter weighing only by their number, cannot ſo eaſily be brought within the compaſs of a ſingle idea, and when we endeavour to do ſo we commonly fix upon one or two of them as a ſample of the whole; as a man who would recommend a poem, a play or any other entertainment, pitches upon a few ſtriking parts for a ſpecimen of the reſt: whereas high delights carrying their whole force in a ſingle point, make a deep impreſſion upon the mind, which excites a deſire proportionable to the repreſentative idea left behind. But frequently deſire encreaſes though the reliſh dies away upon repetition, hence your men of pleaſure retain the former after having utterly loſt the latter, and perhaps receive none other ſatisfaction from their pleaſures than what ariſes from the gratification of their eagerneſs in the purſuit of them. This probably induced Sir John Suckling, who

who was a man of pleaſure, to ſay, Tis expectation makes a bleſſing dear: and if he added, Heaven were not heaven if we knew what it were, we may preſume it was becauſe he had no idea of any other than the Mahometan heaven, which was not likely to prove one upon experience how alluring ſoever it might appear in ſpeculation.

But if we ſit down to ſuch carefull computation as we are able to make of our enjoyments, we ſhall find ourſelves much more beholden upon the whole to thoſe of the gentler kind: for high delights, like high ſauces, if they draw no miſchiefs after them, at leaſt pall the appetite for everything elſe, or create a hankering after themſelves at ſeaſons wherein they are not to be had; thus making us pay dear enough for the tranſient gratification they afford. Yet pleaſures of the tempting kind if properly choſen have their value, not ſo much for their intrinſic worth as for the fruits they produce: for pleaſing ſenſations or reflections rarely come upon us of their own accord, much the greater part of our enjoyment lies in the exerciſe of our activity when engaged in ſome purſuit or employment; but there can be no engagement without an end which we conceive it would give us a more than ordinary degree of complacence to attain.

The pleaſures commanded by riches or thoſe expected from eminence of ſtation or accompliſhment, ſpur men on to induſtry in their ſeveral callings and profeſſions. The joy of ſeeing a piece of workmanſhip compleated, carries an artiſt through the toils and difficulties of his work. I find myſelf not a little encouraged in this my purſuit of the light of nature by caſting back a look now and then upon thoſe rays of it already collected. Even virtue herſelf receives no ſmall acceſſion of vigour from the contemplation of ſuch few of her beauties as we may have in our poſſeſſion. Nor need I mention that ſeaſonable recreation enlivens the ſpirits, gives briſkneſs to the circulation and renders the mind alert for any exerciſe: it often prolongs enjoyment beyond the preſent moment by furniſhing materials to think and talk of afterwards; ſo that a few days diverſion in ſummer may ſupply a fund of entertainment for the ſucceeding winter. Let us not then think pleaſures unworthy the attention of a philoſopher, ſince in good hands they may be turned to excellent ſervices.

14. As expectation makes a bleſſing dear, ſo by making dear it makes it valuable: the main of our enjoyment depends upon our deſires, which take riſe from experience of what has pleaſed us, whence we conceive an expecta-

expectation of its doing the like again. But deſire generally produces a more plentifull crop than the parent plant from which it ſprung, eſpecially in our common diverſions which lie almoſt wholly in the purſuit and very little in the attainment. He that at whiſt ſhould have four honours ſix trumps always dealt him would loſe his whole diverſion, becauſe he would have nothing to do but throw down his cards and ſet up his ſcore. So in bowling the player minds to deliver his bowl aright, he runs after it, chides it, encourages it, writhes his body into all manner of contorſions as if to influence the bias, and herein conſiſts his entertainment; for the joy of winning the game paſſes over in a moment, he takes his ſtake, pockets it, and thinks no more than where to throw the jack for beginning another caſt. Many a man has found greater pleaſure in planting a tree and tending and pruning it and obſerving its growth than he ever did in taſting the fruit: yet the former ariſes wholly from the latter, for elſe why might not he plant a bramble as well as a nectarine?

But every pleaſure does not keep deſire alive alike, nor will every deſire return an equal produce of entertainment, which makes the ſcience of pleaſure ſo little under-

ſtood. Men run eagerly after the moſt intenſe, thinking the more of them they can obtain ſo much the better, being deceived herein by their method of computation; for they reckon, like the boy, that if a quarter of an hours ſwing upon the gate gave immenſe delight, five hours ſwinging muſt give twenty times as much: whereas the arithmetic to be employed in this ſcience differs widely from common arithmetic, two and two do not always make four, the ſecond number often operating as a negative quantity which being added to the former diminiſhes inſtead of encreaſing the ſum. Beſides, when we have ſettled the intrinſic value of our pleaſures all is not done, we muſt conſider other things dependent upon them, and proceed in a kind of algebraical method: ſuch a degree of delight, more by the amuſement it will afford us in the purſuit, the pleaſing expectation it will raiſe beforehand, and the ſoothing reflections it will leave behind; leſs by the labour we muſt undergo, the difficulties and hazards we muſt run to obtain it, the wants and cravings it may create, the diſappointments we may meet with, and the miſchiefs and inconveniences it may introduce. Thus we find the art of bookeeping in the commerce of pleaſure very hard to attain, for beſides the difficulty of reducing

ducing every ſpecies of coin to ſome current ſtandard, we muſt make all fair allowances for intereſt and produce, and take all reaſonable charges and deductions into the account: but any tolerable ſkill we can acquire in this buſineſs is well worth the pains of learning.

I have remarked in another place that our idea of pleaſures, like our proſpect of viſible objects, appears duller when they ſtand at a diſtance, and grows more vivid upon their nearer approach: and that habit and ſympathy take effect by ſuggeſting trains of thought and methods of action without the trouble of hunting for them. For there being a degree of complacence in every common motion of the mind and exerciſe of our activity, eaſe and readineſs become a ſpecies of pleaſure, and whatever gives play to our powers engages us in each ſucceeding moment until ſomething more important carries us into another track. From this ſource I apprehend derived moſt of our little motives influencing our by actions and under motions, which ſteal upon us without our perceiving and ſhape the manner of proceeding in all our performances.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

USE.

AS the greater number by far of our pleaſures ſpring from one another by tranſlation, ſo our other ſatisfactions come to us through the ſame channel, being derived from pleaſure: for nature affects us originally only with ſenſations excited by the play of our external or internal organs, and objects engage us according as in the various alterations and contextures of our frame produced by education, cuſtom or accident, they are made to give that play to the organs. But that uſe bears a derivative value is implied in the very term, for whatever may have been ſaid concerning things beautifull or laudable in themſelves, we never hear them ſtiled uſefull in themſelves but for ſomething elſe, that is, ſo far as they tend to improve our condition or contribute to our enjoyment either immediately or remotely in ſome reſpect or other.

Though nature has poured enjoyments around us with an unſparing hand, yet ſhe has not hung them ſo near within our reach as that we can pluck them whenever we pleaſe:

pleaſe: we muſt do many things before hand preparatory to the obtaining them, we muſt provide inſtruments and lay in materials to ſerve us upon occaſion, furniſh ourſelves with the neceſſary means for adminiſtring to our wants, and take pains in planting and cultivating the tree long before we can gather the fruit. This tendency to ſupply the means of gratification transfers our deſire to things indifferent in themſelves, ſo that having obſerved them frequently ſerviceable we can willingly ſtore them up without view to any particular ſervice they will do us, but upon the general proſpect that we ſhall find occaſion for them one time or other. And as the materials of enjoyment many times are no more to be had with a wiſh than the enjoyments themſelves, but require other materials to procure them, hence uſe grows from out of uſe: for whatever conduces to the acquiſition of uſefull things becomes uſefull itſelf upon that account. Thus if the accommodations of life are uſefull for the comfort and delights they continually afford, money is uſefull too becauſe it will purchaſe thoſe accommodations, an eſtate becauſe it yields an annual income of money, a profeſſion becauſe it tends to raiſe a competency of eſtate, application and induſtry becauſe they help to make men thrive in their profeſſions, ſkill and ſagacity

gacity becauſe they render induſtry ſucceſsfull, experience and learning becauſe they improve our ſkill and ſharpen our ſagacity. All that men eſteem valuable or think worth their while to purſue, derives its value either directly from enjoyment or from ſomething elſe firſt recommended thereby. Riches, power, fame, health, ſtrength, exiſtence, talents, knowledge, accompliſhment, luck, liberty, juſtice, ſteddineſs, become this way objects of our deſire.

2. But deſire, as has been ſhown in the laſt chapter, altho' the child of pleaſure, begets an offspring of the ſame features, make and complection with its grandmother: for the gratification of any deſire, by how diſtant object ſoever excited, affords a preſent pleaſure proportionable to the eagerneſs of the deſire. Therefore we ſee men expreſs great joy according to the ardency of their wiſhes upon any acceſſion of wealth, or power, or knowledge, or enlargement of their liberty, or diſcovery of their ſtrength of reſolution: and theſe ſecondary pleaſures take up much the larger ſhare on the credit ſide of our account after we arrive at manhood; yet even theſe objects affect the ballance more by the engagement of their purſuit or conſequences of their poſſeſſion than by the joy of their acquiſition. Wherefore the wiſeſt of men have

have been ever obſerved attentive to things uſefull in preference to things pleaſant, becauſe the former contain the ſeeds of many future enjoyments, whereas the latter can only improve our condition for the preſent moment: and we have ſeen a little while ago that pleaſure itſelf does not deſerve regard ſo much for its own poignancy as when it becomes uſefull by raiſing an expectation that engages us in a purſuit giving ſcope to agreable reflections, or inſtigates to ſomething more beneficial than itſelf.

That ſpecies of uſe called convenience viſibly bears a reference to pleaſure: for tho' our inſtruments be inconvenient, nevertheleſs we may make ſhift to work with them, but when we have all our implements convenient about us we can compleat our work with more eaſe and diſpatch. The conveniences, as diſtinguiſhed from the neceſſaries of life, ſerve only to make it run more ſmooth and agreable, and to render that an amuſement which would otherwiſe have been a taſk. He that has all neceſſaries fully ſupplied him has everything requiſite for his being, but conveniences ſuperadded enable him not only to ſupport but to enjoy his being.

Deſire having paſſed thro' many tranſlations we often loſe all remembrance of the progreſs it has made, nor can trace it back to the original

ginal fountain, which induces us to believe many deſires natural and interwoven into our conſtitution, that derived their influence from certain things conducive to our enjoyments and conveniences. A very little reflection will convince us this is the caſe with reſpect to money, which however ſometimes looked upon as deſireable in itſelf, and how much ſoever the covetous man may prefer it beyond all things elſe, yet nobody can ſuppoſe he would ever have had the leaſt attachment for it if he had never found it ſerviceable to procure the enjoyments and accommodations of life. But there are other deſires whoſe derivation is not ſo apparent and therefore are imagined born with us or to be propenſities infuſed into the mind, and which break forth into act immediately upon the proper objects to excite them being preſented. Of this ſort are the deſire of knowledge, of liberty, of power, of ſelf-preſervation and many others. I ſhall examine only two which may ſerve as ſamples for the reſt: the love of juſtice, and that fondneſs for having our own Wills diſcernible more or leſs in all men.

3. We find juſtice commonly divided into two branches, called Commutative directing us to render to every man his due, and Diſtributive guiding us in the application of reward and puniſhment. The firſt of theſe you

you ſee no appearance of in children, who greedily catch at everything they can get without regard to the claims of their play-fellows: and when they grow up all the laws, the penalties, the puniſhments in the world, are little enough to prevent the invaſion of property; but the generality of mankind ſtill remain diſpoſed to overreach one another in a bargain and take all undue advantages whenever they can do it ſafely. So that ſince the golden age Aſtrea reſides no more upon earth: even the honeſteſt of men, if they will ſpeak ingenuouſly, muſt acknowledge it extremely difficult to preſerve a ſtrict impartiality of judgement in matters affecting their own private intereſt. Beſides, it ſeems to be agreed among the learned that nature gave the earth and all its produce among mankind in common, and that property would have had no exiſtence but for the neceſſity of it to preſerve order and encourage induſtry with all the improvements conſequent thereupon. The view of theſe advantages inſpires us all with a liking to juſtice, but it is when diſcerned in other people, and certainly there can be nothing more convenient than that everybody ſhould behave juſtly to us: therefore no man but would be glad to ſee juſtice prevail univerſally with an exemption only for himſelf. And though I doubt

doubt not there are many who would act uprightly although there were no laws nor even hazard of a diſcovery to reſtrain them from the contrary, yet theſe are perſons who have learned to regard the intereſts of others as well as themſelves: ſo that their principle of integrity ſtill reſults from convenience, though not their own, but that of other people.

As for diſtributive juſtice we have already ſeen under the article of anger how the deſire of revenge ſprings from expedience; and though men of conſideration and judgement will often puniſh but not in anger, they do it from the neceſſity of puniſhment to keep the world in order, wherefore they regard the intention more than the deed, knowing that the uſe of puniſhment is not to repair the damage ſuſtained, to which it will by no means contribute, but to mend the manners and direct the intention of mankind to the forbearance of injury. Even the vulgar, tho' ordinarily prompted by impulſe of paſſion, yet if you would diſſuade them from the proſecution or retaliation of wrongs, reply readily, Why otherwiſe we cannot ſleep ſafe in our beds, or we ſhall be liable to perpetual inſults: which however inſincere they may be or ignorant of their real motive, ſhows that common ſenſe dictates expedience as the only

only plea to juſtify reſentment. If there were a natural and neceſſary connection between offence and puniſhment, how could there be any room for mercy? which a perſon of humanity will always ſhow whenever it can be extended to the offender without inconvenience to the public or detriment to private perſons. Nor does our inclination to reward grow from any other root than that of expedience, as encouraging men to repeat the good offices that have deſerved it. When we promiſe a poor man a reward for doing us ſome particular ſervice, or offer one for the recovery of goods loſt or apprehenſion of a thief; we have viſibly our own ends in view. And the obſervation that the return of good offices engages men to continue them is ſo obvious as to eſcape nobody's notice, but the convenience found in ſuch returns occurs ſo continually in the commerce of life that ſatisfaction, as cuſtomary in tranſlations, becomes connected with the practice, and we get an habitual aptneſs to retaliate favours as well as injuries without looking forward to the benefits attending upon ſo doing. Thus the heartieſt gratitude, as I have ſhown in the proper place concerning the pureſt love, though bearing the fragranteſt flowers, ſprouts originally from the earthy principle of ſelf intereſt.

4. And that adherence to what we have once ſet our hearts upon, ſo common in the world, iſſues from the ſame bed: for our larger actions, by which alone we can help ourſelves in our needs, conſiſt of many ſingle acts, which muſt all tend towards the ſame point or they will never form an entire body to compleat the purpoſe we intended. We cannot walk acroſs the room with a ſingle ſtep, nor help ourſelves to a glaſs of wine by one motion of our arm, nor compaſs anything whatever until our volitions have been accuſtomed to follow one another in the ſame direction. This diſcovers to us the expedience of a ſteddineſs and conſiſtency of conduct, and renders the having willed a thing a motive with us to will it ſtill until ſome cogent reaſon ſhall occur to the contrary. Experience indeed might convince us in time that it is often expedient to change our meaſures and comply with the neceſſity of our ſituation, but all do not profit by experience: and thoſe are obſerved to be the moſt wilfull who have found the leaſt need of compliance, being either ſuch whoſe ſtrength of body and hardineſs of conſtitution have enabled them to reſiſt compulſion, or ſuch as being conſtantly humoured by perſons about them have uſed to gain their ends by perſiſting. But this ſturdineſs of temper ought by

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no means to be abſolutely rejected, being eminently ſerviceable or pernicious according to the objects whereto it is directed: when turned the wrong way it is called obſtinacy, ſtubborneſs and perverſeneſs, when the right we entitle it ſteddineſs, reſolution and bravery, without which there is no enduring pains, hardſhips and difficulties, nor going through with an arduous undertaking, nor indeed compleating any work that requires labour and time. For conſidering the fluctuating nature of our ideas, it is impoſſible to keep up the deſire firſt urging to the taſk in its full colours, but we ſhould faint in midway upon any fatigue or obſtacle intervening if it were not for the habit of perſeverance in what we had once begun. The forming a reſolution requires a very different ſituation of mind from that of executing, in the former we gather as many conſiderations as we can to fortify our reſolves, in the latter we are too buſy with the meaſures to be taken to admit any further idea relating to our purpoſe than the ſtrength of reſolution wherewith we had determined upon it. Eſpecially when pain aſſaults us it ſo fills the mind that we have no room for more than the remembrance of our having judged the thing to be attained by ſupporting it expedient, without any of the foundations for that

judgement: all we can do further is by an operation upon our organs to withdraw our notice from the ſmart and heighten our deſire or want of perſeverance in our deſign as much as poſſible.

Since then adherence to our purpoſe proves ſo ſignally ſerviceable upon great occaſions and ſo continually uſefull upon common ones, no wonder it becomes the object of deſire in ſome degree with all men, and gives them vexation upon being croſſed and pleaſure upon being gratified. They may not always be able to trace out its reference to uſe, they know they love to have their Wills but forget by what ſteps they fell in love with them: for underſtanding cannot penetrate into all the private receſſes of imagination. In other caſes men are frequently deceived with reſpect to the influence that uſe has upon them, ſelf intereſt giving a wonderfull bias to the judgement and producing thoſe motives we have called the obſcure, becauſe ſheltering themſelves under cover of more ſpecious reaſons while they too often give the real turn to our behaviour.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

HONOUR.

AS uſe ſprouts from pleaſure ſo honour branches out from uſe, and ſtands one remove further from the parent root, for which reaſon it is more readily ſuppoſed innate, its derivation being not ſo eaſily traced: for it never grows to maturity while adhering to the mother plant, nor until ſeparated from it as an offset and ſtanding upon its own ſtem. We are not thought actuated by honour ſo long as we have any further advantage or gratification in view, nor until it becomes a motive of itſelf ſufficient to operate upon us without needing recommendation from anything elſe to give it weight. But this does not prove it to be the gift of nature, for we may remember many inſtances already pointed out of tranſlation, wherein ſatisfaction has been made to fix ſo ſtrongly upon things originally indifferent as to render them powerful motives of action.

Our principle of honour is ſo far from being born with us that we ſhould never have acquired it if we had always been debarred from ſociety. Little children, as they ſhow

no ſigns of ſhame ſo neither do they diſcover any notion of applauſe, until being perpetually told that Mamma will not love them, nor Papa give them pretty things, nor Nurſe take care of them unleſs they be good, they learn to look upon the approbation of perſons about them as deſirable. And when we grow up we find it ſo extremely and continually uſefull to have the good opinion and eſteem of others which make them friendly and obſequious to our deſires, that this is enough to give us a liking to eſteem, and conſequently to thoſe actions or qualities tending to promote it. For reflection and experience leading us by gradation from one thing to another, our deſire of approbation throws a complacence upon actions procuring it, and this again makes us value the poſſeſſion of qualities productive of ſuch actions although we have no preſent opportunity of exerciſing them.

2. Beſides, there lies a nearer way for good qualities to arrive at their valuableneſs: for we find the very ſight of them raiſing an eſteem in the beholder without ſtaying for the benefits to be received from them. Nay that ſight contributes more to give a good opinion of the poſſeſſor than the reception of the benefits, and the latter only as an evidence of the former. Whatever enables a man

man to do much good or hurt, ſets him higher in the eſtimation of the vulgar than a diſpoſition to uſe his powers well: therefore we ſee great talents, ſagacity, ſtrength of body, nobility of birth, and even opulence and good fortune, introduced for topics of panegyric as well as beneficence, public ſpirit and induſtry.

But what is more uſefull, carries away our attention from what is leſs, therefore we judge of things by compariſon, placing our eſteem upon thoſe which are excellent and ſupereminent in their kind; and what we once greatly admired may be eclipſed by ſomething darting a ſuperiour luſtre. And our admiration of ſuperiority renders the marks of it ſubjects of our admiration too: hence proceeds our fondneſs for titles of honour, ſplendor of equipage and badges of diſtinction: hence likewiſe majeſty of countenance, dignity of geſture and ſolemnity of deportment, command our reſpect as expreſſing ſomething extraordinary and excellent within; for where we know the ſubject exhibiting them poſſeſſes nothing more than common, they excite our laughter inſtead of our admiration. Nor are we unaffected with excellence appearing in beaſts or things inanimate or the performances of art: we admire the noble mien of a lion, the magnificence of a

building, the immenſe expanſe of heaven, the regular courſes of the ſtars, the maſter ſtrokes of poetry and ſublimity of ſtile, becauſe theſe objects afford immediate entertainment by filling imagination with large ideas, or expreſs ſomething extraordinary in the authors and cauſes of them. And honour reſting chiefly in compariſon teaches us to ſee an expedience in excelling, for it is not ſo much matter what we are in ourſelves as what degree we ſtand in amongſt others, which ſows the ſeeds of envy, emulation and contention for ſuperiority. But as excellence will not produce its effects until made viſible, this opens the door to oſtentation, vanity and affectation, which may be obſerved abounding moſt in thoſe who have been flattered into an opinion of their having ſomething extraordinary to exhibit or ſome agreable peculiarity in their manner.

3. But the thought of poſſeſſing whatever we eſteem uſefull or advantageous ſooths and gives immediate pleaſure to the mind: for which reaſon there is a near affinity between beauty and honour, both delighting the eye inſtantly upon ſight without reference to thoſe further advantages which firſt made it recommendable, and love and eſteem commonly generating one another, or at leaſt nouriſhing each others growth. In viſible

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objects one can more eaſily diſcern the diſtinction than deſcribe it, only we may ſay that beauty ſeems to affect the ſenſe alone, whereas admiration more apparently requires the concurrence of imagination. But when applied to actions and ſentiments it is harder to know them apart: wherefore the Greeks uſed the ſame term to expreſs them both, and though the Latins had a different name for each, yet they applied their epithets promiſcuouſly, diſtinguiſhing things indifferently either into beautiful and deformed, or laudable and blamable. But the mind, having a natural propenſity to pleaſure, loves to ſolace herſelf in the contemplation of whatever belonging to her ſhe conceives will do her honour: this engenders pride: which may be called a habit of dwelling upon the thought of any ſuppoſed excellencies or advantages men believe themſelves poſſeſſed of, as well power, birth, wealth, ſtrength of body, or beauty of perſon, as endowments of the mind.

But our propenſity to this as well as other pleaſures produces miſchievous effects, too often miſleading the underſtanding, damping induſtry, and deſtroying its own purpoſe by overcharging the appetite. It caſts a wonderfull bias upon the judgement, inclining men to fancy themſelves poſſeſſed of advantages they

they have not, to overvalue thoſe they really have, and to depreciate thoſe of other people. It keeps them ſo attentive to their own ſelf-ſufficiency as to think it needleſs to look for anything further: whereas induſtry beſpeaks a humble mind, more ſollicitous to make new acquiſitions than to count over thoſe already gained, as not judging them enough to reſt ſatisfied with. And it deſtroys the reliſh men find in the poſſeſſion of good things by ſatiating them with the contemplation: for as our bodily members tire upon continual exerciſe, ſo our mental organs cloy upon repetition, ſoon exhauſting the ſweets of an object and entertaining no longer than while receiving freſh ſupplies of novelty and variety. Accordingly the proud reap no delight from their pride, we rather ſee them more gloomy and diſcontented than other people; and if they ſtill retain a fondneſs for reflecting on their ſuperexcellence, it is like the unnatural thirſt of a drunkard, which does not draw him by pleaſure but drives him by the uneaſineſs of his unextinguiſhable cravings.

4. Is it then never allowable to caſt back a look upon anything wherein we have ſucceeded well or upon any advantages we poſſeſs? This I do not aſſert: for the complacence we feel upon ſuch occaſions improves our

our condition ſo long as we can enjoy it pure, and whatever pleaſes deſerves our regard if none other conſideration interfere. I ſee nothing ſhould hinder the boy from ſwinging provided he took care to do his leſſon firſt, not to break down the farmers gate, and to leave off his diverſion before it grew tireſome: ſo neither need we ſcruple to ride upon any little excellency we may poſſeſs, taking only ſuch tranſient views of it as may afford us a real guſt, if we have nothing elſe to do, and neither injure nor offend anybody nor harbour a thought injurious or offenſive to anybody. Beſides there is a further uſe beyond the preſent amuſement in making proper compariſons of things and perſons: for the retroſpect upon what we have done well encourages us to perſevere in the like conduct, the knowledge of any good things we poſſeſs whets our induſtry to preſerve and procure more of them, and a due ſence of our eſtimation among mankind withholds us from conforting with perſons or giving into behaviour unbecoming our character. But what compariſons of this kind are proper or not depends upon a fair computation of the ſervice they will do or the net income of real pleaſures they will yield upon the ballance.

5. As honour branches from uſe, ſo it takes diverſe tinctures according to the ſtock whereon

whereon it is grafted. The profeſſions and ſituations of men in life rendring different things ſerviceable to them, creates a proportionable variety in their ſentiments of honour: the merchant places it in punctuality of payment, the ſoldier in bravery, the artificer in the compleatneſs of his works, the ſcholar in acquiſitions of learning, the fine gentleman in politeneſs and elegancy of taſte, the lady in her beauty or neatneſs of dreſs or ſkill in family oeconomy. There is no man utterly deſtitute of honour becauſe no man but finds the expedience of it in ſome degree or other: nor is there a poſſibility of living in any comfort or tranquillity under univerſal contempt. But mens notions of it are widely different and diſcordant: what one eſteems an honour, another looks upon as a folly or diſgrace; one values himſelf upon his ſincerity and plain dealing, another upon his art of diſſimulation: one upon his patience in enduring wrongs, another upon his quickneſs in reſenting them; tho' Falſtaffe ridiculed the grinning honours of the field, yet he ſcorned to give a reaſon upon compulſion: every one eſteems that higheſt which he has found turning moſt to account in the way of life wherein he is engaged, or beſt promoting his deſigns, or adding to his enjoyment in the company among whom his lot

lot has fallen. Which ſhows that our ſenſe of honour is not natural like that of ſeeing; for this exhibits the ſame diſtinction of colours to all alike, nor ever makes a lilly appear blue to one man, green to another and ſcarlet to a third, according to the ſeveral ways they have been brought up in or employments they have followed.

6. Though our eſtimation of things commonly firſt ariſes from the credit they bear with other people, yet the judgements of mankind being ſo various obliges us to look out for ſome other rule to direct us in our obſervation: for by following what we ſee admired at one time, we may be thought to purſue trifles or incur cenſure at another. To avoid the trouble ſuch accidents would give us we have none other remedy than by hardning ourſelves ſometimes againſt reproach, which we ſee every one ready to do more or leſs upon occaſion: for there could be no ſteddineſs of conduct nor perſeverance in any purpoſe if we were to veer about with every blaſt of applauſe or cenſure. But as no man would wiſh to throw off all ſenſibility, he muſt diſtinguiſh when to reſtrain and when to give it ſcope: this teaches him to look inwards upon himſelf and obſerve what eſtimation things bear in his own mind, and the judgements the mind paſſes in ſuch caſes immediately upon

upon inſpection are called the ſentiments. I know this term is often applied to opinions concerning the truth or falſehood, expedience or inexpedience of things: as when a man is aſked to declare his ſentiments upon a point of natural philoſophy or a maxim of policy or meaſure of prudence, the queſtion means no more than to know what he judges moſt agreable to reaſon or moſt conducive to the purpoſe aimed at. But Sentiment, being derived from Senſe or Feeling, ſeems more peculiarly applicable to thoſe judgements the mind paſſes upon matters of praiſe or blame, which ſhe cannot do without feeling a degree of complacence or diſguſt in contemplating the ſubject whereon ſhe ſo paſſes her judgement.

One can live but little while in the world without acquiring ſome of theſe ſentiments, and when deeply rooted by long habit they become powerfull incentives of action. The teſtimony of a man's own breaſt when clear and full will bear him up againſt the reproaches of a whole world; ſelf approbation when ſtrong and well grounded will ſupport him under hardſhips, diſappointments and diſtreſſes; and the deſire of doing ſomething he may applaud himſelf for will carry him through labours, difficulties and dangers. You may move any man almoſt any way by

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touching his point of honour, if you can but find out where it lies: but herein and in applying the proper means to affect it rests the difficulty, for perhaps it does not lie in the same part nor look towards the same objects as it does in yourself. We currently pronounce the vulgar void of honour because they want those notions of it instilled into us by education and good company: but if they had not a sensibility of their own they would never be moved unless by blows or something affecting them in point of interest, whereas we find the meanest of mankind as apt to take fire upon opprobrious language or defamation, when they understand it, as the most refined.

7. The generality of men draw their sentiments of honour from those with whom they consort, or from the tendency of things to promote what they most ardently desire: they feel themselves affecting some objects and shocked at others, they neither know nor enquire how they come to be so, but follow the present impulse without further examination. But the studious, desirous to see with their own eyes, and unwilling to trust either the opinions of mankind which they perceive infinitely various and contradictory, or even their own sentiments which they find wavering and clashing with one another, endeavour

vour to fix upon ſome criterion whereby to diſtinguiſh true honour from the falſe. This has led many into the notion of an eſſential quality, which residing in certain objects they became laudable in themſelves: which quality I take to have been underſtood by the Kalòn of the Greeks and Honeſtum of the Romans, to which I know of no word that anſwers in the engliſh tongue, but it may be deſcribed, That which raiſes your approbation inſtantly upon being ſuggeſted to the thought without reference to any conſequences attendant thereupon. If you aſked what this Kalòn was, you were referred to the effect it would have upon the eye of an impartial beholder. But ſeveral beholders ſee different appearances in the ſame object; this it was replied aroſe from a fault in the viſion, for the optics of ſome are ſo dimmed and overclouded by the miſts of error and prejudice that, like a jaundiced eye, they cannot ſee the Kalòn in its true colours. Well, but how ſhall we know whether our optics be clear and how to rectify them? why, obſerve the beſt and wiſeſt men and learn to ſee as they do. Thus the whole matter is at laſt reſolved into authority, a method unbecoming a philoſopher, for though the examples of wiſe men be an excellent guide for us to follow in our conduct, it lets us nothing into the

the nature of things unleſs we have the grounds explained whereon they formed their judgement: and as we ſhall meet with many inſtances wherein we cannot have the benefit of their example, we ſhall ſtill remain at a loſs how to diſtinguiſh the genuine Kalòn from the ſpurious. Beſides, the actions of the wiſe themſelves have been made the ſubject of controverſy, many judicious perſons having doubted whether Cato the cenſor had a juſt idea of the Kalòn when he perſecuted the Carthaginians to deſtruction, or Brutus when he aſſaſſinated Ceſar, or the younger Cato, whom Seneca pronounces a perfect wiſeman, when he deſerted his poſt of life at Utica: ſo that we want ſome other teſt to try the dictates of wiſdom when mingled among the frailties of human nature in the very beſt of men.

When ſuch diſputes happen the parties generally recur to ſome principles they think will be admitted on the other ſide; and if thoſe are agreed to 'tis very well, but what if they be denied? or what if it be aſked upon what grounds thoſe principles are founded? I know of none other way to determine the matter than by a reference to uſe. And ſo far the old philoſophers ſeem to have admitted this rule as to allow that all things laud-

able were uſefull, but then they placed thoſe qualities out of their proper order, for they held that things were therefore uſefull becauſe laudable, whereas the truth appears to me to be that they are therefore laudable becauſe uſefull: for I cannot conceive how any practice can be laudable which will never do the leaſt ſervice to the performer nor any body elſe, nor blamable from whence more good will accrue by following it than letting it alone. All ſervices are eſteemed, as well in the eye of the world as in a man's own reflection, according as they are more or leſs ſignal: and if temptations and difficulties ſtanding in the way render a deed the ſubject of greater applauſe, certainly, nothing can be more uſefull than an ability to ſurmount difficulties and reſiſt temptations when they would withold us from any thing beneficial.

8. But if things be laudable becauſe uſefull, muſt not uſe and honour always go together? Is there then no difference between one and the other? If a man entruſted with a valuable depoſit by a perſon deceaſed, debates with himſelf whether he ſhall apply it to the purpoſes directed or to his own benefit, does not uſe exhort him one way and honour the other? Certainly they do: but then uſe muſt be underſtood here of what appears ſuch to him, not what is really ſuch upon the whole

whole upſhot of the account. We get a habit of looking upon power, profit and ſuch like, as valuable, and thence contract a deſire of attaining them whenever an opportunity offers, but this deſire would lead us many times into miſchiefs and inconveniences if not witheld by the reſtraint of honour; or we grudge the pains of purſuing things really valuable, and ſhould miſs of them unleſs ſhamed out of our indolence: here the ſence of honour does us ſignal ſervice by ſtimulating when intereſt wanted ſharpneſs ſufficient, and urging to practices whoſe uſe we are not ſenſible of as lying too remote for us to diſcern. Were there a race of men of ſo penetrating and extenſive an underſtanding as to comprehend at one view all the conſequences of every action, and ſo well regulated a taſte as conſtantly to prefer the greater remote good before the leſſer near at hand, they would have no ſence of honour becauſe they would want none; for their own diſcernment would lead them preciſely into thoſe very courſes which true honour recommends. The neceſſity of this principle ariſes from the weakneſs and narrowneſs of our capacities: they that are whole need not the phyſician nor his remedies, but they that are ſick, and honour is that remedy which alone can cure the diſorders and confuſions brought upon

the world by a too cloſe attachment to our injudicious deſires in diſregard of the general good, wherein our own is ultimately contained or I may ſay lies concealed. The voluptuous, who conſtantly follow whatever appetite or fancy prompts, have the narroweſt minds; a prudent regard to intereſt widens them a little; but a due ſence of honour opens the heart and enlarges the ſoul as far as it is capable of extending. Therefore the wiſeſt and beſt of men, as they have ever been obſerved attentive to things uſefull in preference to things pleaſant, ſo they give the like preference to the laudable before the uſefull, and for the ſame reaſon; becauſe as uſe contains the ſeeds of many future enjoyments, ſo honour leads to further uſes than their wiſdom, but imperfect at the beſt, can always deſcry.

Now to come as near as poſſible to my old friends of former ages I ſhall readily admit that, although things be not therefore uſefull becauſe laudable, yet they ought therefore to be eſteemed uſefull becauſe of that approbation we feel reſting upon them in our own minds. For as we have ſhown in Chap. XI that many truths reputed ſelf-evident were not innate but acquired by experience of facts, nevertheleſs we may juſtly employ them as the baſis of our reaſonings, be-

becauſe the ſtrength wherewith they ſtrike upon the judgement is a good evidence that we had ſufficient grounds for embracing them though now abſolutely forgotten and irrecoverable: ſo when we perceive objects commanding our applauſe inſtantly upon inſpection, we may reſt aſſured that we ourſelves or thoſe perſons from whom we have taken the tincture, have found advantages in them which we do not now retain in memory nor can readily trace out. The uſes we ſee daily reſulting from a principle of honour are enow to give it a value in the eyes of every prudent perſon; continual experience teſtifies that this principle rightly grounded witholds us from folly, rouzes us to induſtry, ſhines through the miſts of prejudice, and ballances the influence of paſſion: nor can anybody avoid taking notice how much men's regard for their credit with others and ſelf approbation within themſelves, contributes to preſerve that good order in the world the benefits whereof they want penetration to diſcern. Therefore we ſhall do well to follow the dictates of our own heart concerning what is commendable or unworthy, for that will inform us ſufficiently for common occaſions, if we take care to conſult it ſincerely and impartially: and when doubts ariſe we muſt adhere to ſuch ſentiments as we find

eſtabliſhed moſt firmly and ſtriking moſt ſtrongly. I know nothing further we can do unleſs we ſtand in a ſituation to diſcern all the conſequences and tendencies of the matters under deliberation; and then that which appears leaſt confined to private or preſent gratification, but moſt extenſively and generally advantageous, will deſerve the character of the moſt laudable.

9. But in computations of this ſort regard muſt be had not only to the uſefulneſs of the objects propoſed, but likewiſe to the uſefulneſs of praiſe or blame towards attaining them: for if there be other motives ſufficient to ſet us at work, commendation were thrown away as being ſuperfluous. This explains why, though honour depends upon uſe, nevertheleſs everything uſefull is not laudable: becauſe where we diſcern the uſe and are moved by it to exert ourſelves, there is no uſe for honour. Therefore we do not laviſh our applauſes upon things we find men willing enough to do of themſelves, however beneficial they may appear. What is more uſefull than eating and ſleeping? but nobody gains credit by them, for appetite prompts us faſt enough without it. Bakers, ſhoemakers and taylors, are very ſerviceable members of ſociety, but who ever roſe to honours by exerciſing thoſe trades? for why? the proſpect of getting a live-

livelihood holds them tight to their work without any other ſpur to aſſiſt it. But upon boys being firſt put out apprentices the maſter finds it uſefull to encourage them by commendation, becauſe they have then none other inducement to do their duty beſides reward and puniſhment. We chide and applaud our children to make them carefull of their money, but when they have gotten a competent habit of oeconomy, then honour changes ſtations ſtanding as a fence on the other ſide to ſecure them againſt covetouſneſs.

Hence too we may learn why the moſt conſiderate perſons honour the intention rather than the deed, for though the uſefulneſs of an action reſults from the performance not the deſign, yet the uſe of commendation lies only in its operating upon the mind, nor does it at all influence the ſucceſs any further than by doubling our diligence. Yet a proper eſtimate of external objects has its uſe too as directing us which way to apply our endeavours out of ſeveral preſenting: for if there were not a credit in having things neat and handſome about us, many men would ſatisfy themſelves as well with grovelling always in the dirt, and if there were not a reſpect paid to eminence of ſtation and fortune, even where we have no high opinion

of the perſons, we ſhould invalidate thoſe rules of good breeding which keep up decorum and render converſation eaſy. Hence likewiſe we may ſee why honour generally runs counter to profit and pleaſure, becauſe the uſe of it lies in reſtraining them when they would carry us on to our detriment; and the more forcibly they tempt us the greater is the merit of reſiſting them, becauſe we then need a ſtronger weight to overballance their influence. The ſame reaſon may account for honour reſting upon compariſon, becauſe uſe frequently does ſo too: for as among many things propoſed to his option a prudent man will always chooſe the moſt uſefull, ſo he will prefer the moſt laudable as carrying the preſumption of being the moſt uſefull. Therefore the deſire of ſurpaſſing others is always faulty unleſs when ſome real benefit will reſult therefrom, or there be ſome good purpoſe in view which cannot be attained without it.

10. The deſire of honour, like all other deſires, gives an immediate pleaſure in the gratification or when moving on ſucceſsfully towards its object, and this may be reckoned among the uſes of honour. But theſe pleaſures are not to be valued according to their intenſeneſs, for high delights of all kinds, though they raviſh the mind while freſh and new,

new, yet they pall the appetite and render it taſteleſs of common enjoyments; nor can they keep their reliſh long, becauſe our organs are too weak to ſupport the violent exerciſe they put them upon. But there is a ſelf-approbation which, being of the gentle kind, throws the ſpirits into eaſy motions that do not exhauſt nor fatigue, and ſooths the mind with an uninterrupted complacence in the reflections ſhe may caſt back upon her general tenour of conduct. For as eaſe, health and ſecurity, afford a degree of actual pleaſure, though implying no more in themſelves than a negation of pain, ſickneſs and danger, ſo there is a real ſatisfaction in keeping clear of everything for which others might juſtly cenſure us or we might blame ourſelves. This then the wiſe man will be moſt carefull to attain, as adding more to the ſum total of his happineſs than the momentary tranſports of joy upon excelling in any way whatever. Nevertheleſs an ardent deſire of doing or poſſeſſing ſomething extraordinary has its value, but as we obſerved before concerning intenſe pleaſures, not ſo much for its intrinſic worth or for the guſt found in the gratification, as for the good fruits it may produce, by ſtimulating our induſtry, furniſhing us with employment and putting us upon

uſefull

uſefull ſevices we might otherwiſe have omitted.

11. If there be any meaning in the expreſſion of things laudable in themſelves, it muſt belong to thoſe we find eſteemed moſt univerſally, or by the beſt judges, or from which we cannot withold our applauſe whenever we conſider them in our own minds, though we know not why they ſo affect us: but our not ſeeing the benefits reſulting therefrom is no proof of their nonexiſtence. By ſuch teſts it behoves us to try our ſentiments every now and then, for as we catch a tincture from others by cuſtom or example, without this caution we ſhall lie perpetually liable to be drawn aſide by the glare of falſe honour from purſuing the true. But when we do employ the method of reference to uſe, we muſt carry the reference to all quarters whereto it can extend; for it is not enough to weigh the conſequences of the preſent action, but we muſt conſider what effect our departure from a rule may have upon ourſelves at other times, how far it may influence other people to follow our example when they have not the like reaſon for doing as we do, and in ſhort all the circumſtances that any ways relate to the caſe. Honour, ſays Mr. Addiſon, is a ſacred tye, and its laws are never to be infringed unleſs

unleſs when more good than hurt will evidently reſult from diſpenſing with them: nor muſt the danger of weakening their authority be forgotten in the account, and if that be conſidered there are ſome of thoſe laws which perhaps a ſufficient warrant can never be found for tranſgreſſing.

12. Situation and circumſtance may caſt a diſhonour upon what appears perfectly innocent in itſelf: there are many things I need not name that every man muſt do, and therefore will acquit himſelf in doing, yet every diſcreet man will chooſe to do in private and conceal from the knowledge of others as much as poſſible. Tis well known what irregularities the Cynics were led into by judging of things as laudable or blamable in themſelves: for intrinſic qualities cannot be diveſted by the circumſtances of time and place from the ſubject whereto nature has united them. A ſtone will retain its hardneſs ſo long as it remains a ſtone, and air be yielding to the touch always and every where: therefore they made no ſcruple to commit the groſſeſt indecencies in public, becauſe their adverſaries could not but admit the acts they performed were at ſome times allowable. But if they had judged by a proper reference to uſe they muſt have ſeen the expedience of decency and decorum, that what

what becomes one man may not become another, and that the ſame actions, according as they do or do not tend to give offence or to the breach of good manners, may become blamable or allowable.

13. Much ado has been made of late days about certain moral ſenſes, which nature is ſuppoſed to have furniſhed us with for the diſcernment of things laudable or blamable, becoming or ridiculous, as ſhe has with the bodily ſenſes for the diſcernment of ſenſible objects: and this notion ſeems introduced to ſupply the place of innate ideas ſince their total overthrow by Mr. Locke. If we alledge that nature is more uniform in her gifts than we find theſe moral ſenſes to be, which judge very variouſly of the ſame object in different perſons, we are ſilenced with the old pretence that all who do not ſee as we do muſt labour under ſome diſorder in their viſion by having contracted films before their eyes from error and prejudice. But how ſhall the moral ſence be proved born with us when we ſee no appearance of it before we arrive at ſome uſe of our underſtanding, and there are whole nations who ſeem utterly deſtitute of it? Our five ſenſes we receive perfect at firſt, they rather decay and grow duller than improve by time, the child and the ſavage can ſee and taſte and ſmell and feel as well as the moſt

refined

refined and civilized. Let us then look upon this ſuppoſed ſixth ſenſe as an acquired faculty generated in us by the operation of thoſe materials thrown in by the other five, together with the combinations formed of them and other ideas reſulting from them in our reflection. We ordinarily imbibe our ſentiments by cuſtom or ſympathy from the company we conſort with or from perſons whoſe judgements we revere: therefore the expoſing of children, extirpating of enemies, aſſaſſinating for affronts, perſecuting for hereſy, do not ſtrike with horror in countries where commonly practiſed or taught by the leaders. But as all cuſtom muſt have a beginning and all judgement ſome foundation to build upon, let us try to diſcover what might firſt bring into credit thoſe objects which the moral ſenſe when ſuppoſed cleareſt will recommend: and this will appear upon examination to be nothing elſe beſides their expedience and eminent ſerviceableneſs to promote the happineſs of mankind. The objects that ſeem moſt ſtrongly to affect the moral ſenſe are integrity of juſtice and reſtraint of brutal appetites, which we have already ſeen deriving their value from expedience: and it is remarkable that the mind diſcerns the beauty of them abroad before ſhe can diſcover it at home. For as the eye ſees

not

not itſelf unleſs by reflection in a glaſs, ſo neither can we know our own internal features unleſs by beholding the counterparts of them in other perſons: therefore if you perceive the moral ſenſe in anybody a little dull, it is common to clear it up by aſking him how he would approve the like behaviour in another towards himſelf. Which ſhows that actions have not an intrinſic turpitude neceſſarily touching the ſenſe when contemplating them naked, but we muſt place them in other ſubjects where their tendency to bring trouble and inconvenience upon ourſelves caſts a turpitude upon them; having frequently ſeen them in this poſition we learn to reflect that what appears foul and ugly without doors would do the ſame within if we ſtood at the proper point of view; we then practiſe the art of removing ourſelves to a diſtance from ourſelves, through which channel we derive that ſkill of diſcernment called the moral ſenſe.

Nevertheleſs I am not for depreciating theſe moral ſenſes, on the contrary I wiſh their notices were more carefully regarded in the world than they are: for their being acquired is no diminution of their value, unleſs we will deſpiſe all arts and ſciences, acquiſitions of learning, and whatever elſe we had not directly from the hand of nature; which would

would reduce us back again to the helpleſs and ignorant condition of our infancy. Men of the moſt ſhining characters and exemplary lives are found peculiarly attentive to them, nor will ever ſuffer themſelves to be drawn into a diſregard for them by the impulſes of paſſion or temptations of profit. Yet being apt ſometimes to gather films and foulneſſes, it may not be amiſs to examine them at the bar of reaſon by a jury of their peers, that is, by comparing them with one another, when we have leiſure and opportunity to give them a fair hearing and take full cogniſance of the cauſe: for the preſumption lies ſtrongly in their favour and the burthen of the proof belongs to him that would impeach their character. For we may have had ſubſtantial grounds for our eſtimation of things though we do not now retain them in mind, and the experience of others may have diſcovered an expedience that we never ſtood in a ſituation to diſcern: therefore whatever appears ſhocking to our thought or generally odious in the eyes of mankind, deſerves to be rejected without very evident and invincible reaſons to the contrary.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

NECESSITY.

BY neceſſity I do not mean that impulſe whereby bodies are made to move and ſtrike upon one another, nor thoſe laws by which nature carries on her operation in a chain of cauſes and effects unavoidably depending upon each other without choice or volition. For I conſider it here as a motive driving the mind to one manner of action when we have the contrary in our inclination and our power: and we hear the term often applied this way, how properly I ſhall not examine, chooſing rather to regard every expreſſion as proper that obtains currency in the language of mankind.

I have laid down that all our motives derive their efficacy from pleaſure, other ſatisfactions flowing through the channel of tranſlation either immediately or remotely from that: but then it muſt be remembered that under pleaſure I comprehend the avoidance of pain, and it is the latter ſolely that gives riſe to the claſs of motives at preſent under conſideration. In all neceſſary actions we have ſome uneaſineſs or diſpleaſure or damage

damage in view, and ſome inclination drawing us another way which we ſhould gratify if it were not for ſuch obſtacle: and as inclination generally ſtands for Will, we are ſaid in ſuch caſes to act unwillingly or againſt our Wills, notwithſtanding that we perform the acts by our volition, and therefore are no more neceſſary agents than when purſuing the thing moſt agreable to our heart's deſire.

2. Thus the motives of neceſſity have the very reverſe for their objects to thoſe of the three former claſſes, to wit, ſome pain or diſquietude of mind, ſome detriment to our poſſeſſions, or blemiſh in our character: to which may be added the omiſſion of ſomething pleaſant, profitable or creditable, which we conceive in our power to attain; for whatever we deſire ſtrongly we feel an uneaſineſs in the thought of going without, which uneaſineſs many times lays us under a neceſſity of taking all meaſures to prevent it. To this claſs belong the obligations of duty, of honour, of juſtice, of prudence, of the laws of the land and of faſhion, the attachment to profeſſions, application to buſineſs, preſervation of our perſons and properties, checks of conſcience, and the greateſt part of the influence of our moral ſenſes. For whenever we do ſo or ſo becauſe we muſt, whether the

obligation be laid upon us by our own fondneſs for particular objects or by the judgements of reaſon, we are actuated by the apprehenſion of ſome miſchief attendant upon the forbearing it. Conſcience particularly acts as a monitor, like Socrates's Demon, never exhorting to anything but reſtraining our deſires from the courſe they would otherwiſe take, informing us what is right no otherwiſe than by warning us againſt what is wrong: and moral ſenſes, when young and newly acquired, operate by the dread of that compunction we ſhould feel upon tranſgreſſing their dictates.

The very term Muſt implies that we ſhould have acted otherwiſe had matters been left to our choice, and indicates a deſire ſubſiſting in the mind, which unavoidably degenerates into want upon our being obliged to thwart when we cannot ſtifle it. Therefore want being an uneaſy paſſion, neceſſity always throws the mind into a ſtate of ſuffering, greater or leſs in proportion to the degree of want urging us to the courſe we muſt not take. But men frequently miſapply the term, uſing it as a pretence to juſtify what they really like and might have omitted without the leaſt inconvenience: or when there is a real neceſſity, aſcribing their action to that though they were in fact pre-engaged by

by other motives. For we muſt remember the motive of action is always ſomething actually in the ſcale; not every good reaſon that might move us if its help were wanted, but ſome object in view and weighing with us at the inſtant time of acting. So that we cannot certainly conclude people uneaſy when we hear them talk of being obliged to ſuch a particular proceeding: for perhaps there was no obligation and they only amuſed themſelves or meant to amuſe us with the pretence of one; or if there were, perhaps they had nothing leſs in their thoughts but proceeded upon other grounds. What is more neceſſary than eating? yet which of us ſits down to table upon that motive? we do not need to be told that without victuals we cannot ſuſtain life nor keep our bodies in health, and this conſideration might have ſufficient influence to bring us to them if there were nothing elſe: but appetite engages us beforehand and ſets our jaws at work long before neceſſity can heave itſelf into the ſcale. On the contrary phyſic, having no other recommendation, will not go down with us until we throw in the heavy weight of neceſſity. And in this as well as all other caſes wherein the cogency of neceſſity gives the real turn to our activity, there is an uneaſineſs correſponding

ponding to the reluctance we feel againſt complying with it.

But as this uneaſineſs proceeds from the oppoſition of contrary deſires, if that which occaſioned the reluctance can be totally ſilenced, neceſſity changes its nature and becomes a matter of choice, having no competitor to ſtruggle againſt it: for as when driven by neceſſity we ſhould have acted otherwiſe if that neceſſity had not occurred, ſo we ſhould have readily complied with it as a thing deſirable if we had had no contrary inclination which muſt be thwarted by it. Therefore perſons well practiſed in the ways of honour take delight in performing the obligations of it and fulfilling the rules of duty and juſtice: for though theſe ties were obligations at firſt and ſtill retain the name, they no longer act as obligations but as objects of deſire, nor does the party influenced by them once think of any miſchief that would enſue or any pleaſure he might loſe upon tranſgreſſing them.

3. The bare exemption from evil often ſuffices to touch us with a ſenſible pleaſure: the teſtimony of a good conſcience, although implying no more than a clearneſs from offence, has been ever held a continual feaſt to the mind. And in common caſes the avoidance of miſchief does not operate as a motive

tive of neceſſity, where there is nothing to raiſe a reluctance againſt the meaſures to be taken for preventing it. We bar up our doors and windows every night to ſecure them againſt robbers, we provide fuel againſt winter and ſend down ſtores into the country for our ſummer occaſions: there is no pleaſure in all this, nor ſhould we do it unleſs neceſſary, yet being familiarized to the practice we do it as a thing cuſtomary without thinking of that neceſſity. The eſſence of neceſſary action conſiſts in an unwillingneſs to perform it; take away that unwillingneſs and the neceſſity is gone. There are perſons of ſo happy temper as to bring their minds into a ready compliance with what muſt be done, and upon diſcerning that, whatever deſires they might have had before for doing otherwiſe inſtantly vaniſh: if we could attain a perfect acquieſcence in whatever the preſent circumſtances require, we ſhould eſcape the iron hand of neceſſity, we might ſee which way it drives and lay our meaſures accordingly, but ſhould always elude its graſp and take the gentler guidance of expedience.

Nevertheleſs ſince our deſires will not always lie down quiet at the word of command, we can only reſtrain them from miſchief by contemplating the neceſſity of ſo doing, and inculcating that idea ſo ſtrongly

as to drive us into the performance of what we could not do willingly; for though it will throw us into an uneaſy ſituation, we muſt ſubmit to it for the good fruits expectant thereupon; the road to eaſe and pleaſure lying frequently through trouble and uneaſineſs. Tis by this way we firſt come within the influence of honour, prudence and juſtice; and the moral ſenſes, as we obſerved before, begin their operation in this manner, though by a long and ſteddy practice they get the better of all opponent inclinations and become themſelves the ſources of deſire, which would then prevail with us if there were no neceſſity to enforce them.

But as neceſſity by good management may be refined into pleaſure, ſo pleaſure by indiſcretion may be corrupted into neceſſity; a conſtant indulgence of our appetites encreaſes their cravings while it leſſens, and at laſt totally deſtroys the guſt we had in gratifying them, ſo that deſire, whoſe office it is to ſolace and delight us, changes into the tormenting paſſion of want. It has been often ſaid that hunger is the beſt ſauce to our meat, but this the voluptuary never finds in his diſh; and likewiſe that novelty gives a reliſh to pleaſures, but by hunting continually after a variety of them we may bring novelty itſelf to be nothing new. Many run a

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perpetual round of diverſions abroad only becauſe they ſhould be miſerable at home; ſo that while they ſeem invited by pleaſure they are really laſhed on by the ſcourge of neceſſity. Therefore if we wiſh to paſs our time eaſily and agreably, the worſt thing we can do is to make toil of a pleaſure, and the beſt to make a virtue of neceſſity.

CHAP. XXVI.

REASON.

THUS far we have been buſied in laying our foundation, a toilſome and tedious work, but wherein diligence and an attention to minute particulars was requiſite, becauſe we were unwilling to leave any cracks or chaſms unfilled over which our future building might ſtand hollow: how well we have ſucceeded in the attempt and whether we have worked the whole compact with a mutual dependence and due coherence of parts, muſt be left to the judgement of others, whoſe deciſion in our favour I rather wiſh for than expect. For to ſay truth it has not anſwered my own expectation, as wanting much of that compleat workmanſhip

I am well ſatisfied the materials were capable of: but with regard to the neceſſity and uſefulneſs of all we have been labouring, I beg the determination of that may be ſuſpended until it ſhall be ſeen what uſes we can make of it. Let us now begin to raiſe the ſuperſtructure, wherein I hope to proceed with a little more eaſe to myſelf and ſatisfaction to anybody that may deign to look upon me. We have examined how and upon what incitements men act, together with the tendencies and conſequences of their action: let us try to diſcover from thence how they ought to act. But I am not ſo fond as to imagine anything can be done this way ſo compleatly as to render all further care and conſideration of other perſons needleſs: if I can ſet up the main pillars of morality and perform the offices of maſon and carpenter in erecting the edifice, this is all can be required of me, I may leave it to each particular man to fit up the ſeveral apartments according to his circumſtances and ſituation in life: for things calculated for general uſe require ſome pains and circumſpection in applying them to private convenience in the variety of caſes that may happen.

2. We have ſeen how the actions of men are of two ſorts, inadvertent and deliberate, the former prompted by imagination and the

others by underſtanding. To imagination belong our combinations and judgements ſtarting up immediately upon the appearance of objects, our ſpontaneous trains of thought, our paſſions, habits and motives, giving the preſent turn to our volition. Of what kind all theſe ſhall be or when or how they ſhall affect us depends upon the impulſe of external objects, upon experience, cuſtom, and other prior cauſes: the mind has no ſhare either in modelling or introducing them, and though ſhe acts by her own power without their aſſiſtance to invigorate her, yet ſhe ſhapes her motions according to the directions received from them. There remains only the underſtanding in whoſe operations the mind acts as principal agent, comparing and marſhalling her ideas, inveſtigating thoſe that lie out of ſight, forming new judgements and diſcovering motives that would not have ariſen of themſelves. Tis therefore by the due uſe of our underſtanding or reaſon alone that we can help ourſelves when imagination would take a wrong courſe or proves inſufficient for our purpoſes. To this then we muſt have recourſe if we would avail ourſelves of anything we have learnt in the foregoing enquiry, becauſe we muſt employ this to rectify whatever ſhall be found amiſs elſewhere.

3. And

3. And in ſuch employment conſiſts principally, if not entirely, the benefit we may expect from reaſon, which is neceſſary to be noted that we may know wherein ſhe may prove ~~more~~ ſerviceable; for ſome people require too much at her hands, more than ſhe is able to perform, they want her to actuate every motion of their lives, which is impoſſible, for her power lies in her authority rather than her ſtrength, ſhe does little or nothing herſelf but acts altogether by her inferiour officers of the family of imagination: at leaſt, till ſhe takes them into her ſervice, her efforts terminate in ſpeculation alone and do not extend to practice. Nor can ſhe work even in her own peculiar province without continual ſupplies from elſewhere; for ſhe works upon materials found in the repoſitory of ideas. She never produces a judgement or a motive from her own fund, but holds the premiſſes in view until they throw aſſent or ſatisfaction upon the concluſion. She is perpetually aſking, Why is ſuch a thing true, Why is it deſirable, but former experience muſt ſuggeſt the grounds from whence the anſwer will reſult; for reaſon does not make the truth nor the deſire, but only lays things together whereout either of them may grow. And when ſhe has formed her deciſions ſhe muſt depoſit them with

with her partner for ſafe cuſtody againſt future occaſions; who proving ever ſo little unfaithfull, all ſhe has depoſited will either be abſolutely loſt or ſo weakened in its colours as to become unſerviceable. She runs very ſhort lengths, ſees very little way at once, therefore muſt eſtabliſh rules and maxims for her own guidance, and make over her treaſures to imagination as ſhe acquires them, that they may riſe ſpontaneouſly to ſerve her afterwards in her further advances towards knowledge. But we ordinarily miſtake the province of reaſon by ſuppoſing every thing reaſonable to lie within it, whereas that epithet implies no more than a thing that reaſon would not diſapprove. But many very juſt and ſolid opinions we imbibe from education or cuſtom without any application to our reaſon at all: and thoſe we do acquire for ourſelves by the due exerciſe of that faculty, when firmly rooted become the property of imagination; conviction growing into perſuaſion. They then command our aſſent without contemplating the evidences whereon they were founded, and that full aſſurance wherewith they ſtrike the mind inſtantly upon preſenting themſelves, is not an act of reaſon but of habit or ſome moral or internal ſenſe, which continue to influence tho' conſideration and underſtanding lie dormant.

mant. Were our faculty of reaſon to be ſuddenly taken from us, how unable ſoever we might find ourſelves to make new acquiſitions of knowledge or judgement, we ſhould not neceſſarily loſe thoſe already gotten by former exerciſes of the faculty.

4. But if the office of reaſon lie within ſo narrow compaſs in her own province of ſpeculation, we ſhall find it reduced to narrower limits when applying her theory to practice; for ſhe is a tedious heavy mover, poring a long while upon objects before ſhe can determine her choice; our active powers will not always wait her leiſure, but take directions elſewhere while ſhe deliberates. Beſides, there is not always time for conſideration, when the ſeaſon of action comes unexpectedly we muſt inſtantly turn ourſelves one way or other, therefore ſhould make no diſpatch in buſineſs, or muſt give up the reins to chance, if we had not ſome rules and meaſures of conduct ready in ſtore for our guidance: and the principal ſervice our underſtanding does is by holding our attention ſteddy to thoſe rules, wherein ſhe quickly tires and faints unleſs there be ſome motive of pleaſure or profit or honour or neceſſity at hand to aſſiſt her. And yet in doing this ſervice ſhe performs the ſmalleſt ſhare of our work, directing only the main tenour of our conduct; but the component

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acts whereof that conduct conſiſts muſt be ſuggeſted in train by former practice and experience: for it avails little to know what is expedient or the rules proper for attaining it without an expertneſs and readineſs in practiſing them. The orator may chooſe his arguments and ſelect the topics proper for enforcing them, but the figures, the language and the pronunciation, will be ſuch as he has accuſtomed himſelf to in former exerciſes. The muſician may think what tune he will play, what diviſions he ſhall run, or with what graces he ſhall embelliſh it; but unleſs his eye has learnt by uſe to run currently along the notes, and his fingers along the keys, he will make very indifferent harmony. The buſineſs of life goes on by means of habit, opinion and affection, which underſtanding only checks from time to time, or turns, or ſets them at work without adding anything to their vigour, unleſs by bringing ſeveral of them to co-operate together. Reaſon, as Mr. Pope ſays, is the card, but paſſion is the gale; and if there were a neceſſity of parting with one of them, we might better ſpare the former than the latter: for though the courſe of the ſhip would be very uncertain without a compaſs, yet without a wind it would not move at all. To loſe our reaſon would make us beaſts: to loſe our appetites, meer logs.

5. If

5. If there be any inſtances wherein reaſon ſhows ſigns of an active vigour, they are when we ſurmount difficulties or endure labours or pains by meer dint of reſolution: yet even here every one's experience may convince him how feebly ſhe acts unleſs ſeconded by ſome powerfull motive retained in view, and how carefully ſhe is forced to fortify herſelf all around with conſiderations of damage or ſhame or compunction. Nor has ſhe even this little vigour naturally, but acquires it by enuring the mind by previous diſcipline to a habit of perſeverance; which when gained, a little time paſſing in ſoftneſs and indulgence will diveſt her of it again. And when with all her care and contrivance ſhe has muſtered up a reſolution, we know too well how wofully it fails in time of trial, how often it is born down by the weight of pain or paſſion, undermined by the working of habit, or ſurprized by ſome ſudden temptation catching her at unawares.

I have remarked elſewhere that if our imagination were rightly ſet ſo as to exhibit no falſe appearances, and our appetites and deſires all turned upon proper objects, we ſhould want nothing elſe to anſwer all the purpoſes of life more effectually and readily than we can do now. On the other hand if our underſtandings were ſo large as to com-

comprize in one proſpect all the tendencies of things ſo far as they might affect us, and to ſee the future in as ſtrong colours as the preſent, we might ſerve ourſelves of that alone to ſupply all our occaſions. But ſince we have neither of our faculties perfect, we muſt employ both in their proper offices to make up for each others deficiency. Man has been incompleatly defined a rational animal, he is rather, to uſe Mr. Woolaſton's words, ſenſitivo-rational, therefore muſt regard both parts of his conſtitution: for one can do nothing without the other, and this would run riot and do worſe than nothing without continual direction from that.

6. The contrariety and oppoſition obſervable in the mind gave riſe, as I have already remarked in my firſt chapter, to the notion of ſeveral Wills within us: for the mind conſtantly following the direction of her ideas, that ſtate of them immediately preceeding her action we entitle the Will, by a metonyme or ſometimes miſtake of the cauſe for the effect. For if we apprehend every proſpect of objects enclining us to act to be really a Will, we ſhall fall into the abſurdity of ſeveral Wills, ſeveral agents and perſons in the ſame man: whereas it is the ſame agent, the ſame power that acts in all caſes, whether we act madly or ſoberly, whether we deny

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or indulge our Wills. But if we take the matter figuratively, this diverſity of perſons may ſerve aptly enough to expreſs the diſordered condition of human nature, wherein reaſon and paſſion perpetually ſtruggle, reſiſt and controul, one another. The metaphor employed by Plato was that of a charioteer driving his pair of horſes, by which latter he allegorized the concupiſcible and iraſcible paſſions: but as we have nowadays left off driving our own chariots but keep a coachman to do it for us, I think the mind may be more commodiouſly compared to a traveller riding a ſingle horſe, wherein reaſon is repreſented by the rider, and imagination with all its train of opinions, appetites and habits, by the beaſt. Everybody ſees the horſe does all the work, the ſtrength and ſpeed requiſite for performing it are his own, he carries his maſter along every ſtep of the journey, directs the motion of his own legs in walking, trotting, galloping or ſtepping over a rote, makes many by-motions, as whiſking the flies with his tail or playing with his bit, all by his own inſtinct; and if the road lie plain and open without bugbears to affright him or rich paſture on either hand to entice him, he will jogg on although the reins were laid upon his neck, or in a well acquainted road take the right turnings of his own

own accord. Perhaps ſometimes he may pr move ſtartiſh or reſtive, turning out of the way or running into a pond to drink maugre all endeavours to prevent him; but this depends greatly upon the diſcipline he has been uſed to. The office of the rider lies in putting his horſe into the proper road and the pace moſt convenient for the preſent purpoſe, guiding and conducting him as he goes along, checking him when too forward or ſpurring him when too tardy, being attentive to his motions, never dropping the whip nor loſing the reins, but ready to interpoſe inſtantly whenever needfull, keeping firm in his ſeat if the beaſt behaves unruly, obſerving what paſſes in the way, the condition of the ground and bearings of the country, in order to take directions therefrom for his proceeding. But this is not all he has to do, for there are many things previous to the journey; he muſt get his tackling into good order, bridle, ſpurrs and other accoutrements; he muſt learn to ſit well in the ſaddle, to underſtand the ways and temper of the beaſt, get acquainted with the roads and enure himſelf by practice to bear long journeys without fatigue or galling; he muſt provide provender for his horſe and deal it out in proper quantities, for if weak and jadiſh, or pampered and gameſome, he will not per-

form the journey well; he muſt have him well broke, taught all his paces, cured of ſtarting, ſtumbling, running away, and all ſkittiſh or ſluggiſh tricks, trained to anſwer the bit and be obedient to the word of command. If he can teach him to canter whenever there is a ſmooth and level turf and ſtop when the ground lies rugged of his own accord, it will contribute to make riding eaſy and pleaſant; he may then enjoy the proſpects around or think of any buſineſs without interruption to his progreſs. As to the choice of a horſe our rider has no concern with that, but muſt content himſelf with ſuch as nature and education have put into his hands: but ſince the ſpirit of the beaſt depends much upon the uſage given him, every prudent man will endeavour to proportion that ſpirit to his own ſtrength and ſkill in horſemanſhip; and according as he finds himſelf a good or bad rider will wiſh to have his horſe ſober or mettleſome. For ſtrong paſſions work wonders where there is a ſtronger force of reaſon to curb them: but where this is weak the appetites muſt be feeble too or they will lie under no controul.

7. From all that has been ſaid above as well literally as allegorically we may learn what the proper buſineſs of reaſon is, namely, to watch over our motions and look out for the

the proper meaſures of conduct with as much circumſpection as the preſent circumſtances of the caſe ſhall permit or require. For this there is little need of inſtruction, but rather exhortation, to prevail on men to exert their faculty; for everybody knows the difference between conſiderate and thoughtleſs behaviour. The principal part of her employment lies in ſtoring the mind with ſolid knowledge, eſtabliſhing uſefull rules of conduct, and above all contracting ſuch habits and deſires as may continually lead the active powers into proper courſes. For this laſt branch is of the moſt importance becauſe it fructifies our knowledge by making it practical; nor can any one doubt that the world would receive more improvement by every body's living up to what they know than by any encreaſe of their knowledge whatever; and that they do not live up to it, can be owing to nothing elſe beſides bad habits and inordinate deſires. But every rule and every deſire muſt have ſome purpoſe to drive at, and it becomes reaſon to examine the propriety of the purpoſe as well as conduciveneſs of the meaſures towards obtaining it: this commonly leads to ſome further end firſt recommending that purpoſe to our choice, and that many times points out another end lying ſtill beyond, and ſo on with-

out limitation. For the moſt part we ſtop at a few general principles which we have found almoſt univerſally received or eſteem valuable in themſelves, without knowing or without remembring what firſt diſcovered to us their value: and this method may ſerve well enough for common uſe. But the ſtudious in their ſeaſons of leiſure and contemplation endeavour to carry back their reſearches as far as they can puſh them and penetrate quite to the fountain head: but being ſenſible that reaſon muſt come to a ſtop at laſt and arrive at ſomething which had a recommendation prior to any that ſhe could give it, they ſtrive to find out what is that Firſt or Ultimate end, for firſt and laſt here are the ſame thing, which nature has given for our purſuit, and from which reaſon muſt deduce all thoſe principles and rules of action ſhe recommends. And as there has been great variance upon this point, it will deſerve a particular conſideration, for which I ſhall appropriate the next enſuing chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

ULTIMATE GOOD.

FOR ſo I chooſe to tranſlate the Summum Bonum of the ancients, as much and as unſucceſsfully ſought after as the philoſopher's ſtone, rather than call it the Chief Good as it is vulgarly termed. For the enquiry was not to aſcertain the degrees of goodneſs in objects or determine what poſſeſſed it in the higheſt pitch beyond all others: but ſince the goodneſs of things depends upon their ſerviceableneſs towards procuring ſomething we want, to diſcover what was that one thing intrinſically good which contented the mind of itſelf and rendred all others deſirable in proportion as they tended directly or remotely to procure it. Good, ſays Mr. Locke, is that which produces pleaſure, and if we underſtand it thus ſtrictly in the true original ſence, our enquiry were vain: for then the very expreſſion of good in itſelf would be abſurd, becauſe nothing good could be ultimate, the pleaſure it produces lying always beyond. But it is cuſtomary to call that good which ſtands at the very end of our wiſhes and contents the mind without reference to anything fur-

ther: and in this common acceptation the term will be applicable to our preſent purpoſe.

2. Upon peruſal of the chapter of ſatisfaction and thoſe of the four claſſes of motives, whoever ſhall happen to think they contain a juſt repreſentation of human nature, need not be long in ſeeking for this ſummum bonum: for he will perceive it to be none other than pleaſure or ſatisfaction, which is pleaſure taken in the largeſt ſence, as comprizing every complacence of mind together with the avoidance of pain or uneaſineſs. Perhaps I ſhall be charged with reviving the old exploded doctrine of Epicurus upon this article, but I am not aſham'd of joining with any man of whatever character in thoſe parts of it where I think he has truth on his ſide: though whether I do really agree with him here, is more than I can be ſure of, for I find great diſputes concerning what he called pleaſure. If he confined it to groſs ſenſual delights or imaginations relative thereto, as his adverſaries charged him with, and the bulk of his followers ſeem to have underſtood him, I cannot conſent to ſhut myſelf up within ſuch narrow limits: for though theſe things may afford a genuine ſatisfaction ſometimes and when ſparingly uſed, yet it is to be had more plentifully elſewhere.

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Therefore, being regardleſs whether my ſentiments tally or no with thoſe of Epicurus, I ſhall not trouble myſelf to examine what he really thought, but endeavour as far as I am able to explain what this ſatisfaction is which I ſuppoſe the ſummum bonum or ultimate end of action. And this I cannot do better than by referring, as I have done before in the chapter upon that article, to every man's experience of the condition of mind he finds himſelf in when anything happens to his wiſh or good liking, when he feels the cool breezes of a ſummer evening or the comfortable warmth of a winter fire, when he gains poſſeſſion of ſomething uſefull or profitable, when he has done anything he can applaud himſelf for or will redound to his credit with perſons he eſteems.

3. But to conſider ſatisfaction phyſically, it is a perception of the mind, reſiding in her alone, conſtantly one and the ſame in kind how much ſoever it may vary in degree: for whether a man be pleaſed with hearing muſic, ſeeing proſpects, taſting dainties, performing laudable actions or making agreable reflections, his complacence and condition of mind will be the ſame if equal in degree tho coming from different quarters. But this complacence, and indeed every other perception, the mind never has unleſs excited in her

by ſome external object ſtriking upon her bodily ſenſes or ſome idea giving play to her mental organs. We have ſuppoſed there may be ſome certain fibre whoſe peculiar office it is to affect the mind in this manner, and our organs pleaſe or not by their motion according as, in the natural texture or preſent diſpoſition of our frame, they ſtand connected with this ſpring of ſatisfaction. Whether there really be ſuch a particular ſpring or no is not very material to know, for if we could aſcertain its exiſtence we cannot come at it either with the finger or ſurgeons probe ſo as to ſet it a working for our entertainment. Since then we cannot touch this ſpring directly, we muſt endeavour to convey an impulſe to it by thoſe channels that nature has provided us with for the purpoſe: for common experience teſtifies that there are variety of ſenſations and reflections qualified to excite ſatisfaction in the mind when we can apply them. But our attention uſually reaching no further than to theſe cauſes, for if we can procure them the effect will follow of courſe, we give the name of pleaſure to thoſe ſenſations and ſcenes of imagination which touch us in the ſenſible part: hence pleaſure becomes an improper term to expreſs the ſummum bonum by, becauſe objects or ideas that have pleaſed may not do ſo again; therefore if we were to re-

recommend it as the end of action we might be miſunderſtood or miſlead ſome unwary perſon already inclined that way into the purſuit of a wrong object; for pleaſure in the vulgar acceptation will not always pleaſe. If Epicurus underſtood it in this ſence, I renounce communion with him as a heretic; but if by pleaſure he meant the very complacence of mind generated by agreable objects of any kind whatever, I cannot refuſe him my aſſiſtance againſt all opponents; and the rather for fear this may prove the only point whereon we ſhall ever have an opportunity of joining forces together.

4. Nor can it be doubted that ſatisfaction is propoſed to our purſuit by nature, when we reflect how univerſally and perpetually it engages all mankind, how ſteddily volition follows the proſpect of immediate ſatisfaction, as has been ſhown in the foregoing enquiry, if one may be ſaid to ſhow a thing that was before ſufficiently manifeſted by Mr. Locke. The man and the child, the civiliſed and the ſavage, the learned and the vulgar, the prudent and the giddy, the good and the wicked, conſtantly purſue whatever appears moſt ſatisfactory to them in their preſent apprehenſion: and if at any time they forego an immediate pleaſure for ſake of a diſtant advantage, it is becauſe they conceive a greater ſatisfaction in the

the proſpect of that advantage or uneaſineſs in the thought of miſſing it. Therefore thoſe who can content themſelves with the enjoyments of to day without feeling an actual concern for the morrow, will never be moved to action by anything future, how fully ſoever they acknowledge the expedience of it: and when pain riſes ſo high as that the mind cannot find any contentment under it, it will overpower the beſt grounded reſolutions. Neither is there any more room to doubt of ſatisfaction being the ultimate end than of its being a natural good, becauſe all other goodneſs centers in that, the gratifications of pleaſure, the rules of prudence and morality, are good only as they tend by themſelves or in their conſequences to ſatisfy the mind: one may give a reaſon for all other things being good but for that alone no reaſon can be given, for experience not reaſon muſt recommend it. Why is knowledge good? becauſe it directs us to chooſe the things that are moſt uſefull: Why are uſefull things good? becauſe they miniſter to the ſupply of our wants and deſires. Why is this ſupply good? becauſe it ſatisfies the mind. Why is ſatisfaction good? here you muſt ſtop, for there lies nothing beyond to furniſh materials for an anſwer: but if anybody denies it you can only refer him to his own common ſence by aſking how he finds

finds himſelf when in a ſtate of ſatisfaction or diſquietude, and whether of them he would prefer to the other.

In ſhort the matter ſeems ſo clear that one may be thought to trifle in ſpending ſo many words to prove it: and after all, what is the upſhot of the whole but to ſhow that ſatisfaction ſatisfies? a meer identical propoſition adding nothing to our knowledge, but the ſame as if one ſhould ſay that plenitude fills, that heat warms, that hardneſs reſiſts and ſoftneſs yields to the touch. Yet as trifling as the propoſition may appear, Mr. Locke has beſtowed a great deal of pains in proving the value and efficacy of ſatisfaction: nor have there been wanting perſons of no ſmall reputation with whom ſuch pains were neceſſary, who out of their extravagant zeal for virtue denied that all other pleaſures conferred anything towards bettering the condition of the mind. Had they pronounced them cloying, unſtable, often deluſive of the expectation and productive of greater miſchiefs, they had ſaid right and enough to anſwer their main purpoſe: but this would not do, they inſiſted that when we ſee a man actually pleaſed with trifles, wanting nothing elſe, but fully contented with the condition of mind they throw him into, nevertheleſs he was miſerable at the very inſtant of enjoyment without regard

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to conſequences. What is this but undertaking to prove that ſatisfaction does not ſatisfy, which whoever can accompliſh may riſe to be a Cardinal, for he need not fear being able to demonſtrate tranſubſtantiation. Our divines talk more rationally when they admit that the pleaſures of ſin may ſatisfy for a moment, but are too dearly bought when purchaſed with diſeaſe, ſhame, remorſe and an incapacity for higher enjoyments.

5. One remark more concerning the ſummum bonum, viz. that tho' a noun of the ſingular number, nevertheleſs it is one in ſpecies only, containing a multitude of individuals. For our perceptions are fleeting and momentary, objects ſtrike ſucceſſively upon our organs and ideas riſe inceſſantly in our imagination, which thereby throw the mind into a ſtate of complacence or diſquietude correſponding with the manner of their impulſe, which has no duration: therefore ſatisfaction cannot continue without a continual application of ſatisfactory cauſes. This gains another name for the ſummum bonum, and makes us entitle it Happineſs, which is the aggregate of ſatisfactions. For though this term be ſometimes applied to the enjoyment of a ſingle moment, and then is ſynonimous with ſatisfaction, yet it more generally and properly denotes

denotes the ſurplus of ſucceſſes a man has met with or may expect over and above his diſappointments: if the ſurplus be anything conſiderable we pronounce him happy, if his diſquietudes greatly exceed we ſtile him miſerable. Ovid underſtood it in this ſence when he laid down that we can never pronounce a man happy before his death, becauſe the fortune of life being uncertain, whatever enjoyments we ſee him poſſeſſed of we can never be ſure they may not be overballanced by evils to come: and Milton the ſame in his apoſtrophe to our firſt parents, Sleep on bleſt pair, yet happy if ye ſeek not other happineſs and know to know no more. But ſound ſleep being a ſtate of inſenſibility is capable neither of ſatisfaction nor uneaſineſs: therefore the ſleeping pair were happy only in reſpect to that ample ſtore of unmingled pleaſures lying in reſerve for them againſt they awoke.

Thus happineſs relates to the whole tenour of our lives, but multitudes of our actions do not reach ſo far as to affect our condition ſo long as we have our being: this breaks happineſs again into ſmaller portions correſponding with the length or extent of their influence. It may be all one after dinner whether I eat mutton or chicken, but if one will pleaſe me better during the time of eating

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and the indulgence will do me no harm, why ſhould not I take that I like beſt? When we lay out a day's diverſion by ſome little excurſion abroad we regard what will entertain us moſt for the day, notwithſtanding ſome trifling inconveniences of ſloppy roads or indifferent accommodations at a paltry inn. If we take a houſe we conſider, not what will be the moſt eaſy for the firſt month, but moſt commodious during the whole leaſe. And when a father puts his ſon to ſchool, he might ſupply him with more enjoyment at home than can be expected during the ſeven years of ſchooling: but he conſiders that learning will enable him to paſs his life afterwards more agreably and uſefully. Thus upon ſeveral actions propoſed to our option, that is always the beſt which will add moſt to our happineſs as far as its conſequences extend.

6. Our ſatisfactions come ſometimes from cauſes operating of their own accord, as upon change of weather from chill or ſultry to moderate, or upon hearing joyfull news unexpectedly; but for the moſt part we muſt procure them for ourſelves by application of the proper means. Now ſince we are prompted to uſe our activity by deſire, ſince the good things occurring ſpontaneouſly would have been objects of our deſire had we known of them

them beforehand or our intervention been wanted, therefore may juſtly be ſtiled deſirable, and ſince deſire of itſelf renders objects ſatisfactory which would otherwiſe have been indifferent; therefore it is the firſt rule of happineſs to procure the gratification of our deſires: nor ſhall I ſcruple to recommend this as the proper buſineſs of life. Let every man by my conſent ſtudy to gratify himſelf in whatever ſuits his taſte and inclination, for they vary infinitely: one man's meat is another man's poiſon, what this perſon likes the next may abhor, what delights at one time may diſguſt at another, and what entertains when new may grow ſtale and inſipid afterwards. Our appetites and fancies prompt us faſt enough to this gratification, to chooſe objects ſuited to our particular taſtes and to vary them as we find our reliſh change: but the misfortune is that deſire often defeats her own purpoſe, either by miſtaking things for ſatisfactory which are not, as when a child does gets to play with the flame of a candle; or by a more common miſtake apprehending gratification to lie in a ſingle point, whereas this, like happineſs, conſiſts in the ſum aggregate of enjoyments. He that indulges one deſire to the croſſing of many others, ought no more to be thought purſuing gratification than he can be thought to purſue pro-

profit who takes twenty pounds to day for goods that he might have ſold tomorrow for forty: a true lover of money will reject it when offered upon ſuch terms, and a true lover of gratification who knows what he is about will reject it upon the like. Therefore there is no occaſion to perſuade men out of their ſenſes, and face them down that gratification adds nothing to their ſatifaction no not for a moment: on the contrary we may exhort them to purſue it as a thing moſt valuable, and therefore to purſue it in the ſame manner as they would other valuable things, that is, not to take a little in hand in lieu of more they might have by and by. Any trifle that hits our fancy ſuffices to content the mind, and if we could enjoy it for ever with the ſame reliſh, it would anſwer our whole purpoſe; for I know of no wearineſs, no ſatiety, no change of taſte in the mind, theſe all belong to the organs bodily and mental. When a glutton ſits down to a well ſpread table with a good appetite, if he ever has any, he poſſeſſes as much of the ſummum bonum as can be obtained within the time; and if he had victuals continually ſupplied him, a hole in his throat to diſcharge them as faſt as ſwallowed, and nothing in the world elſe to do, he might attain it compleatly; but this cannot be: yet if he can

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prolong appetite beyond its ſtretch by high ſauces until he has overcharged himſelf, ſtill I can allow him in a ſtate of enjoyment during the repaſt, for he has a deſire and he gratifies it. But has he none other deſires that will ſollicit him by and by? has he not a deſire of being free from ſickneſs of ſtomach or diſtemper, nothing elſe he wants to do with his money, no diverſion, no buſineſs that requires alertneſs of ſpirits, no regard for his credit, the good word of his friends, or his own peace of mind? if he has other deſires that muſt ſuffer by indulging this one, he is a very bad accomptant in the article of gratification. Thus the very intereſts of our deſires ſometimes require ſelf-denial, which is recommendable only upon that account: nor would I adviſe a man ever to deny himſelf unleſs in order to pleaſe himſelf better another time.

7. Since then our deſires miſlead us ſo groſſly, ſometimes miſtaking their own intention and at other times ſtarving one another, let us have recourſe to reaſon to moderate between them, and to remedy the inconveniences they would bring upon us: and this, upon obſerving the oppoſition among them, will quickly diſcover that there are two ways of attaining gratification, one by procuring the objects we deſire, the other by

accomodating deſire to the objects before us or moſt convenient for us upon the whole. Either of theſe methods would anſwer our purpoſe if we could purſue it effectually: were it poſſible to command everything with a wiſh and ſupply fuel to our deſires as faſt as they ſtart up, ſtill varying their objects as they themſelves vary; or could we carry our heart in our hands, moulding it like wax to the ſhape of every circumſtance occurring, we need never feel a moment's uneaſineſs. But neither of theſe is poſſible, many things that would pleaſe us lie out of our reach, ſome of them never to be obtained, others only now and then as opportunity favours, but the greater part of them ſatiate before deſire abates: on the other hand there are ſome natural deſires we can never totally eradicate, ſome neceſſaries without which we cannot ſuſtain our bodies in vigour nor our ſpirits in alertneſs to ſerve us upon any occaſion. Therefore we muſt drive the nail that will go, uſe our underſtandings in ſurveying the ſtock of materials for gratification either generally or at any particular time in our power, and examining the ſtate of our deſires, which among them are moſt attainable, or leaſt contradictory to others, or what we can do towards bending them to the ply moſt ſuitable to our convenience.

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his journey, but having once taken the right road fixes his eye upon the neareſt parts of it as he goes along: ſo neither can we always contemplate the enjoyments we are providing for ourſelves without interrupting our progreſs. Our capacities are too ſhort to hold the whole line of our purſuit in view, but we muſt reſt upon ſome part of it moſt convenient for our preſent direction: nor indeed could we always ſee to the end of our line if we were to ſtrain never ſo much, therefore muſt truſt to others or to our own former determination for an aſſurance that it will lead us the way we would wiſh. Thus happineſs, although the ultimate end of action, yet is not always, perhaps I might ſay very ſeldom, our ultimate point of view: for our road lies through lanes and hedges or over an uneven hilly country, where we can ſee very little way before us; nay ſometimes we muſt ſeemingly turn our backs upon it, and take a compaſs round in the plain beaten track, to avoid impracticable moraſſes or other obſtacles intervening. Hence we may learn why pleaſure is ſo deceitfull a guide to happineſs, becauſe it plunges us headlong forward through thick and thin, fixing our eyes upon a ſingle point and taking them off from the marks leading to that aggregate of ſatisfactions whereof happineſs conſiſts. Wherefore he that reſolves to pleaſe himſelf

himſelf always will ſcarce ever do ſo, for by perpetually indulging his deſires he will deſtroy or loſe the means of indulging them.

8. For the ſkill of providing materials to gratify our deſires we muſt conſult common prudence and diſcretion, or reſort to the profeſſors of arts and ſciences containing the ſeveral branches of it: but the other method of gratification by managing the mind itſelf and bringing deſire to the moſt convenient ply, belongs properly to the moraliſt; whoſe buſineſs lies not ſo much in informing you how to procure what you want, as how to forbear wanting what you cannot have or would prove hurtfull to you. But want cannot be removed without aid of ſome other want; for as you can never bring a man to aſſent to a propoſition unleſs by means of ſome premiſſes whereto he does already aſſent, ſo you can never bring him to any deſire unleſs by ſhowing the connection it bears with ſomething he already deſires. The deſire of happineſs would ſuffice for this purpoſe if we had it ſtronger infixed than we find in our breaſts: but though all have this deſire ſo far as that they would be willing enough to receive happineſs if they could get it upon aſking for, yet, being an aggregate and therefore always in part at leaſt diſtant, they prefer the preſent gratification of other deſires before it.

Therefore the moraliſt will begin with ſtriving to inculcate this deſire of happineſs into himſelf and others as deeply as poſſible. But ſince this can hardly ever be done ſo effectually as one would wiſh, for we can never raiſe ſo vivid an idea of remote objects as to equal thoſe ſtanding cloſe to us, he will examine all other propenſities belonging to us in order to encourage thoſe which are moſt innocent, moſt ſatisfactory, moſt compatible together, and beſt promoting his principal aim. Theſe he will endeavour to render habitual, ſo as that they may ſtart up to the thought uncalled, and gather ſtrength enough to over power others he wiſhes to eradicate. As we cannot upon every occaſion ſee to the end of our proceedings, he will eſtabliſh certain rules to ſerve as landmarks for guiding us on the way. Theſe rules, when he has leiſure and opportunity for mature conſideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the baſis of ſummum bonum before deſcribed. But becauſe their reference to the ultimate end cannot be continually kept in mind, he will enure himſelf and every body within his reach, by ſuch methods as he ſhall find feaſible, to look upon them as good in themſelves, that they may become influencing principles of action. The outer branches of

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theſe rules, calculated for ordinary occaſions, will of courſe vary according to thoſe occaſions or to the tempers, abilities, ſituations and needs of different perſons, to particularize all which would be endleſs and impracticable: but there are a few general rules univerſally expedient as being the ſtem whereout the reſt are to grow. The firſt ſeems to be that of habituating ourſelves to follow the dictates of judgement in preference to any impulſe of paſſion, fancy or appetite, and forbear whatever our reaſon diſapproves as being wrong: for there is nothing more evident than that the knowledge of right and wrong can do us no benefit while reſting in ſpeculation alone and not reduced into practice; which it can never be unleſs become habitual, and ſtriking with the force of an obligation or an object of deſire.

CHAP. XXVIII.

RECTITUDE.

WE hear much of an eſſential rectitude in certain things, but before we attempt to judge of their eſſence it will be expedient to ſettle with ourſelves the purport of

the word Right, for we ſhall be likely to reaſon very indifferently without underſtanding the terms we employ. Right belongs originally to lines, being the ſame as Strait in oppoſition to Curve or Crooked. Every body knows a right line is the ſhorteſt that can lie between two points ſo as to touch them both, and the neareſt approach from any one to any other given point is along ſuch right line. From hence it has been applied by way of metaphor to rules and actions, which lying in the line of our progreſs towards any purpoſe we aim at, if they be wrong they will carry us aſide, and we ſhall either wholly miſs of our intent or muſt begin again and take a longer compaſs than neceſſary to arrive at it: but if they conduct effectually and directly by the neareſt way we pronounce them right. Therefore the very expreſſion of right in itſelf is abſurd, becauſe things are rendred right by their tendency to ſome end, ſo that you muſt take ſomething exteriour into the account in order to evidence their rectitude. Rules are termed right upon a ſuppoſition of their expedience, and ſo are actions too for the moſt part: when a man digs for hidden treaſure we ſay he has hit upon the right ſpot if he pitches his ſpade juſt over where the treaſure lies, though perhaps he did it by gueſs: but ſince we are often uncertain

certain of our actions we apply them to ſome rule in order to determine their propriety. Hence action has another ſource of rectitude, namely, its conformity with rule, and conſequently may chance to be right or wrong according to which of the two ſources you refer it: for our rules being generally imperfect or built upon probability, we may act right, that is, conformable to them, and yet take a wrong courſe with reſpect to the deſign we had in view. If you look over the hands at whiſt and ſee the party upon whoſe ſide you have betted lead his ace of trumps when the adverſary has king alone, you will be apt to cry out Right played! becauſe it ſuits your purpoſe beſt of anything he could have done; yet perhaps he might play wrong according to the rules of the game. What if you ſee him playing on ſundays? you may perceive he plays his cards extremely well, yet if you are a conſcientious man you will condemn him for acting wrong: but playing is acting, ſo then he acts right and wrong at the ſame inſtant. What becomes now of the eſſence of rectitude, when the oppoſite eſſence reſides in the ſame ſubject? Can the eſſence of things change without any alteration in themſelves, but as they are compared to this or that particular object, or ſet in various lights? Beſides that actions perfectly innocent,

cent, having neither eſſence regarded nakedly in themſelves, may derive it elſewhere: nothing can be more harmleſs than wagging your finger conſidered in itſelf, yet if the finger reſt againſt the trigger of a loaded muſket and a man ſtand juſt before, you cannot do a wronger thing, and why? not becauſe of anything contained in the eſſence of the action, but becauſe of the fatal conſequences attendant thereupon. Nor are rules leſs liable to vary their rectitude, which conſtantly follows expedience and changes with the change of perſons or circumſtances. Suppoſe you lay down for a rule, When you want proviſions go to the eaſt; this may be a very good precept for thoſe who live to the weſtward of a market town, but when carried to villages on any other point of the compaſs loſes its eſſence.

2. It muſt be owned that this eſſential and intrinſic rectitude is not attributed to all rules, but to thoſe only ſuppoſed invariable and general, not confined to particular caſes. I know of none better entitled to this character than that recommended at the cloſe of the foregoing chapter, to follow reaſon in preference to paſſion and appetite: yet one may queſtion whether this be in fact perpetual, for what rule is it to a young child not arrived at the uſe of his underſtanding, or to a man

man who has loſt it through age or diſtempers? Or if there were a man whoſe appetites were ſo happily turned as to fix always upon things beneficial, our rule would be wrong, becauſe reflection and conſideration would retard the ſpeed of appetite and interrupt it in its operations. But this caſe being never likely to happen upon earth, we will admit the rule to be invariable; ſtill its rectitude flows from the condition of mankind, which may be looked upon as a permanent circumſtance attending them through the whole line of their exiſtence. So then all rules whatever as well general as particular become right, not from anything eſſential or in themſelves, but from their reference to happineſs, and the ſituation either natural or accidental of the party to be directed by them.

3. Though I ſaid juſt now that the conformity to rule was a ſecond ſource of rectitude in actions, yet this conformity does not ſo much conſtitute as diſcover their rectitude. Could we always ſee the certain conſequences of our conduct we ſhould need no rules, for our own ſagacity would be a ſufficient guide: but ſince our ultimate end is not perpetually our ultimate point of view, as lying beyond our ken, we want certain marks to direct us in our approach towards it. The rules of life

life are thoſe marks hung up by obſerving men for the benefit of themſelves and others travelling the road: but nobody ſuppoſes a mark to carry any eſſential intrinſic goodneſs. Thus rules draw their goodneſs from the ſhortneſs of our views and narrowneſs of our capacities, and bear a reference not only to the good end whereto they conduce, but likewiſe to the need we ſtand under of a conductor. As people make further proficiency in any art or buſineſs they employ the fewer rules, and in things quite familiar to them they uſe none: like carriers jogging on continually in the ſame road with whom poſts of direction loſe their quality and become no direction at all. To tell a man that when he walks he muſt ſtep one foot firſt and then tother were no rule, for he does it of his own accord; but what is nothing can have no eſſence and contain nothing.

4. But it may be objected that actions ſometimes receive a rectitude from their conformity to rule when they do not anſwer the purpoſe intended by them. A good man, failing in the ſucceſs of his endeavours, will find great conſolation in reflecting that he had acted right, that is, had laid his meaſures juſtly and executed them punctually. But let us remember that the good man aims

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at happineſs rather than pleaſure, that is, at the greater ſum of ſatisfactions preferably to the leſs, and though he miſſes his purpoſe in the preſent inſtance by following his rule, yet he ſhall attain it more compleatly in other inſtances by the like adherence. Your gameſters have two ſayings current among them, one that the cards will beat anybody, the other that the beſt player will always come off winner at the year's end. So how much ſoever fortune may influence our ſucceſs in the game of life, yet ſhe is not ſo unequal in her favours but that prudence and ſteddineſs will always ſucceed in the long run better than folly and inconſiderateneſs. The conſolation under diſappointment of meaſures rightly taken reſts upon this bottom, that as acts of conformity to rule ſtrengthen and evince our habit of adherence to regular conduct, the poſſeſſion of this habit conduces more to our happineſs than any little ſucceſs we might have gained by a lucky miſconduct: and we may reaſonably eſteem ourſelves put into a better condition upon the whole by performing thoſe acts of conformity than we ſhould have ſtood in had we omitted them. Therefore whenever we can diſcern the inexpedience of our rule, and may depart from it without leſſening our own regard for it or thoſe of other people, we always deem this

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an excepted caſe: and if it be true, what is commonly held, that there is no rule without exceptions, then there is no rule which may not become wrong in ſome inſtance or other.

5. Let us now trace out if we can the origin of thoſe epithets Eſſential and Intrinſic, and examine how they firſt came applied to rectitude of rules: for we cannot but ſuppoſe there muſt be ſome good foundation for the uſe of terms we ſee currently uſed among learned and judicious men. There are ſome rules which reſpect the qualities of objects wherewith we have any concern, and of courſe muſt vary according as thoſe objects change their poſition, or others ſucceed in their room, or as we have or ceaſe to have a concern with them: theſe we ſtile occaſional, being calculated for particular occaſions and relating to the ſituation wherein we happen to ſtand. Others take their riſe from the make and conſtitution of man, and therefore cannot change with any change of place or things external, becauſe we can never remove ourſelves from ourſelves: theſe are called eſſential as being founded on the very eſſence of human nature. Thus, lay in a ſtock of coals in ſummer, is a very proper rule of family oeconomy here in this climate, where the coldneſs of our winters renders ſuch a proviſion neceſſary; but if we were

were to inhabit the torrid zone, this rule would loſe its rectitude. But Look before you leap, is a rule calculated upon the obſervation of human nature, wherein appetite would continually hurry on to miſchief if not reſtrained by conſideration: therefore this rule will remain right every where and always ſo long as we continue to be human creatures, that is, ſenſitivo-rational animals. The former I take to be of the occaſional kind and the latter eſſential: and a very proper diſtinction it is, as inſtructing us which to prefer when they happen to come into competition. Nevertheleſs the eſſence belongs, not to the rule, but to the object whereon it is grounded.

6. The idea of right in itſelf I conceive aroſe from obſerving that our rules grow from one another, their rectitude depending upon the rectitude of thoſe whereout they ſpring; and that ſome of them may be rendred right or wrong by authority, cuſtom or compact. It was right ſome years ago to import and wear cambric, but now it would be wrong, becauſe the laws have prohibited it: it was right among our anceſtors to appear in public with ruffs, ſlaſhed ſleeves and high hats, but now wrong, the faſhion being altered: it might have been right yeſterday for me to have reſolved upon taking a long journey of pleaſure, but

if

if I have ſince made a ſolemn appointment to meet a neighbour here at home, it would be wrong to diſappoint him. Theſe things are rendered right or wrong by their conformity or contrariety to the higher rules of obedience to the legiſlature, of decency and good manners, and of fidelity to our engagements, without which there can be no order nor agreable converſe nor dependence in the world: but becauſe we do not always diſcern, or at leaſt not think of their expedience, we entitle them right in themſelves; whereas the rules receiving their ſanction from them we do not call ſo becauſe we can ſee to what they owe their rectitude. This diſtinction likewiſe is of great uſe becauſe it helps to diſcover the proper objects of authority, cuſtom and compact, for what carries a ſtrong intrinſic rectitude they cannot alter: no laws nor general practice of a country nor private engagement can make it right to commit murder. I ſaid a ſtrong intrinſic rectitude, for there are various degrees of it, and rules carrying a higher degree may ſuperſede thoſe of a lower. Surely the rule of ſelf-preſervation muſt be acknowledged right in itſelf, yet the laws of every country oblige men to neglect this by compelling them into military ſervice, and I never heard ſuch laws abſolutely condemned by the ſpeculative as un-

unrighteous. And when intrinſic rules interfere, that ought to carry the preference which conduces moſt largely to happineſs, wherein not only the preſent expedience is to be conſidered, but likewiſe the danger of invalidating a rule and the greater miſchiefs that may enſue thereby: which makes ſuch caſes many times extremely difficult to determine, there being ſo many diſtant conſequences to be taken into account.

7. Thus I conceive thoſe rules eſſentially and intrinſically right of whoſe rectitude we are well ſatisfied or find no controverſy made, although we do not diſcern from whence that rectitude flowed; and theſe rules are of ſignal ſervice for trying others of an inferiour kind by an application to them: therefore I am not for diſcarding the terms, but giving them their due weight and ſetting them upon their proper foundation. For ſome men carry them a great deal too far by ſuppoſing them to imply ſomething valuable contained in the exerciſe of a rule without reference to anything further: as when they place the wiſdom of Regulus's choice of a certain and cruel death rather than breaking faith with his enemies, in the ſole act of conformity to the rules of fidelity abſtracted from conſequences. If Regulus did right, it muſt be

their purity and ſterling be doubted of, there is none other ſo certain way to try them as by the touchſtone of expedience.

CHAP. XXIX.

VIRTUE.

VIRTUE has been always eſteemed ſomething habitual: our firſt advances towards it were ſtiled by the ancients an Inchoation of virtue, or as we may call it the embryo or ſeedling not yet arrived to perfection. A drunkard who abſtains from liquor once or twice does not inſtantly commence a ſober man, nor do we think him entitled to that appellation until he has ſo maſtered his fondneſs for tippling that it diſturbs him no more. Thus virtue we ſee is a habit: it remains to fix on ſome characteriſtic whereby to diſtinguiſh it from other habits. The moſt obvious definition is that of a habit of acting rightly: but this upon examination will be found much too large, as taking in other things which do not belong to the ſubject we would define; for though we muſt acknowledge every act of genuine virtue to be

right, yet every right action is not an act of virtue. It is certainly very right to eat when we are hungry, ſleep when we are weary, put on boots when we ride a journey, and a great coat when we muſt walk abroad in the rain: ſo is the habit of taking things with the right hand rather than the left, ſpeaking when we are ſpoken to, crying out when ſomebody treads upon our toe: but theſe are never looked upon as inſtances of virtue, nor have they any other concern with her than that ſhe does not diſallow them. The next definition occurring is a habit of contradicting any inordinate deſire or impulſe of paſſion: but againſt this there lies two exceptions. One that there are people whoſe natural temperament or manner of education inclines them to be temperate, chaſt, induſtrious, generous or obliging, without any efforts of their own: now it would be hard to deny theſe qualities the title of virtues, and imprudent not to propoſe them as ſuch to the imitation of other perſons. The other that this definition ſeems not to ſuit with virtue at all unleſs in her imperfect embryo ſtate wherein ſhe is not herſelf: for after the oppoſite paſſion being compleatly maſtered, there remains nothing for her to contradict. Can ſuppoſe then that virtue loſes her eſſence oment ſhe has gotten it? or were there

there a man who had conquered all his paſſions, ſhould we deem him deſtitute of every virtue becauſe he poſſeſſes them all? Let us try then once more and call virtue a habit of purſuing courſes contrary to thoſe pernicious ones that paſſion or appetite generally lead men into: we ſhall now ſave the credit of natural good qualities and thoſe imbibed inſenſibly from cuſtom, together with the benefit of their example to the world, and ſecure the prize to all who have compleated their conqueſt. Nor ſhall we contradict the old obſervation, that the paths of virtue are rugged and thorny at firſt, but lead into a delightfull champain country: whereas did virtue conſiſt in oppoſition alone, ſhe could accompany her votary no further than through the thorny paths, but muſt quit him as ſoon as the champain opens. This definition I believe contains the idea of virtue moſt generally entertained, and will ſerve beſt for common uſe: for thoſe courſes which virtue would recommend being beneficial, let us encourage the practice of them by any means we can, and beſtow our applauſes upon them in whatever manner acquired. If a man be affable and courteous and ready to help his neighbour upon every occaſion where wanted, it with reſpect to the world and to his : of mind in the exerciſe of thoſe

qualities, whether he had them from nature or good company or gained them by his own good management and induſtry. Under this notion of virtue it will appear capable of variation both in kind and degree, for as many evil courſes as there are into which men ſtand liable to be drawn by their paſſions and deſires, there will be ſo many oppoſite virtues: and as every habit gathers ſtrength by exerciſe, it will enable a man more and more to reſiſt temptation in proportion as it ſtrikes deeper root. The man may be ſober at home, who cannot forbear exceſſes among a jovial company: or may have common honeſty, though he wants that total exemption from the bias of ſelf-intereſt which would denominate him ſtrictly righteous.

2. Yet it ſtill remains a queſtion whether we ought to ſatisfy ourſelves, much leſs can pleaſe everybody, even with this laſt definition; for it may be aſked, What merit is there in following the bent of inclination or torrent of example when they chance to carry us in a right courſe? Does not the province of virtue lie ſolely in controuling the paſſions and ſurmounting difficulties? at leaſt is ſhe not ſtronger and more conſpicuous in the conqueſt of an adverſary than when ſhe has none to contend with? When we ſee a man bear ſlander and reproach with a becoming

ing patience, does it not heighten our opinion of him to hear that he was of a warm violent temper bred up in a country remarkable for being choleric and teſty? Remember the ſtory of Zopyrus the phyſiognomiſt who pretending to know people's characters by their faces, ſome of Socrates's ſcholars brought him to their maſter, whom he had never ſeen before, and aſked him what he thought of that man. Zopyrus after examining his features pronounced him the moſt debauched, lewd, croſs-grained, ſelfiſh old fellow he had ever met with; upon which the company burſt out a laughing. Hold, ſays Socrates, do not run down the man, he is in the right I aſſure you: for I was all he ſays of me by nature, and if you think me otherwiſe now, it muſt be becauſe I have in ſome meaſure corrected my nature by the ſtudy and practice of philoſophy. Now does not this ſtory manifeſt a higher pitch of virtue in Socrates than he could have attained had his ſtars befriended him with the happieſt turn of conſtitution?

To theſe queries I ſhall anſwer, there is a particular ſpecies of virtue, which we may call the habit of following the dictates of judgement in preference to the impulſe of fancy or appetite, and therefore may well enough fall within our definition, and if it

were poſſible to be attained in full perfection would ſubdue all other deſires, ſo that it could not then conſiſt in oppoſition, having none to ſtruggle againſt. This I acknowledge to be the moſt excellent of the virtues, as moſt generally ſerviceable to influence the practice, and being the root whereout we might raiſe all the others: for if we had this habit in any conſiderable degree, it would ſupply their places and quickly bring us into ſuch of them as were wanting. Therefore when we behold a man perſevering in a right courſe againſt the bent of nature and ſtream of example, we know he muſt have an ample portion of this higher virtue, which redounds more to his honour than any of the inferiour kind. But I ſee no reaſon why the ſuperiour excellence of this virtue ſhould deſtroy the merit of all the reſt. Silver may be worth having though not ſo valuable as gold: and whatever tends to mend our manners, to the benefit of ſociety, or our own convenience, does not deſerve to be deſpiſed though ſomething elſe may tend more eminently to the ſame purpoſes. If a man be made honeſt by ſelf-intereſt to preſerve his cuſtomers, tis better than that he ſhould not be honeſt at all: if he keep himſelf ſober for his health's ſake, ſtill tis a point gained: if he learn activity and perſeverance in difficult undertakings from

from a love of fame, tis likely he will do more good to the world and find more engagement for his time than if he ſat ſtill in indolence. Therefore I am for ſtoring up as many of theſe inferiour virtues as poſſible by any means we ſee feaſible. As old Gripe ſaid to his ſon, my boy get money; if you can, honeſtly; however, get money: ſo would I ſay to any body that will hear me, Acquire good qualities; by your deſire of rectitude, if you can; however, acquire them. Yet notwithſtanding what I have been ſaying here, I think we ought to make the love of rectitude our principal care, to ſtrengthen it as much as in us lies, and keep it in continual exerciſe by rectifying the frailties of our nature and turning thoſe inclinations that ſtill point towards an improper object.

3. The Stoics, as far as I underſtand of them, would allow none other virtue beſides this of rectitude: therefore they held all exerciſes of virtue and all offences equal and alike, robbing an orchard as criminal as breaking open a houſe or betraying the moſt important truſt. For they ſaid that right action without regard to conſequences being the ſole proper object of deſire, ſo that the wiſeman would not forbear houſebreaking out of fear or ſhame or becauſe it hurt his neighbour or any other conſideration except be-

becauſe it was wrong, every departure from this rule ſhowed a want of ſuch deſire or at leaſt an influence of other deſires: he that quits his rule of right to ſteal a cauliflower, ſhows that he has not an abhorrence of wrong doing purely as ſuch, therefore when he travels the right road it is by accident, and if he abſtains from robbing a houſe, there muſt be ſome other motive that withholds him. I think this doctrine of the equality of crimes is now quite out of doors, and therefore we need not trouble ourſelves any further about it. But they held ſome other tenets that we ſtill hear of now and then, as that virtue is good in itſelf and only deſirable, that it is the ultimate good making the poſſeſſor invariably happy: and I think ſome of them denied that it could be acquired but muſt be implanted by nature, or that the party poſſeſſing it could ever loſe it.

4. As to the unacquirableneſs of virtue, this ſomewhat reſembles Whitfield's day of grace, which being not yet come or being once paſt, no man can attain to righteouſneſs. But if we look back upon human nature, there will appear no colour to ſuppoſe ourſelves born with an idea of right or that it ever comes upon us at once. Our ſenſes firſt put us in action, and upon obſerving what objects pleaſe them we get a deſire of thoſe objects: in

in our further progreſs we find it often neceſſary to make long preparation for obtaining the things we deſire, but the meaſures we take ſometimes ſucceeding and ſometimes failing, we learn by obſervation to form rules for our conduct, and thence get the idea of right, by which we underſtand no more than that ſuch a meaſure will lead us ſurely to any purpoſe we have at preſent in view: thus if we would obtain the favour of tyrants, obſequiouſneſs and flattery may be the right way. But this is not rectitude conſidered as a virtue, which we know nothing of until having experienced that our deſires thwart one another, that it is expedient to reſtrain them, and that the exerciſe of ſuch reſtraint in adherence to the dictates of judgement meets with commendation from others and the approbation of our own breaſt, we then look upon the Honeſtum as a mark directing us to what will conduce moſt to our happineſs, and at length as an object of immediate deſire: and when this view appears in the higheſt pitch of colouring imaginable, and becomes ſteddy ſo as never to vary nor fade, then, if ever the caſe happens, I conceive a man compleatly poſſeſſed of the virtue of rectitude. Thus we ſee the deſire of the Honeſtum is a tranſlated deſire, drawn originally from our others by a prudent regard for the greater number of them

them in preference to any particular one that may ſollicit at preſent. Nor can it be doubted without contradicting experience that a man's progreſs in virtue may be quickned by inſtruction, exhortation, example and his own induſtry, or that after having in ſome meaſure attained it he may receive further improvement by the ſame means. There may be a particular time wherein virtue firſt manifeſts herſelf, and ſo there is in the manifeſtation of moſt other habits and acquirements. If you converſe every day with a man from his beginning to learn any art or language, you will become able in ſome one moment to pronounce him a maſter of it: yet for all that, his ſkill was growing gradually all along from his firſt entrance upon the rudiments, nor perhaps did he make a larger progreſs in that day when you took notice of it than in any other before, or than he will do again by further uſe and practice afterwards. And as we gain habits by uſe ſo we may loſe them again by diſuſe: therefore it is a very dangerous poſition which ſome have maintained that the ſaint can never ſin; it were much ſafer to take Saint Paul's caution, Let him that thinketh he ſtandeth take heed leſt he fall.

5. Whether virtue be good in itſelf may be determined by referring to the laſt chapter but one, wherein it appears that ſatisfaction, the only

only intrinſic good, lies in our perceptions: action is only good as it applies the proper objects for raiſing thoſe perceptions, and virtue, which is a habit or diſpoſition of mind, is good only as it leads into ſuch actions; ſo that virtue ſtands two removes from the ſummum bonum. There are ſome pleaſures fully contenting the mind which come upon us by the operation of external objects without any care of our own to procure them: if we could have a continual and uninterrupted ſupply in this manner we ſhould have no uſe for volition at all, and were our appetites ſo rightly ſet as to put volition upon every thing moſt beneficial for us we ſhould have as little uſe for virtue, which is good for nothing elſe but to rectify the diſorders of our nature; but that is enough to make its value ineſtimable tho' not intrinſic. But it will be ſaid there is a ſatisfaction in the very exerciſe of virtuous actions, this I grant, but then it muſt be to thoſe who have a taſte for virtue; and there is the like ſatisfaction in gratifying every other taſte. The virtuoſo finds it when catching a curious butterfly, the proud finds it when flattery ſooths his ear, the covetous when driving an advantageous bargain, the vindictive when taking meaſures to ſatiate his revenge. Perhaps you will ſay there is a ſecret miſgiving and compunction attending the performance of

[illegible]antable actions: I believe there [illegible] in you or me, becauſe I hope we [illegible] ſeeds of virtue in us; but the con[illegible] villain, who has none of theſe, feels [illegible] remorſe to embitter, no reluctance to leſ[illegible], the pleaſure of any wickedneſs his vicious inclinations prompt him to; ſo then in this reſpect he has the advantage of us. But tis the faireſt way to compare both parties in thoſe inſtances wherein they gratify their reſpective deſires. If you and I can at any time command our paſſion by the authority of reaſon, as I hope we ſometimes do, we find an immediate content and complacence of mind: if the hardened wretch goes on ſucceſſively in any wicked attempt he has ſet his heart upon, he finds an immediate content and complacence of mind: therefore thus far the caſe of both is ſimilar. You will aſk whether, if the thing could be done with a fillip, I would be content to change my ſituation with his? By no means, for it is in my power to act right always, unleſs where my judgement happens to be doubtfull; but it is in my power to gratify my other inclinations only now and then as opportunity favours. When I act right I am providing for my future enjoyments; when I act wrong I am doing ſomething that will croſs my other deſires or bring miſchief upon me. If I take one courſe I ſhall

ſhall find frequent occaſion to reflect with pleaſure on having purſued it. if the other I ſhall find perpetual cauſe, if not to repent, at leaſt to rue ſufficiently for my miſconduct. Thus the advantage of virtue over vice and trifle does not lie in the very act but in the conſequences. The purſuit of either will pleaſe each man in proportion as he has a reliſh to it: but one reliſh prompts to take in wholeſome food, the other to that which will bring on ſickneſs of ſtomach, painfull diſtempers, and perhaps utter deſtruction.

6. Were virtue the ultimate and only deſirable good, ſhe would have nothing elſe to do beſides contemplating her own beauties; ſhe could never urge to action, becauſe action muſt proceed upon a view to ſome end, and if that end were not deſirable the action were nugatory: but ſuch contemplation is ſo far from being our only good that one may queſtion whether it be a good at all. I grant the ſatisfaction felt in acting right makes one conſiderable part of virtue's value, but then it muſt be ſuch as ariſes ſpontaneouſly, not forced upon the thought. Should a man do nothing all day long but reflect with himſelf, How I love rectitude! how happy am I in the poſſeſſion of virtue! you would hardly think the better of his character for this practice. Such contemplations as theſe,

theſe, I faſt thrice a week, I pay tythe of mint, anniſe and cummin, I give alms of all I poſſeſs, are more likely to engender ſpiritual pride and bring miſchief upon a man than to prove his virtue or enſure his happineſs. Beſides, the confining virtue to the ſatisfaction of poſſeſſing her deſtroys her very eſſence, which conſiſts in the efficacy ſhe has to ſet us upon exerting our active powers, which cannot move without an aim at ſomething better to be had than gone without: and when the good man enters upon an undertaking, tho' the ſatisfaction of doing right might urge him to reſolve upon it, yet our capacities are too narrow to admit of his carrying this reflection throughout; when he comes to the performance he will be too buſy in purſuing his meaſures to think of anything elſe, but muſt fix his deſire from time to time upon the ſeveral objects as he goes along. He reaps none other benefit from the rectitude of his deſign, during his engagement in the execution of it, than that his conſcience does not check nor his moral ſenſe diſturb him, which is a meer negative benefit. Nor would virtue find materials to work upon if ſhe could find nothing elſe deſirable beſides herſelf, ſhe does not make her objects deſirable but chooſes thoſe already made ſo to her hands, whoſe prior value recommends them to her option:

option: were there no difference what befalls us it were wholly indifferent what we did, for every manner of acting and even total inactivity would become equally right. Where would be the difference between ſetting a man's houſe on fire and running in to extinguiſh the flames? or why does virtue urge you to the latter unleſs becauſe you think the ſecurity of a family and preſervation of their property deſirable things? If you knew them to be virtuous perſons I ſuppoſe you would not be the leſs forward to aſſiſt them: but why may you deſire to do what virtuous perſons ought not to deſire ſhould be done? and if they may deſire to have it done, the deſirableneſs has no relation to their virtue, which would continue the ſame whether burnt out of houſe and home or no, nor would ſuffer dimunition tho' they were to periſh in the flames; but muſt ariſe upon ſome other account. I would not willingly drop a word to abate our love of virtue, for I think it cannot glow too ſtrong ſo long as we preſerve it pure and genuine: but you know I have diſtinguiſhed between love and fondneſs. Let us not then be ſo fondly enamoured with our miſtreſs as to allow nothing valuable elſewhere, for there are other objects deſirable previous to her recommending them: nay ſhe herſelf would never have become deſirable had it not been for them, for why ſhould I ever deſire to do right or whence come by a

ſatisfaction in ſo doing, unleſs from a perſuaſion that it is better for me, that is, productive of more good, to act right than wrong?

7. We will now examine whether virtue will make the poſſeſſor compleatly and invariably happy; or in modern language, whether, of the two kinds of evil, phyſical and moral, the latter alone be really ſuch and the former only in imagination. For my part I can ſee none original evil beſides the phyſical, were there none of that in nature there could be no ſuch thing as moral evil, for we could never do amiſs if no hurt could ever redound from our actions either to ourſelves or any body elſe. Could you ſteal a man's goods without endamaging his property, without depriving him of ſomething uſefull, without taking off the reſtraint of honeſty from your own mind, or ſhaking the authority of thoſe rules which keep the world from diſorder and confuſion, why need you ſcruple to do it? Were it poſſible to murder a man without pain, without abridging him of the enjoyments he might expect in life or might aſſiſt in procuring for other people, and without ſetting an example that might occaſion the murdering of others not ſo circumſtanced, where would be the immorality of the deed? But ſince theſe are wild and impoſſible ſuppoſitions, and that moral evil conſtantly leads ſome way or other directly

directly or remotely into phyſical, therefore it is an evil moſt ſtrenuouſly to be avoided.

8. The queſtion we are now upon commonly produces another, namely, whether pain be an evil or only rendered ſo by opinion: becauſe it being never pretended that virtue would exempt a man from all pain, while this remained an evil ſhe could not perform her engagement to enſure him perpetual happineſs. In the firſt place let us obſerve that pain appears an evil to young children before they can be ſuppoſed to have contracted any erroneous opinion, ſo there remains no doubt of its being ſometimes an evil not of our own making; and if we may afterwards render it harmleſs merely by thinking it ſo, then it will follow that we can change the nature of things by our opinion of them, which ſurely no philoſopher will aſſert. The truth ſeems to be that we may ſometimes help ourſelves againſt the pungency of pain, not by putting out its ſting but by turning it aſide from us. It was obſerved at the cloſe of the chapter of ſenſation that our frame is of a very complicated texture, the influence of objects paſſing through many ſtages before they arrive at the ſeat of perception where only they can affect us: now if pain can be ſtopped in any part of its paſſage we ſhall receive no hurt from it. The mind ſits retired in kingly ſtate,

nothing external, not even the bodily organs can approach her, but they deliver their meſſage to the mental organs, and if theſe officers do not tranſmit it to the royal audience it is the ſame as if never delivered. But the mental organs do not ſtifle meſſages out of wantonneſs, they only drop them when engaged by ſomething elſe picked up in the family: therefore when painfull ſenſations do not gall, it is by means of ſome other idea occupying our notice and ſheltering us from their ſharpneſs. Certain it is we can all upon occaſion ſupport a ſmall degree of pain without uneaſineſs: young ladies will bear it for their ſhape, a beau for the neatneſs of his foot, a common labourer for his ſuſtenance; ſometimes diverſion will beguile it, buſineſs lull it aſleep, fear baniſh it, revenge deſpiſe it, willfulneſs, eagerneſs after pleaſure, or the love of rectitude, overpower it. In all theſe caſes there is a withdrawing of our notice from the pain and turning it upon other objects, either by preſenting thoſe objects or by an operation of our own upon the organs, in which latter caſe the moment we remit our efforts the pain pinches again. In like manner affliction may be rendered eaſy by ſuggeſting topics of conſolation or encouragements for enduring it, or diverting the thoughts into another channel. But it does not prove

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a burthen not galling in its own nature, becauſe you can ſhrink away your ſhoulder from it or thruſt in ſomething ſoft between: and while you can thus keep off the preſſure of the burthen, tis no wonder you are of opinion it is eaſy. Therefore we may admit it true that pain is no evil to thoſe who do not think it ſo, becauſe they think it none who do not feel the ſmart: but opinion muſt follow fact; and cannot make it; nor can you alter your opinion without an appearance at leaſt of evidence, but meerly by willing it. However, it may be of excellent ſervice to entertain a good opinion if you can beforehand, for nothing like a ſtrong aſſurance to help us in exerting our ſtrength for applying the proper means to relieve ourſelves: when Virgil ſaid of his competitors for the naval prize, that they could becauſe they thought they could, he did not mean that ſucceſs was nothing more than opinion, but that their confidence ſpurred up their activity to a higher pitch than they could ever have raiſed it without. If any man can attain ſo ardent a deſire of rectitude as ſhall overballance all attacks of pain it is happy for him, but he may allow us who have not ſuch an effectual remedy in ſtore to call it an evil: and if he can maſter it ſo far as to keep it from ſtinging him, yet I ſuppoſe it will require his

whole efforts ſo that he will have none to ſpare for other occaſions wherein he would wiſh to employ them, and in this light it deſerves ſome bad appellation, let him chooſe his term to expreſs it by.

9. The deſire of rectitude, like other tranſlated deſires, cannot ſubſiſt without continual exerciſe in actions tending to the gratification of it: therefore virtue alone how compleatly ſoever poſſeſſed cannot enſure happineſs, as being unable to enſure its own continuance without the concurrence of fortune ſupplying opportunities of exerting it, which are the food neceſſary for keeping it alive and vigorous. This probably induced ſome of the moſt extravagant zealots for virtue to maintain the lawfulneſs of ſuicide, when fortune was ſo averſe that there was no ſuſtenance for virtue to be had. And even in its moſt flouriſhing ſtate, it gives more or leſs delight in proportion as things fall out well or ill: for how much ſoever the virtuous man may comfort himſelf under diſappointment of his endeavours to ſerve his neighbour with the reflection that he had done his beſt, yet I ſuppoſe he would have been ſtill better pleaſed had the ſucceſs anſwered his intention: and if he ſees a diſtreſs he knows not how to relieve, will he not feel an additional joy upon the proper means being put into his hands?

which it would be wofull hereſy to allow; but during ſuch performance he receives no benefit from his virtue, her influence being ſuſpended, for he does the ſame and feels the ſame as the ſenſualiſt: therefore he is beholden in part at leaſt to nature for his happineſs in giving him appetites the ſources of theſe enjoyments, and to fortune for ſupplying him with materials for ſatisfying his appetites.

10. But how mighty matters ſoever may be juſtly aſcribed to perfect virtue in the higheſt idea we can form of it in ſpeculation, I fear ſuch perfection is not attainable among the ſons of men: the higheſt pitch we can riſe to will not ſet us above all approach of evil, pain will gall, labour will fatigue, diſappointment will vex, affliction will torment, when they cannot overcome us; ſo that we owe more of our enjoyment to nature and fortune than to virtue. There are people with a very moderate portion of virtue, no more than juſt to keep clear of turbulent paſſions and deſtructive vices, who being placed in an eaſy ſituation of life, paſs it more agreably than others of far ſuperiour merit forced to ſtruggle perpetually with diſeaſe, poverty, contradiction and diſtreſs. Much leſs will it appear upon an impartial ſurvey that every mans ſhare of enjoyment in the world bears an exact pro-

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portion to the meaſure of his virtue. Nor yet do the ſtrongeſt inſtances of virtue prove always the ſcenes of greateſt enjoyment: for we muſt remember that uneaſineſs ſets our activity at work as well as ſatisfaction, and the love of right ſometimes operates by the uneaſineſs of departing from it. If we have deſires which we cannot baniſh from our thoughts urging us ſtrongly to do wrong, but the moral ſenſe threatens with ſhame, remorſe and miſchief, it acts as an obligation laying us under a neceſſity of fulfilling it: and we have ſhown in the proper place that neceſſity always throws the mind into a ſtate of uneaſineſs. For aught I know this might be the caſe of Regulus; I would not detract from his merit nor pretend to dive into the exact ſituation of his thoughts, therefore ſhall ſuppoſe what I conceive poſſible in theory, that he might feel ſo ſtrong a ſatisfaction of mind as over ballanced the pain of the tenters. But ſuppoſe another perſon not quite ſo happily diſpoſed, yet he might have a violent abhorrence of infamy, ſelf-reproach and breach of faith, and the uneaſineſs of falling under what his ſoul abhorred might prevail upon him to undergo any torments for eſcaping it: he might ſtill expect uneaſineſs in the tentered caſk, nevertheleſs might chooſe it as the leſſer evil, and in ſo doing he would

would act right and what all men of honour and probity would applaud him for; yet this leſs evil remains ſtill an evil and he while under it in a ſtate of ſuffering. Nor is it a juſt inference that whatever all wiſe men approve and the moral ſenſe clearly recommends muſt neceſſarily be an act of enjoyment; for wiſemen and the moral ſenſe regard the whole of things, therefore will recommend a preſent diminution of happineſs for a greater encreaſe of it to be obtained thereby. We may ſometimes fortify ourſelves againſt pain and ſelf-denial by the dread of infamy or compunction and holding the force of our obligations ſtrongly in view, when we cannot raiſe an immediate ſatisfaction in our proceeding; therefore it is for the intereſts of virtue that we ſhould upon occaſion put ourſelves into the iron hand of neceſſity, ſhe will pinch us ſorely while ſhe has us under her clutches, and all that time we ſhall be very virtuous and yet very uneaſy.

11. Thus we ſee that virtue cannot ſecure us uninterrupted enjoyment, for there are other cauſes contributing to procure it: but though the condition of men does not always anſwer to their degree of virtue, yet I conceive every particular man will be more or leſs happy in proportion as he acts right. Life has been compared to a game, and we know the cards will beat anybody, but he that

that plays them carefully will do more with the ſame cards than another who throws them out at random. The gifts of nature, education and fortune, are the cards put into our hands, all we have to do is to manage them well by a ſteddy adherence to our judgement. Therefore virtue taken in the largeſt ſence, as including every right conduct as well upon ſmall as great occaſions, may well be ſtiled the only thing deſirable, as drawing all other good things in our power after it; for though there be others valuable, yet Seek ye righteouſneſs firſt ~~place~~ and all theſe ſhall be added unto ye. In common language a thing is called deſirable for its conſequences, therefore this, on which all good conſequences we can procure depend, may well deſerve that epithet: we may have other deſires, but they need be only ſuch as ariſe of their own accord or the preſent occaſion requires, but upon this alone it behoves us to take pains in fixing our deſire, becauſe it will direct us to encourage or reſtrain our other deſires as ſhall be moſt for our benefit. And things are ſaid to be good in themſelves when they have a natural tendency to our advantage without regard to reward or applauſe or other adventitious benefits attending them; ſo virtue may be termed good in itſelf, although bringing no honour nor profit nor any-

anything elſe we deſire, becauſe it will lead us into a right behaviour moſt conducive to purpoſes we ſhall hereafter deſire, and furniſh us with pleaſing reflections that will abundantly repay the trouble we were at in purſuing it. In like manner, Happy, in vulgar acceptation, as when Milton pronounced the ſleeping pair happy, does not ſtand confined to the inſtant time of ſpeaking, but like an eſtate which denominates the owner rich though at preſent quite low in pocket, it relates to the whole ſtock of enjoyments belonging to a man. Thus virtue, which we may look upon as an eſtate yielding an income of happineſs, may well entitle the poſſeſſor happy although the rents may not happen juſt now to come in: and as a man, having his all amounting to a hundred pounds in his pocket, would be glad to exchange condition with one of large fortune whom he finds at a diſtance from home without ready money or credit, ſo a prudent man deficient in virtue would think it a happineſs to be placed in the condition of one poſſeſſing it in an eminent degree though at that time not in a ſtate of enjoyment. In the ſence herein laſt deſcribed as being the moſt obvious, one ſhould naturally underſtand thoſe expreſſions of virtue being the one thing deſirable, good in itſelf, and making the poſſeſſor invariably happy; and I be-

believe the perſons who firſt employed them meant to be ſo underſtood, wherein they carry a juſt and uſefull meaning. Therefore I am not deſirous of diſcarding or contradicting them, nor ſhall I heſitate a moment to agree with Socrates, that it is happier to receive an injury than to do one: but as ſome of his followers ancient and modern, men of deeper thought than judgement, have ſtrained them to an extravagance, I was willing to endeavour reſtoring them to their proper and genuine ſignification. This is one of thoſe tranſmutations ſpoken of in the introduction, whereby valuable and excellent truths, which have been debaſed into error and falſehood, may be tranſmuted back again into their original ſterling.

12. I apprehend ſeveral advantages accruing from our reſting the merit of virtue upon this true and ſolid baſis, its uſefulneſs: for if you talk of an eſſential and independent goodneſs, few can diſcern it; if you appeal to the judgement of the wiſe, many think themſelves wiſer; if you tell them that every act of virtue affords greater immediate enjoyment than the practice of vice, they will not believe you, nor do I know how they ſhould as it contradicts their experience; ſo you will have your principle to battle for before you can deduce anything from it. But we proceed upon a poſtulatum that will readily

dily be granted, for nobody can deny that he had rather have his deſires gratified than croſſed: we need only exhort men not to forget their abſent friends, nor to neglect ſuch deſires as they may have at another time, for the ſake of one or two at preſent uppermoſt in their thoughts: ſo the door ſtands open before us, and we ſhall be willingly admitted to go on in ſhowing the neceſſary connection of virtue with gratification. A ſecond benefit of referring virtue to uſe is, that it helps us to rectify our notions of it, to interpret our rules, and teaches us which of them to prefer when they appear to claſh: for our moral ſenſe, though the beſt guide we have, is not always to be truſted; education, cuſtom, prejudice and human frailty, will ſometimes ſet it to a wrong point, and when ſuſpicions of this kind ariſe, there is no ſurer way of trying the juſtneſs of them than by examining whether the courſes, we find ourſelves prompted to, tend more upon the whole to the encreaſe or diminution of happineſs. Many of our rules may be underſtood variouſly, but when this is the caſe that conſtruction, which appears evidently the moſt conducive to general convenience, ought to be choſen as the trueſt: nor is it ſcarce poſſible to apply a rule always properly or know what circumſtances require an exception without

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underſtanding the drift and deſign of it: and when two of them interfere, we can never determine the preference ſo well as when we can clearly diſcern which of them it would be moſt dangerous to break through. For a third advantage of frequently tracing out the good conſequences of virtue, we may reckon that it will give us a better liking of her and greater confidence in the rules ſhe dictates; for by conſideration and continual obſervation of their tendency we ſhall often diſcover an expedience we could not at firſt deſcry, and ſhall more readily entertain an opinion of the like expedience in other caſes where we cannot diſcern it. Whatever practices have the general approbation of mankind or our moral ſenſe urges us earneſtly to, though ſeeming needleſs or inconvenient in our preſent apprehenſion, will then carry a ſtrong preſumption ſufficient to perſuade us of their being beneficial, and we ſhall purſue them by deſire, not neceſſity, that is, not as an obligation but as our intereſt. This ſeems the readieſt way to conduct us to a love of virtue for her own ſake, for having once gotten our thorough confidence and eſteem, wherever ſhe appears ſhe will become our ultimate point of view, which we ſhall follow without looking for anything beyond, and this we may do without ſuppoſing her the

the ultimate end of action, for we have ſeen before that theſe two are often different.

CHAP. XXX.

PRUDENCE.

I Gave warning in the introduction that I might ſometimes ſeem to ſhake the main pillars of morality, but ſhould never do it unleſs when I conceived them ſlid off their original baſes, in order to reſtore them to a ſolid and durable foundation. I hope I have not been found failing of my promiſe, for though in the laſt preceeding chapters we have appeared ſometimes to turn our backs upon rectitude and take the gratification of every man's taſtes and inclinations for our ultimate end, yet at the cloſe of them we have left virtue in a recommendable light ſufficient to engage the attention of every reaſonable perſon, as being juſtly entitled to be called good in itſelf, the one thing deſirable, and capable of making the poſſeſſor happy, in the proper and genuine meaning of thoſe expreſſions, when not ſtrained to unwarrantable lengths, but underſtood as common ſence would

would lead us to underſtand them. We have likewiſe endeavoured to aſcertain the province of virtue, which does not extend to every thing right; for our appetites prompt us to many right things, the ſenſualiſt doing the ſame in ſome inſtances as the righteous: therefore the office of virtue lies in watching over their motions and inſtigating to ſuch right actions from which our other inclinations would lead us aſide. But this deſcription of virtue being thought too general, your ethic writers have diſtinguiſhed her into four principal branches, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Juſtice, which they call cardinal virtues from a latin word ſignifying a hinge, theſe four being the main hinges whereon all inferiour virtues and particular rules of conduct hang. The firſt of theſe in order they reckon Prudence, as being the chief and in effect comprehending the other three, which relate to the removing three certain obſtacles in our nature moſt apt to diſturb and ſtop us in the exerciſe of prudence.

2. Before we enter upon a particular conſideration of this cardinal virtue, it will be neceſſary to obſerve that there are two kinds of prudence which may be diſtinguiſhed, as evils have been, into phyſical and moral. The former conſiſts in knowing the beſt meaſures to be taken upon any occaſion, and

depends upon ſagacity, quickneſs and ſtrength of parts, or upon experience, inſtruction or the opportunities we have had of advancing our knowledge: this we may reckon a valuable endowment but can by no means be ranked under any claſs of virtues, for we find it conſpicuous in perſons overwhelmed with vice and debauchery. But moral prudence, with which alone we have concern at preſent, conſiſts in making the beſt uſe of ſuch lights as we have, not in the number or clearneſs of them; for virtue lies ſolely in the right application of our powers, and may reſide with thoſe of the narroweſt as well as the largeſt extent. Were a man wholly void of moral prudence to be inveſted with it at once in the moſt eminent degree conceivable, he would not become a whit the more knowing for the acquiſition: tis true at the years end he might advance conſiderably in knowledge, becauſe he would omit no opportunity of improving it, but he would not inſtantly diſcern a ſingle truth more than he did before, unleſs perhaps by diſpelling the miſts of ſome paſſion that might juſt then prevent him from taking notice of what he knew well enough already.

3. If we ſurvey the tranſactions of mankind we ſhall find there is a diſcretion much more valuable than knowledge, as being more

more generally ſerviceable and carrying on the affairs of life more compleatly and clearer of miſtakes. Your men of fine ſence having loſt their common ſence get nothing by the exchange: they will work wonders ſometimes in matters happening to ſuit their talents, but know not or regard not how to apply nor conduct them, or commit ſome egregious blunder that overthrows all the good they have done: they perform excellent ſervice under proper direction, but plunge into ſome quagmire when left to themſelves: they can give the beſt advice to others, but through ſome whim or oddity let their own affairs run to ruin. On the other hand we ſee perſons of very moderate capacities who, by a diſcreet management of them, paſs their life with more comfort to themſelves and credit among their neighbours than others of far ſuperiour endowments. They know the extent of their talents and do not aim at things beyond their reach. They regard the propriety of their deſign as well as of the meaſures for executing it: no leſs carefully conſidering what they ſhall do than how they ſhall compaſs it. They attend to all the notices of their judgement, never fondly fixing upon any one point to the overlooking of others. They are ductile and flexible, never ſtriving obſtinately againſt the ſtream, but

ready to ſeize every light that ſhall break in upon them, and to lay by their deſign or change their meaſures as occaſion varies: yet ſteddy to their purpoſe ſo as not to waver with every ſudden ſtart of fancy. Willing to play a ſmall game rather than ſtand out, and always making ſome progreſs when they cannot run extraordinary lengths: yet not backward to quicken their pace and enlarge their ſchemes whenever they find it ſafe and feaſible. Their conduct is uniform and conſiſtent throughout, if they cannot perform great undertakings, what they do is compleat and free from fatal miſtakes, one of which may do more miſchief than a great deal of ſagacity and diligence can afterwards repair.

4. Now this diſcretion diſcoverable in the ordinary behaviour of ſome perſons is not the moral prudence we ſeek after, yet ſeems to be the root giving birth to it and communicates its own complection and flavour to the fruit: for perſons having practiſed this happy manner of proceeding in the common affairs of life, will follow the ſame when they come to have an idea of virtue; they will uſe their whole underſtanding, regard all the rules of rectitude, and proceed upon a judicious love not a fancifull fondneſs for virtue, regarding all her intereſts ſo as to hurt none of them by too eagerly purſuing others. It is a virtue, ſays

ſays Horace, to eſcape vice, and the firſt ſtep to wiſdom is made by getting clear of folly: and we know where elſe it is recommended, not to confine our eyes ſo cloſely to what things we ought to have done as to overlook what things we ought not to have left undone: therefore they will be more ſollicitous to avoid acting wrong than to act remarkably right, nor think that the omiſſion of common duties can be compenſated by works of ſupererogation. I do not ſay that moral prudence is incompatible with great accompliſhments, on the contrary it will improve them to the utmoſt, employ them moſt uſefully in ſervices whereto they are fitted, and appears moſt conſpicuous in the management of them: nevertheleſs it may ſubſiſt without them, or be wanting where they abound, being a diſtinct quality of itſelf. It does not always accompany the moſt glowing zeal, nor give birth to the moſt ſhining performances: as Horace ſays, we may purſue virtue too intenſely, that is, when we purſue her with paſſion, not with judgement. It is not the diſquiſitions of the cloſet, excellent diſcourſes or profound ſpeculations upon the nature of right and wrong, nor yet ſingle acts how exemplary ſoever, but the general tenour of a man's conduct, that denominates him virtuous. As thought and conſideration contri-

bute greatly to encreaſe and clear up the lights of our underſtanding, one ſhould be apt to imagine that thoſe who think moſt carefully upon the ſubject of righteouſneſs ſhould be the moſt righteous perſons, but this is no certain rule: for men may contemplate for ever without making uſe of their diſcoveries, which then tend only to enlarge their knowledge, wherein we have ſeen virtue does not conſiſt, but employs it only as an inſtrument for effecting her purpoſes. And there are perſons of lively tempers and little enured to ſtudy who cannot think intenſely at all, yet do not want diſcretion to ſteer them right in all the variety and quickneſs of their motions. In moſt common inſtances it is eaſy to ſee at a glance what is the beſt ſtep to be taken, the characters of our duty being printed ſo large that he that runs may read them: and if men would uſe themſelves conſtantly to follow their preſent judgement, when clear and vivid, they would make greater progreſs towards rectitude than by any other exerciſe of their faculties whatſoever.

5. It is not eaſy to pronounce upon actions or diſtinguiſh preciſely when they proceed from the virtue of prudence and when not, for we have ſeen the rectitude of actions conſiſts either in their conduciveneſs to the purpoſe intended or in their conformity to rule: but

but men ſometimes act very right upon wrong principles, or adhere to their rule becauſe no temptation ſtarts up in their thought to draw them aſide; in neither of which caſes their prudence can be inferred from their acting prudently, for their taking the right courſe is luck rather than virtue. Nor are we compleat judges even of our own prudence, becauſe having no better method of eſtimating it than by reflecting back upon our paſt conduct, we cannot retain in mind the ſecret motives that may have actuated us, much leſs tell what unlucky turn of imagination might have led us another way. Therefore as I ſaid before we may judge beſt of ourſelves or others from the general tenour of conduct rather than from any particular parts of it how ſhining ſoever. Yet this will not enſure us againſt miſtakes, for our leading principle or ruling paſſion, as it is called, which gives the general turn to our actions, may have been inculcated by others or taken up upon hazard, and we been led by good fortune into a right courſe of behaviour without having ever examined whether it had that tendency or diſcerned the reaſonableneſs whereon it was founded.

6. Neither is it an eaſy matter to ſettle the exact idea of this cardinal virtue we are ſpeaking of, ſo that we may know what to look

for when we go to paſs our judgement. It is not knowledge nor acuteneſs of parts nor clearneſs of underſtanding nor largeneſs of information nor goodneſs of principles inſtilled, for it ſhould be ſomething entirely our own, but all theſe depend upon other cauſes. It may ſeem at firſt ſight to lie in the exerciſe of our reaſoning faculties, becauſe moſt of the miſcarriages in life proceed from inconſiderateneſs and haſty determination; but then it lies as much in quickneſs of following the lights of reaſon whenever they ſhine out clear: for to ſtand thinking when we ſhould be acting, or hunt after ſpeculations when ſomething lies ready at hand for us to do, were not much leſs imprudent than never to think at all. Since then it is ſo difficult to deſcribe, and when we ſeem to have laid our finger upon it ſtill it eludes our graſp, let us endeavour to place it in ſeveral lights, that one may ſupply what ſhall appear wanting in another. I conceive then prudence will enable him that has it compleatly, to keep the mental organs open and watchfull, hearing the whiſpers of the moral ſenſe amid the clamors of paſſion, and diſcerning the feebleſt glimmerings of reaſon thro' the glare of fancy; ſo that every object in the proſpects glancing before him, whether the ſcene contain more or fewer of them, will be ſeen in its true

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ſhape, and his notice will inſtantly turn upon that which is moſt proper. For our doings being all made up of ſingle momentary acts, volition perpetually following the freſh ideas thrown up by imagination, muſt take their denomination from that of their component parts: therefore if the ſteps be prudently taken, the whole progreſs muſt needs be ſo too; but if they be not, we may ſtill chance to ſteer the right courſe while nothing occurs to miſlead us, but our ſucceſs will be owing to the goodneſs of our lights rather than to the ſoundneſs of our eye. Nor does this vigilance or openeſs of the mental eye depend wholly upon induſtry and the intenſe application of our optics, they help to improve it when deficient, or on the contrary may ſometimes do hurt by confining it to one narrow point, but when once acquired, it becomes a habit operating ſpontaneouſly, rather uſing application as an inſtrument to effect its purpoſes than wanting it as a ſpring to put itſelf in motion. Whoever could attain this habit compleatly would never act in the dark nor at random, for tho' his lights might be faint he would diſtinguiſh which of them were the cleareſt, he would find an opportunity for doing ſomething in every ſituation of circumſtances, and would diſcern what is feaſible as well as what is deſireable. It would direct him

him which of his ſeveral faculties to exerciſe, when to deliberate and when to execute, when to ſuſpend his judgement and when ſuſpenſion were needleſs, when to exert reſolution and when to comply with the occaſion, when to beſtir himſelf and when to receive whatever ideas occur. In ſhort he would act with the ſame uniform tenour throughout, as well in trifles as matters of importance, and though he might ſometimes take wrong meaſures through ignorance, his every motion would be right with reſpect to his degree of knowledge or preſent information.

7. In another light we may conſider prudence as a diſpoſition of mind to regard diſtant good equally with preſent pleaſure, eſtimating both according to their real not apparent magnitude: like the ſkill we have of diſcerning a grown perſon twenty yards off to be larger than a child ſitting in our lap, altho' the latter take up more room in our eye. Nature firſt moves us by ſenſations of pleaſure or pain, experience ſoon teaches us that pleaſurable ſenſations will not always come of themſelves but we muſt do ſomething to make proviſion for obtaining them, hence ſpring our deſires and paſſions. Upon further experience we learn that deſire often leads into miſchief, this gives riſe to the moral ſenſe admoniſhing to reſtrain deſire when

when pointed the wrong way: but there being an eaſe in gratifying and a trouble in croſſing it, the conteſt in theſe caſes lies between expedience and pleaſure, and to chooſe conſtantly the former is an effect of prudence. For as worldly prudence engages a man upon every occaſion to improve his fortune rather than get a little ready money in hand: ſo moral prudence will incline him always to prefer that which is beſt before that which will immediately pleaſe his ſenſes or gratify his deſire or his indolence.

8. The third light wherein I ſhall endeavour to place our virtue is that of a readineſs in following the dictates of reaſon: but by reaſon we muſt not underſtand here the act of reaſoning, for that in many caſes might be imprudent, but thoſe treaſures which we have ſhown elſewhere reaſon depoſites in the ſtorehouſe of ideas, that is, ſuch notices occurring from time to time to our judgement as were formerly the produce of careful conſideration or have been examined and approved thereby. The bare poſſeſſion of theſe treaſures renders a man more knowing and many times a more uſefull member of the community, becauſe the deed does the ſervice not the internal diſpoſition of the performer; but tis the readineſs in following them inſtantly upon their appearance that conſtitutes him a perfectly

that care and induſtry by ſome conſideration already in our thoughts, and the firſt act of prudence we ever exerted muſt have had ſome prior motive exciting us to it, which was ſuggeſted by our other deſires. Whether as the nature of man is conſtituted it may be loſt again when once arrived to perfect ſtature we cannot certainly know, having never ſeen an inſtance of ſuch perfection among us; yet it ſeems hard to conceive how the habit of following reaſon can ſubſiſt after reaſon itſelf is totally loſt and all the characters imprinted by her obliterated by age and diſtempers: but we find by wofull experience that ſuch degrees of it as man can attain may be loſt again by deſpondency or uninterrupted proſperity or too great ſecurity or evil company or other cauſes. Nevertheleſs it is the moſt durable poſſeſſion we can have, as being untouched by many outward accidents that may deprive us of all others, and warning us againſt the approach of whatever might endanger it: and the moſt valuable, for though it cannot enſure us perpetual ſucceſs, it will help us to the greateſt meaſure of all other valuable things in our power to obtain: nay if we believe Juvenal, we ſhall find no deity averſe if prudence be not wanting.

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10. This virtue of prudence conſtitutes the eſſence of moral wiſdom, of which ſome in former ages have entertained very abſurd and extravagant notions; ſuppoſing the wiſeman beholden to himſelf alone for his wiſdom, placed above the reach of fortune to hurt him, and maſter of all arts and ſciences from the higheſt to the loweſt, even to the making the cloaths upon his back, the ſhoes upon his feet and the ring upon his finger: wherein they confounded wiſdom with capacity, which are manifeſtly different, the one conſiſting in extenſiveneſs of knowledge, the other ſolely in the due management of ſuch as we have, be it more or be it leſs. Therefore there may be the greateſt folly where there is the moſt knowledge, and upon that very account: for if two perſons take the ſame improper courſe together, he will be deemed to act moſt imprudently who beſt knew how to have acted right. If a man unacquainted with a wood takes a country fellow for his guide, who knows all the paths and turnings perfectly well but will needs puſh on the neareſt way through the thickeſt part until both are entangled in the briars, it is eaſy to ſee that the charge of folly lies wholly at the door of the guide, and for this very reaſon becauſe he knew better than the other. Beſides, by placing wiſdom

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n ſcience they overthrow the wiſeman's claim to the ſole merit of it, making it to depend upon the natural endowments of body or mind, and accidental advantages: for not to mention the neceſſity of inſtruction, leiſure and quickneſs of apprehenſion, to render knowledge compleat, I ſuppoſe they would hardly pretend that a man born blind could ever make himſelf maſter in the art of painting or ſcience of optics.

11. But neither, when we underſtand wiſdom in the proper and genuine ſence, can the poſſeſſor claim it as entirely of his own creation, for it grows out of common diſcretion, being the ſame quality carried to the greateſt length human nature can contain: but this depends upon an obſervant though perhaps not always a thoughtfull temper, upon good guidance or example, and upon lucky accidents; for men often learn diſcretion from their own miſconduct, when the miſchiefs of it happen to be ſo obvious that they cannot but take notice, and ſo galling that they cannot fail of remembring them. And he muſt have an uncommon degree of ſelf conceit, who can perſuade himſelf that he ſhould have acted with the ſame diſcretion he does, had he been born with a dull apprehenſion and ſtrong ſenſations or bred up among the ſavages in America. I know ſome affect to cry up the bar-

barbarous nations as furniſhing inſtances of as great ſoundneſs of judgement as is to be met with among the moſt civilized: I ſhall not deny that ſuch inſtances may be found, becauſe having no acquaintance with thoſe nations I cannot diſprove them, but we muſt remember that diſcretion proceeds from obſervance of temper, incidents touching the notice, inſtruction or example, and any one of theſe cauſes may ſometimes operate ſo favourably as to ſupply the place of the others.

Let us now ſuppoſe the ſage poſſeſſed of perfect wiſdom, yet is he ſecure that he ſhall always retain it? Why yes, it is always in his power to act according to the circumſtances of every ſituation that ſhall happen. I grant it, but this is no anſwer to the queſtion, for ſo it is in the power of the unwiſe: but our power takes its turn, or in other words volition is determined, by the motives and ideas preſent in the thought, and what ideas or in what colour ſhall be preſented depends upon the ſtate of the mental organs, ſo that any little change in their texture might deſtroy the beſt diſpoſition of mind or turn it into the worſt. Now who can know the whole compoſition of man ſo thoroughly as to pronounce certainly that no external cauſes may operate to work a different texture in our organs? It may perhaps be alledged that the men-

mental organs have a ſeparate mechaniſm of their own independent of the bodily, ſo that though their play may be ſuſpended or varied according to the different action of the latter, yet no diſeaſe nor accident happening to the groſſer parts nor impulſe of outward objects can alter their texture. Whether the caſe be ſo in fact or no is more than I can tell, but admitting it true, ſtill is the wiſeman beholden to nature for having framed his compoſition in two ſuch diſtinct compartments; and he owes the preſervation of his beſt property to the laws ſhe has kindly provided for ſecuring it againſt damage from that part of his mechaniſm which does not lie under his abſolute command. Neither is he little beholden to fortune for ſupplying him with materials and opportunities of exerciſing his wiſdom, which render it more ſerviceable to others and productive of enjoyment to himſelf than it could be without thoſe aſſiſtances.

12. But whatever condition the conſummate wiſeman may ſtand in, we who only make diſtant advances towards his perfection, cannot pretend to ſelf-ſufficiency, nor claim the merit of any little ſucceſs we meet with as all our own: for we find our pittance of virtue improve and kept alive by exerciſe, but when this exerciſe is interrupted for want of proper ſubjects to work upon, or our minds

thrown off the hinge by croſs accidents, or our diſcretion beguiled by temptations, we perceive ourſelves retarded if not thrown backward in our progreſs. Let us then acknowledge our obligation to nature, as well for the good ſhe has already done us, as for the continuance of it by her ſalutary eſtabliſhments; and own ourſelves dependent upon fortune for the favours we may ſtill hope for at her hands, leaving however, like wiſe generals, as little to her diſpoſal as poſſible: and nothing will better put us in a way of being befriended by her when favourable, or ſhelter us from her attacks when ſhe proves out of humour, than ſuch degree of moral prudence as we are capable of attaining.

CHAP. XXXI.

FORTITUDE.

OF all the obſtacles ſtanding in our way when diſpoſed to act right, none operates ſo powerfully as fear: other paſſions beguile or tire us out, but this ſtops us ſhort in our career; therefore the conqueſt of this paſſion has been made one of the cardinal virtues. It

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is not eaſy to fix upon a proper definition of this virtue, at firſt thought one ſhould be apt to call it a habit of fearleſneſs, but every abſence of fear is not courage: for it may proceed from ignorance of the danger, as when a child goes to play with the muzzle of a loaded muſket; or it may ariſe from an inſenſibility of temper, for there are people who ſee their danger but want feeling enough to be touched by it. Now we muſt acknowledge this inſenſibility a very uſeful quality to the public, for without it perhaps we could not properly man our fleets nor recruit our armies: yet is it ſo far from deſerving the name of virtue that it ſeems ſcarce compatible with the principal of them, I mean prudence, which grows out of caution and ever keeps it in company throughout all her proceedings. Beſides that we find fear a neceſſary engine to reſtrain many inordinate deſires and unruly paſſions that would elſe make ſtrange havock and diſorder in the world: and if the intrepidity of pirates and banditti could be wreſted from them, it would be much better both for themſelves and all others within their reach.

2. This fearleſneſs of temper depends upon natural conſtitution as much as any quality we can poſſeſs, for where the animal ſyſtem is ſtrong and robuſt it is eaſily acquired, but

when the nerves are weak and extremely ſenſible, they fall preſently into tremours that throw the mind off the hinges and caſt a confuſion over her. Nor are the changes in our diſpoſition of body without their influence: old age abates the ſpirit, men have their ebbs and flows of bravery, and ſome diſtempers bring a mechanical terror upon the imagination. It has been obſerved that courage may be partial, dauntleſs to ſome objects and gone upon the appearance of others: Mr. Addiſon tells us he knew an officer who could march up to the mouth of a cannon, but affrighted at his own ſhadow and unable to bear being left alone in the dark. Such contrariety of character muſt have been owing to impreſſions taken in his youth; and indeed courage as well as timorouſneſs may come by ſympathy and imitation from the company wherewith men conſort: the recruit becomes intrepid by the dauntleſs looks and diſcourſes of his comrades and their taunts upon cowardice, he improves better this way than he could do by all the lectures of philoſophy aided by his own utmoſt induſtry. Courage from whatever cauſe ariſing may be ranked under thoſe inferiour virtues mentioned at the beginning of CHAP. XXIX. which ſpring indifferently from nature, education, cuſtom or our own diligence: nor is it the leſs intrinſically

ſically valuable becauſe ſometimes turned to miſchievous purpoſes, for the beſt things corrupted become the worſt. It gains admiration and applauſe more than any of the reſt, for fear being the moſt difficult paſſion to overcome therefore the conqueſt of it deſerves to be moſt honoured, becauſe honour, as we have already ſeen under that article, belongs not only to things the moſt uſefull but to thoſe where the honour itſelf will be of the greateſt uſe; as it certainly will here, for nothing carries men ſo effectually through danger as a quick ſenſe of honour, which therefore has always been looked upon as the neceſſary qualification and diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of a ſoldier. Yet courage to deſerve the name of virtue in any degree muſt be habitual, not owing to inſenſibility, for the danger muſt be ſeen but deſpiſed, nor accidental or occaſioned by the prevalence of any paſſion. Some folks are mighty valiant in their cups, others in the heat of reſentment care not what becomes of themſelves ſo they can but wreak their revenge, others again eagerly bent upon ſome fooliſh deſire will run any hazards to gratify it; in all theſe their rage is not their own but caſt upon them by another agent working upon them, rather a mark of ſtupidity than of bravery.

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3. From what has been obſerved above we may gather the true notion of fortitude, and having ſeen what it is not may more eaſily diſcover what it is. The contempt of danger when owing to the want of apprehenſion, thoughtleſneſs, or to ſome other idea forcibly occupying the thought, carries no merit at all: when the effect of conſtitution, education, or the deſire of applauſe, and become habitual, it deſerves the name of virtue and our commendation as ſuch: but to entitle it a cardinal virtue it muſt be a branch of prudence, which we have ſeen conſiſts in diſcerning all the lights of our underſtanding as they preſent from time to time before us. Therefore he that poſſeſſes fortitude compleatly will enjoy a perpetual preſence of mind, nothing will ruffle or diſcompoſe him but he will proceed in an equal tenour, not having his ſeaſons of failing nor particular objects to ſtart at, the dread of ſhame will no more diſconcert him than other evils, he will regard conſequences in order to take his meaſures accordingly but reſt wholly unconcerned at the event, he will ſuffer no idea to intrude upon him againſt his liking and will have the abſolute command of his notice to fix it upon any point he judges proper. Etymologiſts derive virtue from virility, ſuppoſing it to denote a manly ſtrength and vigour of mind: now vigour will naturally exert

exert itſelf in throwing off everything diſpleaſing or unwelcome, and as a concern for ſiniſter events further than requiſite in directing us to provide againſt them, and the dazzle of objects preventing the ſight of others that lie before us, are what everybody would wiſh to avoid, when ideas intrude forcibly upon the mind it proves her infirmity and inability to reſiſt them. Thus the being maſter of our thoughts, having the perfect uſe of our diſcernment, and all that authority over our mental organs which they are capable of obeying, conſtitutes prudence; and that branch of it relating to terrible ideas is underſtood by fortitude, which though not the leſs for being aided by nature, cuſtom or other cauſes, yet is not compleat until it can operate without them.

4. But in order to render this command of our ideas compleat, it is neceſſary that preſent evils ſhould be no more capable of diſcompoſing us than the apprehenſion of them at a diſtance; for if we can face danger while aloof but ſhrink under miſchiefs when actually falling upon us, it argues a feebleneſs of our ideas rather than the ſtrength of our mind. Therefore patience has always been eſteemed a ſpecies of fortitude, enabling us to bear pain, labour, indignity, affliction, diſappointment and whatever elſe is irkſome to human

nature. I will not undertake to determine whether theſe may be rendred quite harmleſs ſo as not to hurt at all, yet if there be any ſalve to prevent their galling patience is certainly the thing, which whoever poſſeſſes compleatly, if he cannot eſcape ſuffering by them, yet he will be able to divert his thoughts in great meaſure upon other objects: for he will never be thrown off his baſis, nor permit them ſo to obſcure the notices of his judgement as that he cannot find ſomething proper to be done upon the preſent occaſion, which may in part at leaſt engage his attention. Nay he will very often prevail to fix it wholly upon the meaſures of his conduct, in which caſe he will relieve himſelf entirely, for when we can forbear attending to uneaſineſs it vaniſhes, which made ſome imagine it lay ſolely in opinion. When the mind has gotten this habitual command over her motions, ſhe will exerciſe it I conceive, for I can do no more than conjecture, with eaſe, freedom and readineſs, and without variation. But for us learners in the art, we muſt expect to meet many difficulties, which we cannot ſurmount nor hope to make any movement without frequently exerting our reſolution: nor ſhould we diſdain to ourſelves of example, company, ſhame, mentation or any other helps that may

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advance us forward. But to make the moſt of our reſolution it will be requiſite to know the ſtrength of it, that we may not put it upon more than it will perform: becauſe repeated ill ſucceſs may drive to deſpair and damp the ſpirits inſtead of raiſing them. It will be expedient to take all opportunities of encreaſing what little courage or patience we have, to examine in what particulars we are defective and what feaſible methods we have of remedying that defect, thus keeping our reſolution in continual exerciſe: for every habit and every power of our nature gathers ſtrength by being exerciſed. With ſuch good management and a vigilant but judicious uſe of the ſtrength we have, we ſhall be continually advancing forwards by little and little: and the acquiſition of any of thoſe inferiour virtues ſpoken of in § 2. will bring us ſo much nearer to perfection, for if it were poſſible to attain every one, I imagine the aggregate of them all would make that fortitude we are in queſt of.

5. Intrepidity in the day of battle is not the only ſpecies of courage, for I ſuppoſe many a brave officer might not be able to walk upon a wall like our common bricklayers; which ſhows he has not an abſolute command over his ideas, ſince ſome of them will intrude ſo far upon his judgement as to make him throw himſelf down for fear of falling. The art of walking

walking upon walls is ſcarce neceſſary for thoſe who do not intend to follow the trade of a bricklayer, for they may find other objects whereon to exerciſe their reſolution to better advantage, therefore I do not recommend it anybody to learn until he has compleated himſelf in all other branches of knowledge: but I apprehend the ideal ſage, having a perfect maſtery over his imagination, would upon occaſion run along the ridge of a houſe as ſecurely as he could upon the ſame tiles ranged along his chamber floor; and would likewiſe, where it were neceſſary, bear any filthy diſcourſe, noiſome ſmell, or naſtineſs beſmearing him, without ſqueamiſhneſs or offence to his delicacy. But beſides natural terrors which may ſeize anybody upon firſt trial before they have hardened themſelves by cuſtom, there are others which gather like ruſt upon the imaginations of particular people, making them diſtruſt their own ſenſes and afraid that ſome ſudden impulſe ſhould drive them upon extravagant actions, tho' they have never yet done any ſuch and have the ſtrongeſt intention to avoid them. I know a very ſenſible man who once ſcrupled to take a bank note into his hand for fear he ſhould throw it into the fire: another unwilling to go near a precipice leaſt he ſhould have an inclination to throw himſelf down. I have heard

heard of a lady that terrified herſelf when going a viſiting with a notion that ſhe might tumble down on entring the room or ſay ſomething very rude: and I myſelf when a boy, having occaſion to retire to ſome private corner, have been ſometimes grievouſly diſturbed leſt I ſhould be ſtill in a room full of company and only fancied I had left them. I am apt to ſuſpect there are more of theſe whimſies in the world than one hears of, for people are ſhy of betraying their foibles and tis but by chance after being very intimate that one gets any ſuch confeſſion out of them. Theſe little diſtempers of mind may proceed from too great intenſeneſs of thought, for as hard labour brings a trembling and weakneſs upon the nerves until refreſhed by reſt, ſo the organs of attention being overſtrained become unable to reſiſt whatever fancies ſtart up in its way, and I believe your hard ſtudents if they take notice will find more of this diſturbance after a ſeries of cloſe application or having been much alone than at other times: but if it be thought that ladies and children cannot be ſuppoſed to hurt themſelves this way, let it be remembered that they too ſometimes puzzle their brains as much tho' not upon the ſame ſubjects nor in the ſame manner as great ſcholars. The like effect may ſpring from a cuſtom of making uncommon

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ſuppoſitions which the ſtudious ſometimes neceſſarily and ſometimes needleſly give into, or the habit of building caſtles in the air that others often divert themſelves with: for by theſe practices we teach imagination to paint her figures as ſtrong as the real objects exhibited to us by nature. Another ſource of the ſame ſtream may riſe upon taking too much of the pillow, for ſleep protracted longer than neceſſary will not be ſound, but in dreams volition remains inactive all being carried on by the ſpontaneous workings of our organs, which having thereby gotten a habit of moving themſelves, will afterwards throw up dreaming thoughts amongſt our waking ones ſo ſtrongly that we ſhall ſcarce be able to know them aſunder. I would recommend it to perſons labouring under this infirmity to obſerve whether they do not find it trouble them leſs upon thoſe days wherein they happen to have riſen early. I do not know that the believers in a free will of indifferency are more ſubject to theſe fantaſtical diſturbances than other folks, yet one may well wonder why they ſhould not, for upon their principles the danger would be real not fantaſtical: becauſe what avails it to have our ſenſes, our judgement and diſcretion, if by our elective power we may annex the idea of Beſt to whatever they warn us moſt clearly againſt? How

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can we depend upon our ſubſequent behaviour correſponding with our precedent, if volition be determined by nothing antecedent, nothing exteriour to the Will itſelf? In ſhort take away the influence of motives, and all before us becomes contingent, doubtfull and hazardous.

But whatever cauſes give riſe to ſuch apprehenſions they certainly indicate an impotence of mind, that has not a command over her ideas nor can turn her notice upon any ſpot ſhe pleaſes in the ſcenes of her imagination. One cannot expect a remedy in this caſe ſo much from reaſon as reſolution or rather care and vigilance, for authority grows by cuſtom and every power gathers ſtrength from exerciſe: therefore it is expedient to accuſtom ourſelves to chooſe out of the ideas before us for our inſpection, to thruſt away thoſe that would intrude upon our notice and to diſcern the degree of evidence ſufficient to work aſſurance. It has been made appear in CHAP. XI. that abſolute mathematical certainty was not made for man, therefore whoever looks always for that, muſt hang in perpetual doubt and obſcurity.

6. There is likewiſe a courage of aſſenting as well as acting, for it cannot be denied that men may cramp themſelves in their deliberations for fear of diſcovering a fallacy in ſomething

thing whereof they have conceived a favourable prejudice: and certainly without a freedom of thought, there is very little advance to be made in our reſearches after truth. But then it ought not to be forgotten that there is a difference between courage and raſhneſs, between freedom and change of ſervitude: for if we run deeper into one prejudice by flying eagerly from another, we ſhall not much enlarge our liberty. Therefore it behoves us to join caution to our bravery, without which it will not be genuine, to look around us obſerving every quarter from whence an undue influence may fall upon us, to examine all ſides calmly and impartially, and give a juſt weight to the preſumption that our prejudice may have been founded upon ſolid reaſons formerly diſcerned by ourſelves or others tho' we cannot now recover them.

7. Neither is patience confined ſolely to the endurance of pains and labours, thoſe whoſe ſituation exempts them from ſuch trials, may yet find ſubjects whereon to exerciſe this branch of fortitude. There is nobody but meets with diſappointments, croſs accidents, contradictions and interruptions, as well in buſineſs as diverſion, and if we could bear theſe without ruffling, it would certainly be gaining a valuable point. For my part I often envy the patience of hackney coachmen ſitting

ting whole hours in all weathers upon their boxes, tradeſmen waiting behind their counters, and ſervants attending in antichambers liable to be called upon any trifling errand at every touch of the bell: were I in their ſituation, reſtrained from employing myſelf as I liked and unable to enter upon a train of thought becauſe expecting every inſtant to have it broken, I ſhould be miſerable: but tho' I would not chooſe to paſs my time in idleneſs, I ſhould be glad to bear it when forced upon me unavoidably. While I am poring with the microſcope upon objects lying within the light of nature, if a billet rolls off the hearth or in any ſervant comes in abruptly with a meſſage, I cannot help fretting and vexing a little inwardly: this I acknowledge to be a failing, and would wiſh to receive all events with tranquillity and eveneſs of temper, purſuing my little engagements without anxiety and breaking them off without diſcompoſure. For virtue is valuable all over; if we cannot obtain large portions of her yet every little ſcrap will repay the trouble of acquiring, as containing a ſource of enjoyment and adding ſomething to our eſtate in the fund of happineſs.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

TEMPERANCE.

THERE have been heroes intrepid in dangers and indefatigable in labours, deſpiſing death, wounds and hardſhips, who yet have been ſhamefully overcome by luxury and all kinds of wanton deſires, made ſlaves to popular applauſe or to ſome favourite miſtreſs. For beſides the dread of approaching or preſſure of preſent evil, there is another obſtacle againſt the influence of reaſon by the allurement of pleaſure either in proſpect or fruition; and it no leſs requires an exertion of vigour in the mind to ſecure her againſt being drawn off her baſis by the one than driven by the other. Therefore the habit of reſiſting pleaſure and controuling deſire has been juſtly reckoned a cardinal virtue, called by the name of Temperance. Nor does it leſs deſerve a title to one of the four principal places than fortitude, as being more generally uſefull for all ranks and conditions of people and more difficult to be attained compleatly. For many perſons are not in a ſituation expoſing them to much danger or labour, nor of a conſtitution ſubjecting them to acute or frequent pains, and ſo may

may paſs through life well enough although ſomewhat deficient in courage or patience: but there is no man without deſires, and no man whom they will not lead aſtray from the paths of reaſon if he has not power to reſtrain them. Nor perhaps is it harder to ſubdue terror effectually than pleaſure: the one requires a ſtronger reſolution, the other a more conſtant vigilance. Pain and danger aſſault us rarely, their attacks are furious but generally ſhort, if you can ſuſtain the firſt onſet the buſineſs is done, or ſhould they renew the charge they will do it feebler after every repulſe until at length they ceaſe to be formidable: but deſire brings a numerous hoſt into the field, put one enemy to flight and another preſently ſucceeds in his place, if they cannot maſter you by force they will weary you down by importunity, if they find you invulnerable in front they will detach a regiment of ſecret motives to take you in rear, ſo that you may be brought to the ground without knowing from what quarter the blow came. Therefore you muſt continually keep upon your guard and beſtir yourſelf without reſpite, which demands a larger fund of vigor to perform than any ſudden ſtarts of reſolution, as it ſhows more robuſtneſs to carry a weight for miles than to pull out a wedge at a jerk. Beſides that inteſtin

...s are always accounted the moſt dan-
...s, and though pleaſure ſometimes al-
... with outward objects, it oftner tempts
... deſires that have found harbour in the
breaſt: and the moſt judicious perſons have
always eſteemed the conqueſt of oneſelf the
moſt important and moſt glorious of victo-
ries, which a man may moſt juſtly applaud
himſelf for however the world may think
otherwiſe.

2. According to my notions of temperance it is not confined to reſtraining the ſollicitations of appetite or what is uſually called pleaſure, but extends to habit, paſſion, humour, and whatever elſe would entice us away from following our judgement: therefore covetouſneſs, ambition, reſentment, extravagant joy, ſanguine hope, thirſt of knowledge, and even zeal for virtue when not conducted by reaſon, are ſpecies of intemperance, as well as luxury, debauchery and indolence. Pleaſure is moſt dangerous in the ſeaſon of youth, when the organs are vigorous, ſenſations ſtrong, and every allurement preſents with the charm of novelty: in our riper years there is generally ſome ruling paſſion, either of advancement in honour or fortune, encreaſe of knowledge, or other particular aim, that captivates the mind and inſtead of obeying the command of reaſon

preſſes

preſſes it into its ſervice: and the intemperance of old age ſhows itſelf in an attachment to our own ways and humours upon the moſt trifling occaſions. But education, cuſtom and conſtitution, raiſe a different ſet of ideas in each man; therefore it behoves him to examine his condition of mind, and ſet himſelf moſt carefully to guard that quarter where he perceives the greateſt danger threaten.

3. As deſire not only entices by the delight promiſed upon gratification, but when oppoſed often degenerates into want, which derives by the uneaſineſs of miſſing the thing deſired; therefore temperance muſt call in patience as an auxiliary to aſſiſt her; and we find the uneaſineſs ariſing upon a delay of deſire vulgarly ſtiled impatience. He that cannot forbear hankering after a pleaſure loſt nor ſupport the trouble any little importunate habit may give him, will make no progreſs towards maſtering them; for whatever ground he may have gained by repelling the firſt attack, he will loſe it all again upon the ſecond. And ſometimes I believe men give way for fear of this uneaſineſs when it might not have proved inſupportable: ſo that a little courage and confidence in our ſtrength is very helpful upon theſe occaſions.

4. Of all the propenſities that take us at unawares none are more dangerous than indolence and pride or vanity, becauſe none are more univerſal and none more ſly in making their approaches covertly: a man can hardly fall into exceſſes of debauchery without being ſenſible of them, but he may be vain or idle without ever knowing that he is ſo. Lazineſs ſeems to be the very oppoſite to virtue, for as this conſiſts in exerting the vigour of the mind to diſcern the lights of our judgement when overſhaded by other ideas, he that could keep this vigour perpetually alert would never fall into any error of conduct. But there is a love of eaſe in us all that makes people often beſtir themſelves prodigiouſly in the proſecution of ſome fond deſire rather than be at the pains of overcoming it, and gives birth to the violence and impatience of paſſion, which wants to have the purpoſe aimed at by it preſently attained that the buſineſs may be over. And perhaps lazineſs may lie at the bottom of all pride and vanity, for there is much leſs trouble in perſuading ourſelves we poſſeſs accompliſhments we have not, in contemplating thoſe we have or diſplaying them to public view, than in improving them or acquiring new ones. He that is always diligent in advancing forwards, will ſcarce have time for more than a tranſi-

ent look now and then upon the progreſs he has made, much leſs will he ſtand pointing out the length of it to every paſſenger he ſees in the way. But vanity is ſo deeply rooted in us by education, by example and ſympathy, and aſſails on ſo many quarters, that no wonder we can never guard againſt it effectually: we are taught to judge of ourſelves and our poſſeſſions of any kind by compariſon with others, to deſpiſe or overlook what we have not, and value ourſelves upon any trifle peculiarly our own. The ſpectator tells us of a young lady whom he found one day hold up her head higher than ordinary, and wondering what could be the occaſion, her ſiſter whiſpered him that ſhe had got on a new pair of ſilk garters. One would think virtue ſhould ſecure a man moſt effectually againſt all vain imaginations, but there is a pride of thinking oneſelf and a vanity of appearing virtuous: nay ſome have been proud of their humility and contempt of pride, as witneſs Diogenes when he trampled upon the fine tapeſtry brought by Plato from the court of Sicily. But until a man can diſcover all the ſecret receſſes of his heart, and reſtrain his fondneſs for contemplating or diſplaying any ſuppoſed perfection, he will not have attained compleatly the virtue of temperance.

5. Nor is moderation leſs neceſſary than courage to enſure a true liberty of thought. Men eſteem themſelves free thinkers becauſe they can think anything, but I do not hold them really ſuch unleſs they can likewiſe forbear to think anything. It has been often obſerved there is a certain enthuſiaſm in poetry, and perhaps there is a degree of it tho' not ſo much obſerved in argumentation and moſt proſe compoſitions. The neat ſtructure of an hypotheſis, the ſhrewdneſs of a diſcovery, the acuteneſs of an obſervation, the charm of novelty or pleaſure of overthrowing a vulgar error, will ſometimes tranſport men beyond themſelves: one ſparkling thought will eclipſe all others their judgement preſents, and a ſecret inclination caſt a glare of evidence upon any notion that favours it. There are other reſtraints upon our freedom beſides puſillanimity, and in order to think perfectly free we muſt learn to think ſoberly as well as boldly: for courage and caution, like two antagoniſt muſcles, ſerve to keep one another from drawing the mind awry, if either of them have loſt its tone, the party may be ſaid to labour under a paralytic diſorder.

6. Some ſeaſonable auſterity and ſelf-denial will be found expedient or rather neceſſary for us all to practiſe: for we have not ſuch

ſuch ſtrength of mind as to ſurmount all oppoſition, therefore muſt endeavour to weaken the enemy by entring the liſts againſt him as often as we can do it ſafely, and by ſo doing we ſhall add vigour to our own reſolution which always gathers ſtrength by exerciſe. This conſideration will engage us ſometimes to deny innocent deſires that we may have it in our power to reſtrain them when hurtfull. For the ſame reaſon we ought to keep a guard upon our thoughts as well as upon our actions: for there is an intemperance of imagination that engages men to dwell upon fantaſtical ſcenes of power or gain or revenge or unwarrantable pleaſures under a notion of their being harmleſs becauſe they do not immediately break forth into act. But when we reflect upon what has been ſhown before in the courſe of theſe enquiries, how great a ſway imagination has in ſhaping our behaviour, it will appear extremely dangerous to let that take a wrong turn: for it may ſteal upon us inſenſibly and give a wrong turn to our conduct when we are not aware; at leaſt it will abate our reliſh for other employments wherein we might ſpend our time to better advantage.

7. But ſelf-denial is an evil conſidered in itſelf, wherefore thoſe are not to be heeded who would perſuade us into a life of auſteri-

ties without regard to any good purpoſes to be effected thereby: for happineſs, that is, content and ſolace of mind is our proper aim, nor does preſent enjoyment ever deſerve to be rejected unleſs for the ſake of ſome greater enjoyment to be had in exchange for it. There is no good merely in croſſing and afflicting ourſelves, but ſelf-denial becomes recommendable for the eaſe it will procure us by breaking the force of thoſe deſires that would interrupt and teaze and torment us perpetually with their importunities. Our buſineſs is not to extinguiſh deſire, without which there could be no pleaſure in life, no choice among objects before us nor glee in anything we undertake, but to prevent it from being troubleſome: and while we have unruly deſires belonging to us it is neceſſary to travel the rugged road of ſelf-denial in our progreſs towards the wiſeman's tranquillity. For I conceive the conſummate ſage, if there were ſuch a one upon earth, would never practice ſelf-denial, becauſe he would not have an opportunity, his deſires lying under ſuch controul as never to raiſe an oppoſition for him to ſtruggle againſt: not that he would be without deſires, on the contrary I imagine he would abound in them more than we do, receiving delight from them in many things we ſhould count inſipid; but they would hang

hang ſo looſe about him as to let go their hold the inſtant an object appeared improper or unattainable, to leave no ſecret hankering behind nor ever degenerate into want: like the ſheep who they ſay is never thirſty unleſs when he ſees water, ſo his appetites would prove ſources of pleaſure to him but none of pain. And why ſhould we think ſuch a diſpoſition of mind impoſſible when there is ſcarce any of us who do not poſſeſs it in ſome little degree? We can ſit down with deſire to a party at cards when propoſed, or content ourſelves without it if not agreed to: we may eat fruit with good appetite in ſummer and take pains in planting trees to procure it, without wanting it in winter: we can beſtir ourſelves luſtily in forwarding ſchemes of hunting or bowling or dancing or other diververſion, when they fall in our way, and reſt fully contented with our ſituation when they do not. So that we have nothing to do but improve a faculty we already poſſeſs, and extend our authority gradually to all our other propenſities whether of profit or honour or building or equipage or curioſity or knowledge or whatever elſe would raiſe an intemperance of deſire. The ſecret of happineſs lies in having a multitude of engagements fitted for every occaſion that can happen, ſo that ſome or other of them may conſtantly give us an appetite

appetite for employment, but none that ſhall diſturb us when we judge it neceſſary or proper to break them off.

8. As ſelf-denial helps to bring deſire under controul, ſo indulgence muſt needs have a contrary effect, adding vigour to the adverſary and enfeebling ourſelves: it is throwing the reins upon the horſe's neck, which will quickly make him grow unmanageable. Wherefore it behoves us to be cautious of our moſt innocent deſires, leaſt by indulging we render them habitual, and inſtead of inviting, which is their proper office, they will dragg us forcibly along: nor ſhall we ever recover our liberty without a more painfull ſelf-denial than had been otherwiſe needfull. Nor do intenſe pleaſures deſerve the value too commonly ſet upon them; it may be a man's misfortune to have been too highly delighted, for it will often deſtroy the reliſh of his common enjoyments, or fix ſo ſtrong an impreſſion upon the fancy as ſhall obliterate all other ideas, and make him perpetually reſtleſs for a repetition: ſo that whoever ſeeks to be highly pleaſed, runs a hazard of being ſeldom pleaſed, and paſſing the greateſt part of his time in diſquietude and impatience. Many perſons, eſpecially young folks, make pleaſure their ſole aim whenever they can get the command of their time, in thoſe intervals when the reſtraints

ſtraints of their ſuperiours are withdrawn, imagining they ſhall enjoy the more by how much the more aſſiduouſly they purſue it: but this is a fallacious way of reckoning, for pleaſure is an errant coquet, flying thoſe who court her moſt ſervilely and ſhowing herſelf moſt gracious to thoſe who bear the greateſt indifference towards her. She makes forward advances to the unwary to bring them to her lure, but when ſhe has gotten them faſt in her fetters ſhe uſes them ſcurvily, allowing them no reſt in her ſervice and feeding them only with deluſive expectations and ſtale ſcraps of enjoyment that have utterly loſt their ſavour. Nor indeed is it in her power, were ſhe ever ſo kindly diſpoſed to give a ſolid and laſting enjoyment; for thoſe pleaſures your men of pleaſure hunt after owe their guſt meerly to their novelty and the vigour of youthfull blood and the freſhneſs of the organs, but our organs can ſupply no more than a certain portion of entertainment, for when much employed in the ſame way, tho' they may ſtill perform their work yet they loſe that ſenſibility in the exerciſe which they had originally. Therefore he that makes intenſe pleaſure his whole buſineſs is like an extravagant heir, who ſquanders away his whole patrimony in a year or two, and leaves himſelf nothing to live upon afterwards beſides poverty,

verty, want and diſtreſs. Hence we may ſee the benefit of this cardinal virtue Temperance, which will debar us no pleaſure we can have at free coſt, but reſcue us from thoſe that would make us pay more for them than they are worth, will open to us many ſources of delight the voluptuous never taſte of, and ſecure us an eſtate for life in ſuch enjoyments whereof our nature is capable.

CHAP. XXXIII.

JUSTICE.

THERE is one particular deſire, that of appropriating whatever we can get to ourſelves and following our own pleaſure without regard to the hurt it may do other perſons, which prevails ſo univerſally and ſtrongly among mankind, and which indulged cauſes ſuch diſorder in the world, that the reſtraint of it has been thought worthy to be made a cardinal virtue, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Juſtice. It is eaſy to ſee that juſtice owe[illegible]ociety, for it could have n[illegible]an to live ſeparately [illegible] not in any inſtance a power

a power of endamaging the poſſeſſions, infringing the liberty or abridging the enjoyments, of his fellow creatures. Were men juſt now brought out of ſuch a ſtate and placed upon this habitable earth, every one would naturally take of the good things ſcattered around him whatever he wanted for his preſent occaſion; when he went to do the ſame a ſecond time, he might often find that ſomebody elſe had taken away the things he wanted before him; this would put him as often as he had an opportunity upon ſecuring as many of them as he could get together to provide againſt the like accidents for the future; from whence ſprings ſelf-intereſt, the deſire of gain and covetouſneſs. But as others would do the ſame the publick ſtock would be ſoon exhauſted, the fruits all gathered from the trees, and the deſire of engroſſing would then prompt men to invade one another's hoards: whence muſt enſue trouble, vexation and contention, and much waſte muſt be made in the ſtruggle to the great damage of them all. Theſe inconveniences being ſeverely felt would teach them to ſee that their true intereſts lay in reſtraining their own deſires within ſuch compaſs as might bring them compatible with thoſe of others, and they would form rules for ſecuring to each man his ſhare of the bleſſings that nature

ture had poured out among them. But it being obvious that the gifts of nature may be improved by labour, nor indeed can fully ſupply our wants without it, and there being no encouragement for any man to labour if all the reſt were to ſhare the fruits of it with himſelf, they would find it neceſſary that all ſhould enjoy the produce of their ſkill and induſtry in ſeveralty without interruption from others: and this would lay the foundation of property. But as it may often lie in a man's power to work out ſome advantage for others or for the publick, and the ſecurity of property would be no encouragement with him ſo to do, becauſe the fruits of his labour in this caſe would not redound to his own benefit, they would ſee the expedience of a compenſation or reward to ſerve as an encouragement for performing ſuch ſervices. On the other hand ſome would ſtill employ their ſtrength or cunning to encroach upon their neighbour's properties, or through meer wantonneſs or reſentment or other unruly paſſion, would endamage them in their perſons or poſſeſſions: this would ſhow the neceſſity of puniſhment to reſtrain ſuch outrages. And as vicious inclinations according to their ſtrength would require a greater or leſs reſtraint to curb them, therefore puniſhment would be apportioned to the heinouſneſs

ouſneſs of the offence, of which the greatneſs of the miſchief done would be deemed an evidence when the inward depravity could not otherwiſe be diſcovered.

2. Were mankind reduced to a ſtate of nature, I imagine they would gradually fall into notions of juſtice by ſuch ſteps as thoſe above deſcribed. But we being born into ſettled communities having regulations already eſtabliſhed, take them as we find them with the ſanction of authority annexed to them, without penetrating into the ſources from whence they derived. Yet if we were to ſuppoſe all reward and puniſhment, all law and honeſty, baniſhed from among a people, there would be nothing left to guide them beſides ſelf-intereſt, appetite, paſſion and humour, and it is eaſy to ſee what wild doings, what havock and diſtraction, theſe would introduce. Since then we find ſo manifeſt a neceſſity of juſtice to ſecure the happineſs and tranquillity of life, we need ſeek for no other foundation than utility whereon to build our obligation to ſupport it. Many laws are calculated for the particular convenience of the people, to whom they are given, and would be unjuſt becauſe inconvenient if tranſported into other countries. The duty of ſubordination and obedience to higher powers ariſes from the benefits of union: for it being impoſſible that all indivi-

individuals ſhould agree in their meaſures of conduct or ſtand in a ſituation to judge of them, if the authority were not placed in a few hands a nation could never act as one man to repel the invaſions of an enemy, nor execute any one undertaking that required the concurrence of numbers. Therefore though it be poſſible that governors may command things inconvenient, yet it is not juſtifiable to diſobey them, becauſe of the debility that muſt enſue upon looſening of their authority. Juſt as a man, who ſhould find a troubleſome twitching in his muſcles, would do very wrong to deſtroy the tone of them: for he had better bear the preſent uneaſineſs than loſe the uſe of his limbs. It has been commonly ſaid the worſt kind of government was preferable to anarchy: wherefore the conſideration of that preference will prove a tie upon every prudent man to ſubmit to ſuch government.

3. Nobody will deny there is a natural juſtice diſtinct from the legal, and muſt be preſuppoſed before men can pay a proper ſubmiſſion to authority: for whoever obeys the law for fear of incurring the penalty is not a juſt man, he only deſerves the title of juſt who would deal honeſtly and forbear offending although there were no terrors hanging over to compel him, and who does not think of

of the penalties annexed but acts upon a motive of principle. Where this principle is wanting, the beſt contrived laws cannot wholly ſupply the deficiency: for they being calculated for general uſe, it is impoſſible to ſhape them ſo exactly as to ſuit all the variety of caſes that may happen, therefore there wants ſome other clue to direct us when to purſue and when to abate the rigour of juſtice. Beſides there are many ways by which men have it in their power to affect one another in matters where the law does not, and perhaps could not interfere, particularly in the application of applauſe and cenſure: in all theſe caſes they can have no other guidance than the law of their own minds binding to the obſervance of certain rules founded originally upon utility, though not always or rather very ſeldom carrying a viſible connection therewith. We have ſeen under the article of honour that praiſe and blame belong properly to thoſe objects whereto the annexing them will do greateſt ſervice. Reparation for damages tends to the ſecurity of property, preventing retaliation, and anſwering as a penalty to reſtrain miſchievouſneſs and heedleſneſs. The labourer is worthy of his hire becauſe it cannot be expected men ſhould labour without it: and the ſhopkeeper ought to be paid for his goods becauſe elſe there

would be an end of all commerce and induſtry. Merit and demerit of all kinds ariſe from a right underſtanding and prudent regard to our own intereſts; and the very term Deſerve implies that ſuch a particular treatment will be moſt expedient upon ſuch or ſuch a behaviour.

4. Thus every ſpecies of juſtice, as well public as private, as well commutative as diſtributive, reſts upon the baſis of utility: but what cauſes the miſtake upon this matter is the double ſence of the word utility, as diſtinguiſhed into real and apparent; for in philoſophical conſideration it is underſtood of that which upon the whole amount of conſequences tends moſt to advance a man's real happineſs, but in vulgar language it ſtands for that which exhibits the cleareſt proſpect of advantage or profit. If we look back upon the chapter of uſe we ſhall find how pleaſure transfers ſatisfaction upon things inſtrumental or preparatory to the procuring it, from whence grow the principle of ſelf-intereſt and many deſires of things conceived beneficial or conducive to our purpoſes. Now if we take this ſelf-intereſt and the gratification of theſe deſires for utility, it is certainly quite different from juſtice as ſtanding generally at the greateſt variance with it; he that deals honeſtly when not compelled either by

by the fear of puniſhment or cenſure, and without this he cannot claim a title to honeſty, manifeſtly foregoes his intereſt for the ſake of juſtice. But our ultimate end of action is not always or rather very rarely our ultimate point of view, for our faculties being too ſcanty to look forward to the journey's end, we ſet up certain marks whereon to fix our attention from time to time for our guidance on the way: ſome of the firſt of theſe marks are the rules of intereſt, profit, convenience and worldly prudence, but they proving often inſufficient, we find a neceſſity of other marks in the rules of honour and juſtice to rectify their miſtaken directions.

I am well aware that each of us ſingly learns our honeſty by inſtruction or ſympathy from others, but then it can ſcarce be denied that thoſe, who firſt ſet the example, did it from obſervation of the miſchiefs attendant upon a too cloſe attachment to intereſt. If we could conſtantly ſee to the end of our proceedings and compute exactly the whole produce of enjoyment and ſuffering to be expected from them, we ſhould want no other rule than that of preferring the greater diſtant good before preſent pleaſure, for our own advantage would guide us ſufficiently in all parts of our conduct: but ſince we cannot look ſo far, and intereſt frequently leads aſtray

from its own purpoſes, we have need enough of the reſtraint of juſtice to keep us from being beguiled by it and led out of the road to real utility, which we often miſs of thro' too great eagerneſs for the apparent. It may be remarked that honour and juſtice abound more in rules than any other principle of action, becauſe lying further removed from pleaſure we can ſeldomer diſcern the connection therewith, and conſequently ſtand more in need of direction. But rules will ſtand us in no ſtead without a propenſity urging ſtrongly to practiſe them, which propenſity in the preſent caſe is ſtiled the moral ſenſe or conſcience: wherefore it behoves every man to cultivate or improve this moral ſence or conſcientious regard for the obligations of juſtice to the utmoſt, and adhere to it without reſerve againſt all the ſollicitations of intereſt. The proper office of juſtice lies in reſtraining our ſelfiſh deſires: a thorough righteous man will never ſuffer any of them either to draw him privily or hurry him forcibly upon actions for which his heart may afterwards miſgive him or which his moral ſence warns him to beware as unlawfull, altho' he may not directly diſcern their inexpedience. 'Tis true he may ſometimes miſtake and forego his lawfull advantages needleſsly, but the poſſeſſion of a ſtrong moral ſence is more valuable than

than any preſent benefit he could receive from its weakneſs; and he may look upon theſe inconveniences in the light of troubles naturally attending an eſtate, which no man would throw away for the ſake of eſcaping them.

Therefore it is much the ſafer ſide to be too ſcrupulous than too remiſs, eſpecially for young people. Tully uſed to reckon exuberance a good ſign in a young orator, and ſay he loved to find ſomething to prune off. The moraliſt may ſay the ſame with reſpect to his ſcholars, that he loves to ſee the moral ſenſe vigorous and redundant affording ſomething to prune off; for it is much harder to nouriſh up a weakly plant than reduce one that is luxuriant. The expedience of juſtice lies thro' ſo many ſtages that it is difficult to trace them, but the inconveniences of over ſtrictneſs are eaſier manifeſted nor will fail to diſcover themſelves upon a little experience. But tho' the moral ſenſe ought to maſter deſire, it ought not to prevail over reaſon; therefore whenever upon a full and fair examination we find our rules tend to greater harm than good, we muſt alter or diſpenſe with them, and ſince they are liable to error it will behove us, as often as a proper opportunity offers, to try them by a reference to uſe. This will prevent their running into extravagancies and give us

a better opinion of them; for by frequently obſerving the benefit of juſtice, we ſhall become intimately perſuaded of its expedience at other times when we do not diſcern them; which will teach us a confidence in our moral ſenſe, and make us look upon the laudableneſs of an action as a certain evidence of its uſefulneſs.

5. As we are mighty fond of perſonifying everything, even the creatures of imagination, abſtract notions, and whatever we can expreſs by a noun ſubſtantive, it is common to conſider the law either of the land or of nature as a perſon, having perception, volition, deſign, deſire and paſſion. In this light if we look for what deſign the law muſt be ſuppoſed to have, we cannot well conceive any other than the preſervation of property, the ſecurity of life, limb, peace, liberty and all other requiſites for enjoyment, that may be deſtroyed or leſſened by the behaviour of men to one another. But all deſign tends to ſomething future, the paſt being no object of power or contrivance: hence it is plain the law carries always a proſpect forwards and only caſts a retroſpect behind in order to take her meaſures for providing againſt the time to come. The reparation ſhe awards for damages ſuſtained, manifeſtly relates to the future convenience of the party aggrieved, for if he be ſatisfied by being reinſtated

ſtated in the poſſeſſion of thoſe materials for enjoyment he had before the offence committed or receiving an equivalent that will anſwer his purpoſes as well, the law is ſatisfied too. But it may often happen that the offender is not able to make reparation, or the injury, as in caſes of murder or maiming, is of a nature not to be repaired or compenſated: under theſe circumſtances the law will not be ſuppoſed to deſign impoſſibilities, and can only have in view the preventing the like injuries for the future by ſuch puniſhment as ſhall be judged ſufficient for that purpoſe. So that in reality puniſhment is not inflicted for crimes committed, but as a remedy againſt thoſe which might be committed hereafter; and guilt is rather a direction than a motive for taking vengeance. And that this is ſo will appear more evident when we reflect that natural juſtice reſtrains the thoughts, deſires and intentions of men as well as their outward actions: nor do the laws ſometimes ſcruple to puniſh for the intent where no miſchief has been actually done. Conſpiring to defraud, aſſaulting with intent to rob or raviſh, are deemed miſdemeanors; lifting up a latch in the night time with deſign to commit burglary, forging or knowingly publiſhing a forged note, are made felony; imagining the death of the king is high treaſon. And if an

overt act be required to convict the delinquent, I believe every one, who knows the nature of right and wrong, will admit that the overt act adds nothing to the delinquency, but is only neceſſary to prove it becauſe we cannot dive into the thoughts of men nor judge of them otherwiſe than by their actions. Were there a man to whom the hearts of all others ſhould lie open and a diſcretionary power entruſted to do as he judged reaſonable, he would not think it unjuſt to apply ſuch puniſhment for the moſt ſecret evil deſigns as he conceived effectual for preventing them from breaking forth into act.

6. But to purſue our idea of perſonality in the law; as we all look upon the defeating of our deſigns as a damage, and the law deſigning the peace and ſecurity of thoſe under her protection, therefore every hurt brought upon individuals is conſidered as an injury done the law itſelf for which ſhe will require ſuch ſatisfaction as can be made, that is, ſuch adequate puniſhment as may deter the offender or others from repeating the offence, and reinſtate her in her power ſhe had before of protecting: this brings puniſhment under the idea of a reparation or ſatisfaction for damage done, not indeed to the party injured, but to the law; for when the offender has undergone the chaſtiſement allotted him, he is ſaid to have

have ſatisfied the law and to ſtand right again in court. Then as in ourſelves ſatisfaction becomes often transferred from the end to the means, particularly in reſentment where we think of nothing further than wreaking our revenge, and in purſuits of honour or power which we do not follow for their uſes but to gratify our preſent deſires of them, we conceive the ſame paſſions to prevail and the ſame narrow views to obtain in the law, which animadverts upon delinquents for her own ſatisfaction rather than for the ſake of the community under her charge.

7. This cuſtom of conceiving the law to have intereſts of her own to ſerve, and the deteſtation which ariſes inſtantly in the hearts of the beſt and wiſeſt men upon the thought of heinous wickedneſs, has given riſe to the opinion of an immediate and eſſential connection between offence and puniſhment, which is ſuppoſed due to the former without taking any other idea into conſideration. I ſhall readily agree that in taking meaſures for puniſhing we need conſider nothing further than the degree of delinquency, for being well ſatisfied our rule is right we need not nay cannot conſtantly look forward to the reaſons inducing us to believe it right; and ſo we depend upon the 47th of Euclid as a certain truth without running on to the demonſtrations

tions, convincing us of its being true: but if we ſearch for the foundation of juſtice, tho' here too we ſhall find a connection, it will be hard to trace it out unleſs by the intervention of two links lying between, I mean, the power of men ſtill to hurt one another, and the tendency of puniſhment to make them change or withold them from executing their evil intentions. Were mankind to be ſuddenly placed in a ſituation which ſhould render them incapable of ever more receiving damage from others, or their diſpoſitions of mind ſo changed as that they ſhould never more think of doing acts of injuſtice, I believe every good man would vote for a general amneſty of all former miſdemeanors, becauſe the remembrance of them would be needleſs in one caſe and uſeleſs in the other.

If the connection between offence and puniſhment were natural and neceſſary, ſubmiſſion and repentance could never diſſociate them, for the nature of actions cannot be altered by anything ſubſequent; but repentance, anſwering the purpoſe intended by chaſtiſement, takes away the uſe of it and thereby diſſolves the connection: therefore when ſeverity appears neceſſary as a warning to others that they may not expect to come off upon the like eaſy terms, the juſt man will not accept of repentance: thus we ſee juſtice diſarmed

armed upon becoming needleſs, and the ſword put into her hands again upon the further proſpect of neceſſity.

And the ſame cauſe extends her province beyond the limits naturally belonging to it, by warranting her ſometimes to take vengeance upon the innocent for wrongs wherein they have had no ſhare: for this is the caſe of war, wherein the goods and poſſeſſions of private perſons are invaded for injuries received from the ſtate. I know that in national tranſactions all the members of a community are looked upon as conſtituting one perſon, and in this light you take revenge upon the perſon that injured you: but this is only an imaginary perſonality, very uſefull for pointing out the meaſures of national juſtice, but by no means ſupporting it as a foundation. If the french king has fortified Dunkirk or encroached upon our colonies in America in breach of treaties, you cannot charge the merchant trading from Martinico with any faithleſsneſs or badneſs of heart upon that account: ſo juſtice ſtands here ſeparated from delinquency and every ſpice of evil intention, for you eſteem it lawfull to ſeize his effects by way of reprizal. But why do you judge it lawfull? becauſe you cannot right yourſelf otherwiſe: ſo neceſſity makes the juſtice, for were it poſſible to come at the governors directly

ſeedly without touching the ſubjects, no righteous man would think the latter method punishable, notwithſtanding any ſuppoſed identity of perſon between them.

8. Were the juſtneſs of actions eſſential and inherent, whenever the rules of juſtice claſh, as we find them ſometimes do, that which muſt be ſuperſeded muſt abate ſomething from the juſtneſs of the other: for the caſe is ſo in matters of profit or pleaſure. If you lay out a ſum of money to make an improvement of greater value upon your eſtate, you are certainly a gainer: yet could you procure the ſame improvement free of charges your gain would be greater. If you might partake of ſome very agreable diverſion by going five miles thro' very dirty roads, 'tis worth your while; yet could you have it without that trouble I ſuppoſe you would like it better. But ſuppoſe two men in different parts of a field near a river alarmed by the cry of ſome perſon drowning, one has a path to run along but the other cannot go to help without trampling down his neighbour's corn, which you muſt allow to be an unjuſt action conſidered in itſelf, nevertheleſs I conceive the ſtricteſt caſuiſt would acknowledge the merit of both equal: ſo the leſſer rule bears no intrinſic value to be ſubtracted from the greater, for the expedience of abſtaining from

from another's property is taken off by the higher importance of ſaving a man's life.

9. Nor do the obligations of truth and fidelity reſt upon any other baſis than experience: it is eaſy to ſee that were truth baniſhed the world there could be no intercourſe among mankind, no uſe of ſpeech; if you aſked anybody's direction upon the road you might as well let it alone, for you could gather nothing from their anſwer if there were no truth in men. Were all falſehood wrong as ſuch, why are poems and novels ſuffered? why do moraliſts invent fables wherein they introduce beaſts talking, gods appearing in the air, and the moon deſiring to be taken meaſure of for a ſuit of cloaths? But when fiction may ſerve ſome good purpoſe and does no hurt, the wiſeſt do not ſcruple to employ it. Did the bare form of an agreement create an obligation to perform it, no circumſtances whatever could render it invalid. Are then all thoſe ſuitors unrighteous who apply to our courts of equity to be relieved from their contracts? or are the courts iniquitous in decreeing them relief? But were there no faith among men, no regard to their engage ~~arguments~~, anybody may ſee with half an eye what ſtagnation of buſineſs, what mutual diffidence and confuſion muſt enſue; and 'tis the avoidance of thoſe evils that gives them their ſanction: therefore

when

when the rigid obſervance of compacts manifeſtly tends to greater miſchiefs than could be avoided thereby, no righteous judge, having authority ſo to do, will ſcruple ſetting them aſide. Nevertheleſs this does not juſtify a man in breaking his engagements whenever he finds it detrimental or inconvenient to keep them, for our views are ſo narrow that we cannot always ſee all the conſequences of our actions, and rules are the marks hung out to direct us to an advantage we cannot diſcern: therefore the wiſeman will adhere inviolably to his rules though he cannot diſcover their expedience, for he will look upon the manifeſt injuſtice of a thing as a ſtronger evidence of its being detrimental than any appearance that may ariſe to the contrary; yet an expedience there muſt be or the rules will not be right. For juſtice is the miniſter of reaſon though it ought to be the maſter of action: and it is one thing to eſtabliſh rules of conduct, but another to ſhow the foundation of them. When a man is to act he ought to conſult his ideas of juſtice and follow whitherſoever they direct without reſerve or looking to anything further, but when we enquire why juſtice is recommendable it behoves us to trace out the reference it bears to happineſs, for without this it will be hard to prove the obligation to it, and this being once clearly evinced

evinced it would want nothing elſe to give it all the influence that could be deſired.

This method ſeems to have been attempted by the old philoſophers but they ſtopped ſhort in the midway, as we may learn from Cicero, who was no philoſopher himſelf but an elegant reporter of the greek philoſophy, where he endeavours to ſhow the prudence of Regulus's conduct in LIB. III. CAP. 27, 8, 9, of his Offices; for he tells us thoſe are to be rejected who would ſeparate utility from juſtice, becauſe, ſays he, whatever is juſt or honeſtum is therefore uſefull. This is giving the ladies reaſon, It is ſo becauſe it is; for he does not vouchſafe a word to prove why it is uſefull. That every thing juſt is really advantageous I ſhall not deny, nor that the practice of juſtice is the ſureſt road to happineſs, but I muſt deny that this is a firſt principle or ſelf-evident propoſition or to be diſcerned without much thought and conſideration, for I know that in many caſes the contrary appears upon firſt ſight: therefore it had become a philoſopher, eſpecially ſuch a powerful artificer of words as Cicero, to have laid open the fallacy of this appearance and ſhown the intermediate ſteps by which juſtice leads to utility. He might have had an ample field to expatiate upon in the benefits and neceſſity of juſtice to the welfare of mankind. He might have ſhowed

that

that the Roman commonwealth roſe to that pitch of grandeur they ſhone in by a ſtrict fidelity to their engagements, and that they afterwards began to decline and fall into confuſion by their oppreſſion of the provinces taken under their protection, and their ſelfiſh endeavours to encroach upon one another's rights. He might then have gone on to prove the good of every individual contained in that of the public, and thence concluded that Regulus all things conſidered acted more for his own advantage in ſubmitting to the torments he underwent than he could have done by any breach of faith whatſoever. As for his rhodomontade that the brave man looks upon pain as a mere trifle, this overthrows his other aſſertion, becauſe it ſeems to admit that if pain were an evil it might juſtify the breach of engagements: and indeed we who take it for ſuch commonly do admit it as an excuſe when in a degree we conceive intolerable. When a ſum of money is ſent for a particular purpoſe, juſtice certainly requires it ſhould be diſpoſed of according to the owner's directions. Suppoſe then the party carrying it attacked on the way by ruffians who threaten him with ſome grievous miſchief unleſs he will deliver it them: if he be perfectly honeſt and at the ſame time poſſeſſed of the ſtoical fortitude ſo as not to value pain at a ſtraw, he will bear the

the worſt they can do to him rather than betray his truſt: but ſuppoſe the meſſenger were a weak and fearfull woman to whom violent ill uſage were really terrible, I believe none of us would think it the leaſt abatement of her character for honeſty if ſhe yielded to her terrors. So that juſtice is not ſo neceſſarily connected with uſe but that a greater evil on the other ſide may ſeparate them, and in that caſe the action ceaſes to be juſt: wherefore utility conſtitutes the eſſence of juſtice, but not juſtice that of utility.

10. But though juſtice be not utility, nevertheleſs it ought to be eſteemed the certain mark and evidence of utility, and an intimate perſuaſion of its being ſo, will faſten deſire upon it as upon an ultimate point of view without needing anything beyond to recommend it. Whoever has this deſire ſo ſtrong as to counterpoize all other deſires, poſſeſſes the cardinal virtue here treated of: and whoever has not this deſire at all, cannot be called an honeſt man in any degree, tho' he may do honeſtly for fear of puniſhment or proſpect of advantage. Therefore if a righteous man be aſked why he fulfills his engagements, though to his own manifeſt detriment, he will anſwer, Becauſe it would have been unjuſt to have failed in them; for he wants no other motive to induce him, and if the

queriſt be righteous too he will want no other reaſon to ſatisfy him. But if he be aſked further why he eſteems juſtice a proper motive of action, and he be a perſon who does not take his principles upon truſt from the example or authority of others, but has uſed to examine them himſelf, he will refer to the general neceſſity and expedience of juſtice, and alledge that what conduces to the general good of mankind muſt be good for every particular. But could it be made appear that injuſtice in ſome ſingle inſtance tended to the general advantage, he would not think himſelf warranted to practiſe it, becauſe the miſchief of ſetting a bad example, and weakening the authority of a beneficial rule, would be greater than any preſent advantage that might accrue from the breach of it. And even ſuppoſing his injuſtice could be concealed from all the world ſo that it could do no hurt by example, ſtill he would not believe it allowable for fear it ſhould have a bad influence upon his own mind. For whoever underſtands human nature, knows how dangerous it is to leſſen the force of thoſe reſtraints that withold us from the exorbitancies of ſelf-intereſt: if we break into them in ſome inſtances where we might do it innocently, we ſhall run a great hazard of loſing their influence at other times when it will be abſo-

abſolutely neceſſary for keeping us within bounds. Nor can we doubt of there being an utility in juſtice, when we find it acknowledged in ſome meaſure by the unanimous conſent of all mankind: it is a vulgar ſaying that Honeſty is the beſt policy; nor perhaps is there a man who, if he could accompliſh his deſires juſtly, would not chooſe it that way rather than by wrong. The very gangs of highwaymen and ſtreet robbers obſerve ſome fidelity, tho' little enough tis true, in their engagements with one another: ſo that even thoſe perſons who take their notions of utility and pleaſure for their ſole guidance, ſtill pay ſome regard to juſtice, being led by their experience of its conducing neceſſarily thereto.

11. The juſt man, to deſerve that appellation, muſt be ſo throughout, in ſmall matters as well as great: he will regard natural juſtice and legal too when it is not ſuperſeded by the other: he will abſtain from injuring not only the perſons, poſſeſſions and liberties of his neighbours but likewiſe their good name, reputation and claim to the merit of their performances, neither deceiving by flattery, blackening by calumny, overbearing by haughtineſs, nor overreaching by cunning: he will beware of wronging anybody even in his own private eſtimation nor give credit

haſtily to unfavourable reports, but judge of perſons and interpret actions candidly and cautiouſly: he will look upon all untruth or bias to the prejudice of another as a ſpecies of injuſtice, and will eſteem ingratitude one of the moſt flagrant.

12. As juſtice conſiſts in a hearty deſire of doing right to every one againſt the ſollicitations of other deſires urging another way, and as among contending impulſes the moſt vigorous will always prevail, therefore juſtice, though diſtinct from temperance and fortitude, cannot well ſubſiſt without them, becauſe it is their office to reduce our other deſires within a manageable compaſs. Ambition, covetouſneſs, extravagant fondneſs for pleaſure, anger, and all kinds of intemperance, hurry men on, otherwiſe well diſpoſed, to unwarrantable actions. Fretfulneſs, ſloth, over delicacy, effeminate ſoftneſs and every other branch of impatience, will not ſuffer them to do juſtly where any pains or difficulty are requiſite. Theſe vices lay them under a neceſſity of tranſgreſſing: but though we have ſeen before that a real neceſſity takes away injuſtice from a deed, yet an unneceſſary neceſſity, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, that is, one brought upon us by our own folly, leaves it in full colours. Therefore the ancients

ancients were right when they ſaid that whoever poſſeſſed one virtue compleatly muſt poſſeſs them all, becauſe they mutually nouriſh and protect one another.

CHAP. XXXIV.

BENEVOLENCE.

THE grand impediment againſt making philoſophy univerſally underſtood ariſes from the particular ſtile unavoidably employed therein, different from that uſed upon common occaſions. Sometimes it is found neceſſary to frame technical terms unknown to the man of plain ſenſe: at other times when words of general currency will ſerve, yet a peculiar idiom and ſtructure is neceſſary to make them anſwer the purpoſe effectually. This is no where more apparent than in ſpeaking of the virtues, which are vulgarly conceived infinitely numerous and various: but the moraliſt, being willing to methodize his thoughts and reduce the wilderneſs into a regular plan, endeavours to comprize them all under four general heads, to which he aſſigns names already in uſe, but

muſt extend their ſignification beyond what cuſtom will warrant, in order to bring them wide enough to take in all he would have them. By this means it happens that the plain man, attempting to follow his method, finds himſelf frequently perplexed: for after being fully ſatisfied that an action is right, he ſtill remains at a loſs to know what particular ſpecies of virtue it belongs to; or perhaps ſometimes miſtakes that to be the virtue recommended which is really no virtue at all. Thus prudence, the principal virtue comprehending all the reſt, ſtands in vulgar acceptation for ſagacity, penetration, experience and clearneſs of judgement, which are not virtue but good fortune; or if attained by our own induſtry, ſtill are the fruits of virtue rather than the tree itſelf: and as prudence is vulgarly underſtood of a cautious regard to intereſt, we find it often ſtanding at the greateſt variance with virtue. But we have ſeen before, that moral prudence conſiſts in making a due uſe of our lights, not in the abundance or clearneſs of them, and vigorouſly adhering to the dictates of reaſon againſt the ſollicitations of intereſt or any other deſire whatſoever. So likewiſe fortitude is made to include patience, becauſe the ſame robuſtneſs of temper that enables the poſſeſſor to ſtare danger in the face, is ſuppoſed to render him invincible by pain.

pain. But to common apprehenſion a man may be very patient and yet very timorous: nor on the other hand, if we ſee him preſerve an uninterrupted preſence of mind in perils of all kinds, ſhall we think him deficient in courage, becauſe he frets under impriſonment or cannot bear diſappointment and contradiction. In like manner temperance implies the moderation of every deſire and appetite that would carry us on unadviſedly to preſent gratification: but in our familiar diſcourſes we confine it to ſobriety in eating and drinking, for if we find a man abſtemious in theſe points we count him a model of temperance, notwithſtanding he may be ambitious or ſlothfull or revengefull. To come laſtly to the cardinal virtue of juſtice, the philoſopher muſt comprize under it benevolence and whatever we do for the benefit or pleaſure of others without regard to our own: but nobody elſe would eſteem that perſon a friend or good neighbour, who ſhould do no more to ſerve another than what the ſtrictneſs of juſtice obliges him to.

2. For this reaſon I have thought convenient to make a diſtinct article of benevolence, which if you pleaſe may be called a fifth cardinal virtue. For though it has been hitherto reputed a branch of juſtice as ſpringing from the ſame ground, namely, that

our own good is contained in the good of others, yet I do not ſee why it may not as well be reckoned the root and juſtice the branch, ſince it bears that and many good fruits beſide: for we do not uſe to behave diſhoneſtly to our friends, and if we had a proper regard and concern for all mankind I do not imagine we could ever deal unjuſtly with anybody. However this be there is a manifeſt difference between them in the common conceptions of the world. Juſtice only reſtrains from doing damage or wrong: good nature does the ſame too, but over and above this prompts to do all the ſervice for which there is an opportunity. A debt and a favour ſeem eſſentially diſtinct ſo that what is one cannot be the other; for a man is bound by obligation to render to every one his dues, but in doing a kindneſs he muſt be free from all obligation or elſe it is no kindneſs. If a man pays you what he owed, you do not thank him for it, he only eſcapes the cenſure you might have thrown upon him for failing: but if he does you a ſervice you had no right to expect, he deſerves your acknowledgements. Since then benevolence carries a different idea in common apprehenſion from juſtice, what has been offered in illuſtration of that ſubject, will not ſuffice for this: and if we conſider how it is generally under-

underſtood, I think it may be called a diffuſed love to the whole ſpecies, in which light the ſame definition we gave of love will remain applicable here, to wit the pleaſure of pleaſing: Or if as we diſtinguiſhed the paſſion into love and fondneſs, ſo we ſhould diſtinguiſh the virtue into benevolence and good nature, the one will be a pleaſure of benefitting and the other that of pleaſing. To render it perfectly formed deſire muſt connect immediately with theſe ends, for if there be any thought of our own intereſt or gratification between, what we do for others is not an act of kindneſs. I do not apprehend that nature gives us any ſuch deſire, but we have already ſhown in ſeveral places by what ſteps deſire becomes transferred from ourſelves to other objects, and when we can perform good offices upon the ſole conſideration of their being ſuch, then is the tranſlation compleat. Whoever has this deſire habitual will feel a ſatisfaction in acts of kindneſs proportionable to the benefit of them, which will urge him to perform them as a matter of entertainment whenever they fall in his way.

3. Perſons deficient in this quality endeavour to run it down and juſtify their own narrow views by alledging that it is only ſelfiſhneſs in a particular form: for if the benevolent man does a good natured thing for his own

own ſatisfaction that he finds in it, there is ſelf at bottom, for he acts to pleaſe himſelf. Where then, ſay they, is his merit? what is he better than us? he follows conſtantly what he likes, and ſo do we: the only difference between us is, that we have a different taſte of pleaſure from him. To take theſe objections in order let us conſider that form in many caſes is all in all, the eſſence of things depending thereupon. Fruit when come to its maturity or during its ſtate of ſap in the tree or of earthly particles in the ground, is the ſame ſubſtance all along: beef whether raw or roaſted or putrefied, is ſtill the ſame beef varying only in form: but whoever ſhall overlook this difference of form will bring grievous diſorders upon his ſtomach: ſo then there is no abſurdity in ſuppoſing ſelfiſhneſs may be foul and noiſome under one form, but amiable and recommendable under another. But we have no need to make this ſuppoſition as we ſhall not admit that acts of kindneſs, howmuchſoever we may follow our own inclination therein, carry any ſpice of ſelfiſhneſs. But men are led into this miſtake by laying too much ſtreſs upon etymology, for Selfiſhneſs being derived from Self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to pleaſe one's own inclination muſt fall under that appellation, not conſidering that derivatives

tives do not always retain the full latitude of their roots. Wearing woollen cloaths or eating mutton does not make a man ſheepiſh, nor does employing himſelf now and then in reading render him bookiſh: ſo neither is everything ſelfiſh that relates to oneſelf. If ſomebody ſhould tell you that ſuch a one was a very ſelfiſh perſon, and for proof of it give a long account of his being once catched on horſeback by a ſhower, that he took ſhelter under a tree, that he alighted, put on his great coat and was wholly buſied in muffling himſelf up, without having a ſingle thought all the while of his wife or children, his friends or his country: would not you take it for a banter? or would you think the perſon or his behaviour could be called ſelfiſh in any propriety of ſpeech? What if a man agreable and obliging in company ſhould happen to deſire another lump of ſugar in his tea to pleaſe his own palate, would they pronounce him a whit the more ſelfiſh upon that account? So that ſelfiſhneſs is not having a regard for oneſelf, but having no regard for anything elſe. Therefore the moraliſt may exhort men to a prudent concern for their own intereſts, and at the ſame time diſſuade them from ſelfiſhneſs, without inconſiſtency.

4. As for the influence of ſatisfaction we have already ſeen how that gives life to all our mo-

motions, ſo that if that rendered them ſelfiſh there would be no uſe for the term nor any diſtinction between ſelfiſh and diſintereſted: for the wiſe and the fooliſh, the good and the wicked, the thoughtfull and the giddy, in buſineſs and diverſion, in their deliberate and inconſiderate actions, all inceſſantly follow ſatisfaction. But we have ſhown that ſatisfaction is ever one and the ſame in kind, and the variety of motives ariſes from the difference of vehicles containing it, which vehicles are the objects of deſire, for we know well enough we muſt have the ſatisfaction if we can attain the ſatisfactory object: wherefore deſire fixes upon this as an ultimate point, and we take our meaſures according to what we conceive ſatisfactory. Nature firſt conveys ſatisfaction by the miniſtry of the ſenſes, from thence it becomes transferred to the inſtruments or materials we have found qualified to furniſh us with agreable ſenſations: by degrees we come to have an intercourſe with mankind and find that they get away the materials of pleaſure from one another, we then learn a deſire of ſecuring as many of them to ourſelves as we can, and this I apprehend gives riſe to ſelf intereſt, which is never underſtood, either in common or philoſophical language, of the natural propenſity to pleaſure, but of the purſuit of our own ends in oppoſition

tion to thoſe of other perſons. In proceſs of time wantoneſs or reſentment or bad company brings ſome to delight in miſchief, and theſe we term miſchievous: others are led by conſideration or kind uſage or better example to take the like delight in good offices, and theſe become benevolent: ſuch as have neither of thoſe taſtes, but always do either good or hurt juſt as it ſerves their own purpoſe, are properly ſelfiſh. Hence the following of inclination does not conſtitute ſelfiſhneſs, for in this reſpect all men are alike, but the difference reſults from what they ſeverally fix their inclinations upon: for 'tis the object of deſire, the ultimate point in proſpect, that denominates an action. He that abſtains from miſchief out of fear of puniſhment or for ſome private advantage, is ſelfiſh not benevolent in the deed: and if he do it becauſe he thinks it his duty, ſtill he is not benevolent tho' he may have ſome other virtue which guided him in the doing; for to entitle an action to that epithet it muſt proceed from the ſole motive of goodwill without thought of anything beyond the benefit of the party who is the ſubject of it.

5. Nor need anybody be at a loſs to form an idea of ſuch an inclination, for I ſuppoſe the moſt ſelfiſh creature breathing may chance to be ſometimes in good humour, and has ſome

ſome child or miſtreſs or boon companion to whom he can take delight in doing a favour when he has no end of his own to ſerve upon them: let him only reflect upon the ſtate of his mind in theſe hearty moods, and he may underſtand that benevolence is no more than the ſame diſpoſition carried as far as human frailty can extend it. Neither need we ſeek for any greater refinement or purity of intention than this I have been ſpeaking of; we may lawfully and laudably follow our pleaſure provided that be ſet upon ſuch an employment. The good old rule holds in this caſe, of doing and ſtanding affected to others as we would have them do and ſtand affected to us: now what can we deſire better than that they ſhould take delight in pleaſing us? Could your family, your friends, your neighbours, your acquaintance, come and ſay with truth and ſincerity, Sir, pleaſe to let us know wherein we can ſerve you for we ſhall take delight in doing it: what would you want of them more? what other diſpoſition could you wiſh them to put on? Would you anſwer them, Look ye good folks, while you take delight in ſerving me, you do it to pleaſe yourſelves, ſo I dont thank you for it: but if you would lay a real obligation upon me you muſt firſt hate me with all your might, and then the ſervices you ſhall do me will be purely diſintereſted.

Surely

Surely he that could make this reply muſt have a very whimſical turn of thought and a ſtrong tincture of envy, ſince he cannot be content to receive a kindneſs unleſs the perſon conferring ſuffers for it by forcing himſelf againſt his inclination.

6. As commendation and a return of good offices tend to encourage benevolence, therefore it deſerves them: for we have ſeen in a former place that honour and reward belong properly to where they will do moſt ſervice. But the reward muſt not conſtantly follow too cloſe upon the action, for then it will be apt to catch the eye and become the end expected at every performance, which will render it ſelfiſh. But when good offices meet with a return of the like only in general or in the groſs, they lye too wide to be carried always in view, and deſire will fix upon the acts of kindneſs as upon an ultimate point: wherefore many ſpoil their children by hiring them perpetually with playthings to do as they would have them. As an action takes its quality not from the thing done but from the motive operating to produce it, therefore benevolence to be genuine muſt be free and voluntary: for what we are drawn or overperſuaded to do does not proceed from inclination and is rather an act of impulſe than choice. There is a ſoftneſs and milkyneſs of

temper

temper that cannot ſay nay to anything, but he that can never refuſe a favour can hardly be ſaid ever to grant one: for it is wreſted from him not given, he does it to rid himſelf of an importunity and ſave the trouble of a denial, in which caſe it is a weakneſs rather than a virtue. Hence good nature is often called and ſometimes really proceeds from folly, which gets no thanks when it proves moſt beneficial: for men applaud themſelves for having gained a compliance by wheedling or preſſing, and ſecretly laugh at the ſilly thing that could be won by ſuch artifices.

7. There is likewiſe a ſpurious benevolence which flows from vanity, it makes men helpfull and obliging to ſhow their power and importance or gain the incenſe of applauſe or bring others into dependence upon them. Perſons actuated by this motive may behave kindly enough to ſuch as are ſubmiſſive to them, but are generally envious of their ſuperiours and carry themſelves haughtily to thoſe who do not want them, and cannot endure to ſee any good that is not done by themſelves. Wherefore how much ſoever they may value themſelves upon their good deeds, they carry no intrinſic merit: for their deſire never terminates upon the good of another, but only urges to it as a neceſſary means for ſerving their own ends. So that the

the commendation beſtowed on them by ſuch as penetrate into their motive, is not paid as a debt but thrown out as a lure drawing them to a continuance of the like practices, and the commerce on both ſides is rather a traffic of intereſt than a mutual intercourſe of kindneſs.

8. But true benevolence, as it will not bear mingling with any other motive or paſſion, ſo neither may it become a paſſion itſelf, for it muſt be judicious, and then can never be ſuch. We have laid down in the chapter of paſſion that the difference between that and affection lies only in the degree, and that not in the abſolute ſtrength of it neither, but in its riſing ſo high as to become uncontroulable by reaſon. If this deſcription of paſſion be admitted I can readily come into the ſtoical doctrine concerning apathy: for the wiſeman will always remain maſter of his own actions, he will never ſuffer any inclination, not even the beſt of them, to gain an aſcendant over him, he will permit them to recommend and invite and will employ them to aſſiſt him but never follow them implicitly, and will preſerve his ſeat of empire over them to prevent their encroaching upon one another's rights. By this impartiality and ſteddy tenour of conduct he will fall deficient in no one branch of benevolence, and though he will prove a tender and affectionate relation, a ſincere and zealous friend,

yet his attachment to particulars will not overwhelm his regard to mankind in general but rather cheriſh and purify it; for by reflecting on the ſincerity and heartineſs wherewith he can run to oblige thoſe who are deareſt to him, he will have a pattern from his own experience inſtructing him what kind of diſtinction to put on with reſpect to others. Nor will he carry himſelf ſtiffly and auſterely, deſpiſing little good offices when they do not ſtand in the way of more important: for tho' his benevolence will not degenerate into fondneſs, neither will it want for tenderneſs. He will ſtudy not only to do ſolid good but to pleaſe and humour whenever it can be done without ill conſequence, and will be as much tho' not ſo weakly compliant, as the good natured man a little before ſpoken of, to every innocent deſire and fancy: but in the manner of his compliance will reſemble the ivy which twines and conforms itſelf freely to all the inequalities of the ſubſtance whereto it adheres, rather than the metal that takes an impreſſion forcibly ſtamped upon it, or the vapours drawn up out of their element by the inſinuating action of the ſun. Courteouſneſs is the ſkin and outſide of virtue, and though a man would wiſh in the firſt place to enjoy vigour of limbs and ſoundneſs of conſtitution, yet if he can have a good ſkin too it is no detriment

triment to his perſon. Therefore this will not be neglected by the ſage we have in idea, he will finiſh his virtue in every part, ſmall as well as great, ornamental as well as ſerviceable, nor think the body of it compleat until the bones and muſcles are inveſted with their proper covering.

9. But the having one inclination does not neceſſarily imply the utter baniſhment of all others, therefore benevolence will never make a man's regard for another deſtroy his proper regard for his own intereſts, nor ſuperſede the obligations of juſtice, temperance or other rules of action: much leſs will it prompt him to humour any body to their own real detriment. If we take our idea of benevolence from the notions of it current among the polite world, it ſhould ſeem to conſiſt wholly in trifles, ſubſcribing to a concert, making one in a party of pleaſure, ſaying civil things, promoting any little ſcheme of ones acquaintance, or complying with them in all their follies and fancies. What is this but placing the eſſence of virtue in her outſide, making her a man of ſtraw, an empty covering containing nothing within? But the wiſeman, tho' not regardleſs of an agreable complexion, will deſire to have a ſolid ſubſtance underneath; he will aim conſtantly at the greater good, uſe his judgement to diſcern it, conſult his moral

[illegible] discretion as the ſureſt guides to find [illegible] exert his reſolution to follow their directions.

[illegible]. Nevertheleſs if different inclinations may reſide in the ſame perſon, yet inclinations directly oppoſite cannot; wherefore pure and perfect benevolence can never delight in miſchief nor harbour any thought of revenge: I do not ſay that it will preſerve the ſame behaviour under all kinds of uſage, for this would make it a weakneſs inſtead of a virtue, but a proper notice may be taken of injuries without any ſentiment of revenge. The judge is not revengefull when he pronounces ſentence upon the criminal, nor the magiſtrate when he chaſtiſes thoſe who contemn his authority: for they do it to preſerve peace, property and order, the greateſt bleſſings of ſociety. But revenge is properly a deſire of hurting thoſe who have offended without any further conſideration: the view terminates on that point, which it can never do in the good man, being always turned a contrary way. He may puniſh or cenſure where he has it in his power and judges it expedient and neceſſary, but he always carries that neceſſity in view: ſo that his animadverſions will be matter of compulſion not of choice, an undeſirable means to attain a greater good. He will conſider wickedneſs as a diſtemper of the mind, dangerous

to

to the patient, contagious and pernicious to the public, and proceed againſt it in the ſame diſpoſition as a ſurgeon who performs a painful operation for the ſake of a cure, or cuts off a limb that would endanger the whole body. He will take injuries patiently when he has not power to reſent them, or finds the retaliation attended with more inconvenience than advantage. He will be ready to forgive whenever repentance renders puniſhment unneceſſary, and rejoice to find it become ſo. Nor will he not retain a goodwill even towards his enemies, for enmity he will have none himſelf nor any reſentment againſt them, but will only oppoſe them ſo far as to repell their attacks or take away their power or reſtrain their inclination to do hurt: in all other matters conſiſtent with thoſe purpoſes he will be ready to do them any kindneſs. He will have that laudable love of pleaſure as to take it in all the good he ſees, and feel the proſperities even of ſtrangers; and be ſo covetous of enjoyment as to make that of other perſons his own by partaking in the ſatisfaction attending it.

11. This it may be ſaid is a glorious and happy temper of mind, but poſſible only in ſpeculation and unattainable by frail mortal men, who are ſo deeply engaged in providing for their own neceſſities as not to be capable

...ughts much beyond them-
...ons prove too ſtrong for their
..., and whoſe aptneſs to in-
...erpetually break out into act if
... not a deſire of revenge to keep it in
...m afraid all this is but too true, yet
...emplating the character of an ideal
... we may learn what it is we are to aim at,
... if we deſpair of arriving at perfection we
... endeavour to reſemble it in ſome particu-
...s we find feaſible. For we are none of us
without ſome ſeeds of good nature which
with due cultivation may be made to produce
ſomething in the moſt barren ground. Our
own occaſions do not ſo perpetually engage us
but that we may ſometimes ſpare a look elſe-
where, nor do any of us want our ſeaſons of
good humour, wherein we can find a ſenſible
delight in aſſiſting and obliging without pro-
ſpect of advantage to ourſelves. The buſi-
neſs then is to encourage theſe favourable diſ-
poſitions whenever they appear, for tho' we
cannot raiſe nor change an inclination at once,
yet experience teſtifies that like a tender twig
it may be brought to grow in any ſhape by
continual bending: ſo that tho' we muſt
force ourſelves at firſt, yet repeated acts will
contract a habit, which we ſhall then follow
with eaſe and pleaſure. It will be of ſignal
ſervice frequently to place ourſelves in the ſitu-
ation

ation of other perſons, to adopt their deſires and imagine ourſelves under their wants, at leaſt to paint as exact a repreſentation as we can of their condition of mind according to our manner of behaviour towards them: for then the force of ſympathy will aſſiſt us greatly, becauſe as a cheerfull countenance makes the company cheerfull, we ſhall be willing to brighten the proſpect as much as we can that it may reflect the more pleaſurable ideas upon ourſelves. Nor muſt we neglect to root up thoſe weeds that check the growth of benevolence, an intemperance of ſelf intereſt, an averſeneſs to trouble, a contemptuouſneſs of pride, an inconſiderateneſs of vanity, but above all a ſpirit of animoſity. I hope we are none of us inſatiable in our reſentments, and if we can ſet a meaſure to them at all, what better able to aſſign the proper limits than reaſon? but this will always apportion them to the neceſſity of preventing ſome greater miſchief that could not otherwiſe be avoided. And though paſſion may ſometimes ſuſpend the influence of reaſon, we may hinder it from enſlaving her: and if we cannot help being angry, may take care that the Sun ſhall not go down upon our wrath. As an encouragement to practiſe the methods above pointed out or any others our obſervation may ſuggeſt, let us conſider and inculcate in our memory

benefits naturally redounding to ourſelves from a benevolent temper of mind, which I ſhall now endeavour to inveſtigate.

12. I have aſſigned happineſs a man's own happineſs or the aggregate of his ſatisfactions, for the ultimate end of action: therefore it behoves me to ſhow what reference the quality I recommend bears to that end, or elſe it will not appear worth the wiſeman's poſſeſſing. Nor does this contradict what I laid down a little while ago, that a benevolent act muſt carry nothing of ſelf in view: for it has been made evident upon ſeveral occaſions already that our ultimate end is very rarely our ultimate point of view, but we have divers principles, like ſo many ſtages of our journey, which occupy our thoughts from time to time as we proceed. Thus when the wiſeman meets an opportunity of doing a kind thing, he follows his diſpoſition to embrace it without looking for anything further, he performs the good office becauſe he likes it, becauſe he judges it right: but we muſt imagine he had taken his own heart under examination before, and determined to cheriſh benevolence there, becauſe of the connection he had obſerved it to have with happineſs, or with ſome other principle wherein he had formerly found the like connection. Let us then ſuppoſe him utterly diveſted of all his deſires except that

want it themſelves: it gives a confidence in the poſſeſſor and renders his tranſactions of all kinds eaſier to be diſpatched, for nobody will ſcruple to truſt him whom they find always wiſhing them well and ready to do them more than juſtice.

14. Thirdly benevolence is an inclination oftener to be gratified and leſs liable to diſappointment than malice: tis true miſchief may be done eaſier than good, but then mankind will quickly be aware of it and take meaſures to prevent it, whereas they will be ready to aſſiſt the endeavours of him that deſigns them well. So that though according to the principles formerly laid down we muſt admit that acts of good or ill nature may give equal pleaſure to thoſe who have a taſte for either, yet the one will naturally meet with oppoſition and the other with concurrence from the perſons upon whom they are to be exerciſed. If I take delight in miſchief there may be ways of vexing another which I do not know; theſe he will carefully conceal from me, and ſo I ſhall miſs a pleaſure that was in my power to have enjoyed: but if he knows me fond of good offices he will be ready enough of his own accord to tell me wherein I can ſerve him, and ſo furniſh me with opportunities of gratifying my inclination that I might never have thought of myſelf.

15. Fourthly

15. Fourthly good nature multiplies the ſources of enjoyment, for as the pleaſure of life conſiſts for the moſt part in action, and he is the happieſt man who can always find ſomething to engage his purſuit, therefore a reliſh for good offices is an advantage to the owner, becauſe it will furniſh agreable employment for many ſpaces of time wherein he has nothing to do for himſelf. Beſides, it will teach him to rejoice in ſervices wherein he had no hand, make him partake of the pleaſures he ſees, and even lighten his misfortunes by reflecting how many people are exempt from them. Nor let it be objected that thoſe who ſympathize with the ſucceſsful will be apt to do the like with the afflicted, for the perfect wiſeman would feel none of the uneaſineſs of compaſſion, and though we imperfect creatures muſt encourage it ſo far as to give a ſpur to our induſtry in helping, yet we may prevent it from making us ſuffer much at the ſight of diſtreſſes we cannot poſſibly relieve. So that for a few troubles of this kind the tender hearted man meets with, he finds a multitude of enjoyments the croſs-grained and ſelfiſh never taſte of.

16. Fifthly benevolence prevents groundleſs ſuſpicions and jealouſies, ill opinions of mankind, unfavourable conſtruction of words and actions: for men are not wont to think

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ill of thoſe to whom they wiſh well. It will likewiſe make us obſervant of happy events befalling other people, for we naturally take notice of objects we are pleaſed to ſee: which will give us a better notion of external nature and the diſpenſations of fortune. For the taſtes and wants of mankind varying infinitely, what ſuits one extremely well is wholly uſeleſs to another, wherefore thoſe narrow ſouls who can ſee nothing good that does not relate to themſelves, if their own deſires happen to be diſappointed, grow melancholy, diſcontented and out of humour with the world. But the generous open-hearted man ſees a thouſand bright ſpots in the proſpect around him, not ſtriking directly upon himſelf but reflected from others: when the clouds hang over his own head he can ſmile at the ſunſhine on either hand, and pleaſe himſelf in contemplating the uſes of things that cannot do him any ſervice. I believe it may be generally remarked that the beſt tempered people are the beſt ſatisfied with the perſons and things about them, freeſt from gloomineſs and repinings at the condition of human life, and conſequently eaſieſt in themſelves, moſt uninterruptedly chearfull and beſt pleaſed with their ſituation.

17. By often contemplating theſe advantages of benevolence, a man may bring himſelf

ſelf to a hearty liking of it, and then whatever opportunities of exerciſing it offer he will embrace them out of inclination, not from any ſelfiſh views but becauſe he thinks it the beſt, the moſt becoming and moſt ſatisfactory thing he can do. For deſire being perfectly tranſlated to the act itſelf, he will no more need to retain in mind the reaſons firſt inducing him to put on that diſpoſition, than the covetous man has to keep his eye upon the conveniences he may purchaſe with his money, or the mathematician to run over perpetually the whole proceſs of demonſtration by which he arrived at his theorems. For we have remarked more than once before, that tis the motive at preſent in view, not any inducement formerly recommending that motive, which denominates the action: therefore he who ſhows an habitual readineſs to do good offices without further conſideration than their being ſuch, is truly benevolent, whatever prudential or other cauſes firſt gave him that reliſh.

18. But there is a ſpurious benevolence too often miſtaken for the genuine, which proceeds from violent attachments to particular perſons: ſome will do anything for thoſe they fancy, but nothing for thoſe whoſe faces they do not like. This ſtands but one little remove from ſelfiſhneſs, being a weakneſs rather

rather than a virtue, rendring men partial to their favourites, unjuſt or indifferent to everybody elſe, and therefore ought carefully to be guarded againſt. For the virtues do not uſe to deſtroy nor interfere with one another, nor will ſterling benevolence ever make the poſſeſſor unequitable or intemperate in his likings; it knows no bounds beſides thoſe of reaſon, and diffuſes itſelf to all capable of receiving benefit by it: I do not ſay in equal meaſure, but as juſtice, though not requiring an equality of poſſeſſions, yet ſecures the rights of all alike, ſo will benevolence deal out to all their proper ſhare of kindneſs, nor ever confine her regards ſo cloſely to one or a few objects as to have none left for any others.

CHAP. XXXV.

MORAL POLICY.

PLATO in his fifth republic introduces Socrates declaring, that the world would never go well until either philoſophers were entruſted with the management of public affairs, or perſons in authority became philoſophers;

ſophers: that is, as he explains it afterwards, until both ſciences of political and moral wiſdom center in the ſame perſons. If this aſſertion be taken literally I am afraid it will not conduce much to the benefit of mankind; for each ſcience being more than enough to employ the thoughts of any ſingle man, were our miniſters to ſpend their time in hunting after the abſtractions of metaphyſics, they muſt unavoidably neglect many duties of their ſtation; and on the other hand were the helm of government committed to perſons well verſed in theſe matters, the ſhip would quickly ſtrike againſt the rocks for want of ſkilfulneſs in the pilots, who would be more attentive to the rectitude of their courſe than expert in their meaſures for purſuing it. This conſtruction then favours more of philoſophical vanity than ſound prudence: as it arrogates to the ſtudious a claim to power, or at leaſt would make him of conſequence with men of power, by urging them to a purſuit wherein they muſt reſort to him for inſtruction. Therefore I ſhould rather interpret Socrates's meaning to be, that either profeſſor, without interfering in the province belonging properly to the other, ſhould only adopt ſo much of each other's ſcience as may render his own compleat and effectual.

2. How

2. How much of philoſophy may be requiſite for politicians I ſhall not preſume to determine: for as they muſt be poſſeſſed of great ſagacity and penetration to have merited that character, they are much better qualified to judge for themſelves than I can be to direct them. Yet I think I may without offence exhort them to uſe their own judgement, not only in contriving methods for bringing their ſchemes to bear, but in diſcerning the propriety of the ſchemes they take up. What tends moſt effectually to encreaſe their power and aggrandizement, it belongs to their own ſcience to aſcertain; but I could wiſh they would aſk themſelves further why they deſire power or aggrandizement at all. I do not propoſe this queſtion by way of defiance, as if I thought there could no ſolid reaſon be given for entertaining ſuch deſire: but if we have ever ſo good reaſons for our conduct I conceive it expedient we ſhould know them, becauſe they may direct us how far and in what manner to purſue it. Common perſons may be allowed to act implicitly upon principles inſtilled into them by others, for their want of capacity to ſtrike out lights for themſelves will plead their excuſe: but for men of extraordinary talents to make power their ruling paſſion meerly becauſe they were taught to admire it in their childhood, becauſe

they ſee others aſpiring eagerly after it, becauſe it gains the applauſes of the multitude, becauſe it happens to hit their fancy, ſeems unbecoming their character. It may be expected from ſuch that inſtead of acting upon impulſe or ſuffering themſelves to be drawn by ſympathy and example, they ſhould trace their motives up to the firſt principles whereto reaſon can carry them, and before they begin their career of ambition, examine the grounds which may juſtify them for entring upon ſuch a courſe. If they ſhould find upon ſuch enquiry that happineſs or complacence of mind, from whatever object received, is the ſole proper and ultimate end of action, that the good of every individual is beſt promoted by promoting the general good, that our paſſions and particular aims ought to be regarded as engines employed by reaſon for ſpurring on our activity to work out her purpoſes, and that whatever deſire can be no longer gratified it is moſt prudent to extinguiſh, they might then employ their power while they had it, in advancing the welfare of their country, as well by procuring it ſtrength and ſecurity againſt foreign dangers as by eſtabliſhing regulations for its internal polity: and if age or infirmities, the intrigues of a cabal or popular diſtaſte, ſhould diveſt them of their authority, they might reſign it quietly, without

out reluctance, without attempting to raiſe diſturbances, and without want of employment to ſolace themſelves with in a private ſtation. I am the more emboldened to offer this exhortation becauſe I conceive it not diſagreable to the taſte of the preſent times; if one almoſt immured within his cloſet may judge of the ſentiments of the great by ſo much of their behaviour as ſtands expoſed to public view. For our wars are made, not for ambition or conqueſt, for particular views or private reſentments, but for the ſecurity of commerce and advancing the public intereſts: wholeſome proviſions are annually contriving for the better order, the convenience and even pleaſures of the community: when changes happen in the miniſtry they paſs on ſilently without interruption to public affairs, except a little clamour and invective while the ſmart of a diſappointment is freſh, which diſturbs the quiet of none but ſuch are as fond of the ſport for want of ſomething better to employ their time in: and in general I think I can diſcern a ſtronger tincture of ſound philoſophy and regard to the general good among our modern ſtateſmen than I can find in the hiſtories of our anceſtors.

3. Thus much may ſuffice for the politicians, and more it might not have become me to urge upon men of their ſuperiour ta-

lents: but with regard to the philoſophers, under which claſs I would beg leave upon the preſent occaſion to comprehend all who apply any ſerious attention to ſtudy the meaſures of right and wrong, I may be more free and particular, as reckoning them to lie nearer my own level. And I cannot help remarking that their ardor for virtue ſometimes outruns their diſcretion, and like other ſtrong deſires defeats its own purpoſes through too great eagerneſs in purſuing them. It is poſſible with the beſt intentions in the world to bring much miſchief both upon ourſelves and others, by following headlong a blind zeal without knowledge and without examining the expedience of our aims or fitneſs of the meaſures taken to effect them. The province of zeal lies in ſeaſons of action, and its office is to carry us through labour, pain, difficulty, danger, to bear down the force of any paſſion that ſhall obſtruct our paſſage; but it does not become us to act without conſidering why nor wherefore, and in ſeaſons of deliberation the mind cannot be too calm and unprejudiced, nor the mental eye too diſengaged from any ſingle point or too much at liberty to look upon every object around and diſcern them in their proper colours. Wherefore I apprehend with Socrates that the world would go on much better if well diſpoſed

ſed perſons would not confide too implicitly in their rules, but examine them from time to time as they have leiſure and opportunity, conſider their tendencies, mark how they ſucceed, and obſerve whether in particular inſtances they lead to that ultimate end of all rules, the encreaſe of happineſs: and further if in the proſecution of them they would mingle a little policy with their uprightneſs, chooſing ſuch meaſures as upon every occaſion will contribute moſt to the purpoſe they have in hand. Craft, cunning and artifice, ſtand oppoſed to fair dealing, ſincerity and open heartedneſs; from whence it ſeems to have been unwarily concluded, that to be honeſt a man muſt have thrown aſide his underſtanding. But there are honeſt arts as well as deceitfull tricks, and it is not the manner of proceeding, but the aim driven at, that denominates them either. The ſame ſagacity and attention to catch opportunities which makes craft in the ſelfiſh, becomes prudence and good policy in the benevolent: nor do I ſee why a man ſhould not employ all the talents nature and education have furniſhed him with to good purpoſes, becauſe ſome others have perverted them to bad ones. The covetous man, who makes money his idol, will cheat for it if he cannot procure it otherwiſe: what then ſhould hinder the good man, who takes happineſs for

his ſole aim, from cheating his neighbours into it if he cannot get them to receive it willingly?

4. The foundation of politics I take to lie in ſubmitting every other deſire to the ruling paſſion: though honours be particularly alluring to the ambitious, yet if the ſtateſman ſees that he ſhall have greater influence by ſitting among the commons, he will not accept of a title; and how ſtrongly ſoever he may have eſtabliſhed maxims with himſelf for encreaſing his intereſt, if he perceives them by any circumſtances rendred improper for his purpoſe, he will readily forego them. Now the virtuous man's principal aim is the advancement of happineſs, to which every other conſideration ought to give way; and though he may have contracted deſires as ſubſervient thereto and ſet up marks for himſelf to guide him on the way, yet if by any accident his deſires become incompatible therewith or his rules lead him aſtray, he ought to depart from them without ſcruple; he may caſt his eye upon the marks for the direction they will afford him, but ought never to forget the main purpoſe for which they were ſet up. We have ſeen that ſatisfaction conſiſts in perception, that action is good only as it affords ſatisfactory perceptions, and virtue good as it leads into a courſe of ſuch

ſuch actions: ſo that virtue is a means only conducting to our ultimate end, and ſtands at leaſt two removes from happineſs. Tis true we cannot expect to attain our end without uſing the proper means, and I know of no means ſo proper or effectual as a ſteddy adherence to whatever our moral ſenſe repreſents to us as right. Were our internal ſences of nature's immediate donation they would probably diſcern their objects as truly and diſtinctly as the bodily ſenſes, but it has been ſhown in a former place that their judgements are of the tranſlated kind, conveyed to us through experience, ſympathy or the inſtructions of others, which channels ſometimes corrupt the ſtream: ſo that this guide, though the ſureſt we have, does not always prove infallible, nor is there anything ſo idle or abſurd but what men have been reconciled to under a notion of its being right. How many have been led into all the follies of faſhion, drawn into miſchievous compliances with the company, put upon ruinous expences, urged to take revenge for ſlight affronts and ſuppoſed injuries, hurried on thro' all the cruelties of perſecution, becauſe they eſteemed them right? Perhaps their own judgement and inclination would have carried them another way, yet they proceed though with reluctance becauſe they think they

ought? For ſhame, reſentment, vanity and prejudice, will ſometimes aſſume the garb and countenance of a moral ſenſe.

5. Nor is reaſon herſelf to be truſted too haſtily, for ſhe may find occaſion to correct her own miſtakes: and an obſtinate adherence to her deciſions once made, againſt further information, tends as much to produce bigotry as any deference to authority whatſoever. Perſons of this tenacious turn alledge ordinarily in their defence that we muſt neceſſarily follow our reaſon becauſe we have no higher faculty to controul it: but it is no uncommon thing for the ſame faculty to controul its own judgements. What have we to judge of viſible objects beſide the eye? yet this eye, upon their being brought nearer or placed in a different light, may diſcover the fallacioufneſs of the notices itſelf had given before: or on perceiving a hazineſs in the proſpect, may know its own appearances to be imperfect, and yield to the information of others who ſtand in a ſituation to diſcern them clearer. So reaſon may find cauſes ſometimes to ſubmit herſelf to authority, and truſt to others in matters belonging to their ſeveral ſciences, although appearing paradoxical to herſelf: nor can ſhe ever be ſo ſure of her determinations but that evidence may ariſe ſufficient to overthrow them. Let us

then

then admit it poſſible that a man may act very unreaſonably through too ſtrong an attachment to reaſon; let her therefore continually watch over her own motions as well as thoſe of our inferiour powers, for if ſhe treads confidently and careleſſly ſhe may be as liable to trip as appetite.

6. Beſides, it has been made appear before that reaſon actuates very few of our motions, ſhe acts chiefly by her inferiour officers of the family of imagination: while her treaſures remain in her own cuſtody they reſt in ſpeculation alone, nor do they become practical until ſhe has made them over in property to her partner, in which caſe they take the nature of appetites. For it avails nothing to know what is right, nor to reſolve upon it, until we have contracted a deſire and inclination ſtrong enough to carry us through all difficulties in the purſuit of it: ſo that virtue itſelf when compleatly formed is but an appetite, acquired indeed by our own induſtry, but impelling to action in the ſame manner with the natural. Now none of our appetites, not even the beſt of them, can be left entirely to themſelves without extreme hazard: our very hunger and thirſt after righteouſneſs, like that of meats and drinks, if eagerly and fondly indulged, may

riſe

riſe to extravagant cravings or hanker after unwholeſome food.

7. But neither can the love of rectitude in general anſwer all the purpoſes of life: we muſt divide it into various branches and furniſh ourſelves with under propenſities ſuitable to the ſeveral occaſions wherein we are to act, from whence ſpring thoſe inferiour virtues that help to diverſify the characters of mankind. Now how much ſoever the main foundations of right and wrong may be laid in nature and conſequently unalterable, certain it is that the particular habits and propenſities conducting us in the ſeveral parts of our behaviour may change their rectitude with a change of ſituation or circumſtances: and what is virtue at one time or in one man, become vice or folly in another. What is more commendable than application in a young lad while the ſpirits are briſk and the animal circulation vigorous? but if he continues the ſame intenſeneſs of application after age and infirmities have diſabled him from doing any good thereby, when it takes him off from other duties whereof he may be capable, or tends to impairing his health, it becomes faulty. To the young trader beginning upon a ſlender ſtock, a habit of parcimony and attention to little matters is a neceſſary duty: but if any ſudden fortune ſhould caſt an eſtate upon him, the

the ſame diſpoſition of mind would remain no longer proper or becoming. It is well known what ſtrong hold our habits of all kinds take upon us, and thoſe firſt recommended by reaſon or taught us by perſons in whoſe underſtanding we confide, are looked upon as right in themſelves, taken as firſt principles of action, and not eaſily laid aſide when grown unreaſonable; unleſs we have practiſed that ſtateſman's habit of caſting our eye frequently upon our ultimate end, and uſed ourſelves to try our rules of conduct by a reference to expedience.

8. The ſame conſideration likewiſe may induce us to regard other things more beneficial to the world in ſome caſes than what is ordinarily eſteemed virtue. A man that wants ſhoes will ſooner reſort to a clever workman than one ſcrupulouſly honeſt that is a bungler in his trade: and when attacked by a diſtemper had rather call in a debauchee phyſician ſkilfull in his profeſſion than one ſtrictly conſcientious but of dull capacity and little experience. Were all our artiſans and profeſſors to barter their knowledge and dexterity for a proportionable degree of virtue, the world would ſuffer greatly by the exchange: we ſhould all be ready indeed to help one another, but could do no good for want of knowing how to go about it. Therefore there are o-

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ther qualities, beſide that of an upright diſpoſition, worthy the attention of him that deſigns the general good. The want of making this reflection ſeems the grand miſtake of enthuſiaſts and rigid obſervers of a ſtoical rectitude: for by their inceſſant and vehement exhortations to inward righteouſneſs they either make men ſelfiſh, ſo buſied in improving the ſtate of their own minds as never to do anything for anybody elſe, unleſs to pray for them or cenſure them or give money to thoſe who pretend to give it away again; or elſe take them off from the buſineſs of their callings, wherein they might do real ſervice to their neighbours. But virtue, as has been obſerved before concerning reaſon, confers us very little benefit with her own hands, no more than by that complacence of mind we feel in the exerciſe of it, which we may ſometimes find as well in the gratification of any other deſire: the principal ſervice ſhe does is by keeping us diligent in acquiring all other things beneficial to us, and applying them when acquired to the beſt advantage both of ourſelves and others. Wherefore he that never loſes remembrance of the general good, will endeavour to procure for himſelf and ſuch as lie within his influence, all uſefull endowments both of body and mind as well as the diſpoſition to uſe them rightly. If he ſhould do otherwiſe he would

would be like a man who ſhould ſpend his whole time in a riding ſchool in order to make himſelf a compleat horſeman, but never get a horſe to ride upon either on the road or field.

9. Nor muſt it be forgotten that our virtues do not ſtart up in us inſtantaneouſly, but grow out of other habits and deſires. Ambition, covetouſneſs, vanity, ſpur us on to induſtry, an affectation of being thought polite makes men obliging, fear begets caution, obſtinacy produces courage, and a carefull regard to our own intereſts generates diſcretion, from whence ſprouts the cardinal virtue of prudence. The main turn of our future lives is ordinarily given before we arrive at manhood: the courſe we are then put upon by our friends or led into by our own particular liking taken up without judgement but by meer fancy, the taſtes, inclinations, opinions we then imbibe, lay the foundation of thoſe virtues we afterwards acquire. Perhaps an admiration raiſed at the finery of a chancellour or lord Mayor's coach, may have ſtimulated many a young ſchool boy or apprentice to that application which lays the groundwork of thoſe good qualities that will make him eminent at the bar or in commerce. Therefore a judicious lover of virtue will ſtudy to cultivate and prepare the ground for

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its reception, and nouriſh up ſuch wild plants as may ſerve for ſtocks whereon it may be grafted moſt eaſily and flouriſh moſt abundantly.

10. He will conſider further that the buſy mind of man cannot ſtand a moment idle: our activity muſt exert itſelf ſome way or other from morning to night, and if reaſon has not planned out a courſe wherein it may expatiate, it will run after any whim or folly that ſhall preſent it with allurement. Beſides, ſatisfaction being momentary cannot be provided for compleatly without ſupplying freſh fuel every moment to keep it alive: happineſs depends upon having ſomething conſtantly at hand wherein we can employ ourſelves with reliſh. Now the grand occaſions of exerciſing virtue do not offer at every ſeaſon, nor can the mind always find employment in her immediate ſervice: wherefore it will be expedient to furniſh ourſelves with other aims and purſuits, methods of engagement or recreation, which may fill up the ſpaces ſhe leaves vacant; chooſing ſuch if poſſible as may conduce remotely to her intereſts, or at leaſt ſuch as are innocent and may protect her by preventing the growth of thoſe evils that might blight and overſhadow her.

11. It is one characteriſtic of policy that it aims at things feaſible rather than

than things deſirable, never attempts impoſſibilities but applies its endeavours always to drive the nail that will go, and lays aſide its moſt favourite ſchemes when the tide of popular diſlike ſets moſt ſtrongly againſt them. If the nation will not have an exciſe, the ſtateſman lays aſide all further thoughts of it; and if they will have a militia, he concurs in planning ſchemes to ſatisfy them. In this reſpect your very righteous people prove often groſſly deficient: they fix their eye upon the ſublimeſt heights of virtue without conſidering whether they be attainable; they confine their exhortations to practices that would prove of excellent ſervice but they have no likelihood of ever being followed, and ſo by aiming at too much, miſs of that benefit they might have done. Whereas it would become them better to ſtudy not only the abſtract nature of things but likewiſe the nature of men, their characters, diſpoſitions and capacities; accommodating their endeavours to the ſubjects whereon they employ them, and circumſtances of the times wherein they exert them; chooſing rather to ſow ſuch ſeeds as the ſoil will bear and the ſeaſon cheriſh, than ſuch as would yield the moſt delicious grain. The intereſts of virtue require ſometimes that we ſhould temporiſe and diſſemble, becoming all things

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to all men if by any means we may gain ſome, and drawing them unawares into their good by ſeeming to ſooth them in their favourite inclinations. He that would ſerve virtue effectually muſt not diſdain to do her ſmall ſervices as well as great, for occaſions of the latter, as was obſerved in the laſt ſection, do not occur at every turn; and many times when we cannot get her authority to prevail, we may introduce ſomething very much reſembling her, and contribute to the growth of other good qualities, that ſhall in ſome meaſure ſupply her place by inſtigating to the very works ſhe herſelf would recommend. Beſides, when the mind has been habituated to the practice of good works, from what motive ſoever induced thereto, it will become more ſuſceptible of right intentions afterwards.

12. There is a well known maxim of politics, Divide and govern, which the moraliſt may turn to good account in the management of his province. The little ſtate of man is far from being an abſolute monarchy or having any ſettled or well regulated polity, the prerogative lies within a very narrow compaſs, but the power lodges in the rabble of appetites and paſſions: and any importunate fancy that, like ſome popular orator the favourite of the day, can raiſe a mob of them

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to clamour after it, bears down all oppoſition. Reaſon can do nothing to ſtem the torrent, unleſs ſhe can ſtir up a party among the populace to ſide with her: for if they begin to quarrel among themſelves, ſhe may then caſt in her weight to turn the ballance between them. Nor can ſhe ever prevail by meer dint of reſolution to have her commands vigorouſly executed without aid of ſome paſſion to ſecond her, and as ſhe will always find one or other of them oppoſing her meaſures, ſhe muſt continually play them one againſt another: pleaſure againſt indolence, ſelfiſhneſs againſt pleaſure, vanity againſt ſelfiſhneſs, fear againſt raſhneſs, ſhame againſt indulgence, reſentment againſt cowardice, reputation againſt injuſtice, and particular deſires againſt their ſeveral competitors. Wherefore ſhe ought to bend her endeavours towards ſuppreſſing the moſt riotous, rather encouraging the weaker and more manageable that ſhe may have ſomething ready at hand to aſſiſt in pulling down the others: but above all ſhe muſt beware of letting any one grow ſo powerfull as that it may wreſt the ſtaff out of her hands. If ſhe does admit a ruling paſſion let her employ it as a firſt miniſter to execute her orders, not as a favourite to gain an aſcendant over her, nor ſuffer it to fill the council board with a clan

of its own dependents. Your zealots ſometimes commit this overſight, for obſerving that all men have a deſire of excelling, they endeavour to turn this principle to the ſervices of virtue, and herein they do well: but they go on to encourage it without meaſure until it begets ſpiritual pride, cenſoriouſneſs, fourneſs, envy and ill nature, poſſeſſes their whole minds, becomes the ſole motive to good works and vitiates the beſt of their performances.

13. The politician carefully ſurveys the ground before him, conſiders what may be done with the materials he has to work upon, does not run counter to prevailing humours nor particular fancies, but ſtudies how to turn them to his own advantage, ſets every engine at work and neglects no trifle that may be employed anyways to advance his purpoſes. So let the moraliſt obſerve the diſpoſition and qualities of his own mind, the circumſtances of his ſituation, the temper and character of the times wherein he lives: not ſtriving to force his way by oppoſition, nor vainly expecting to make everything tally with an ideal plan, how well ſoever framed in his own imagination; but contriving how to draw the moſt good from opinions and cuſtoms already received, by grafting ſomething beneficial upon them: not driving men violently

lently out of their accuſtomed courſes, but turning them gently and dextrouſly into ſuch track as may lead to their ſolid advantage. For a ſingle perſon may promote the intereſts of virtue better by joining in with the company to encourage practices tending in any degree thereto, than he can by ſtriking into a new road which he has nothing beſides his own authority to recommend. Nor let him deſpiſe every little ceremony or vulgar notion as idle and unworthy his notice: for ſometimes theſe ſmall ſprings may be turned to good account, or made to put others in motion which may prove more efficacious.

14. It is no inconſiderable branch of the miniſter's art to diſcern the talents of men, to know what they are fit for, and employ every one in the way wherein he may be moſt uſefull. In like manner it is an eſſential part of the moraliſt's office to obſerve carefully with what endowments nature and education have furniſhed himſelf or any others he has to deal with, what are the duties of their reſpective ſtations, and what opportunities they have of promoting the grand deſign of happineſs. For though it were to be wiſhed that every virtue might be infuſed into every man, yet this being impracticable, it behoves each perſon to acquire ſuch particular ſpecies of them as are beſt adapted to his uſe.

For different profeſſions require different qualifications to ſucceed in them: courage is peculiarly neceſſary for ſome, temperance for others, impartiality of juſtice for others. Wherefore let every man apply himſelf to the attainment of that virtue wherein he can make the greateſt progreſs, and which will render him the moſt ſerviceable according to the ſituation and circumſtances he ſtands in. Were it poſſible to make profound philoſophers of the common artiſans and mechanics, the world would be very little benefitted thereby, for it might take them from attending to the buſineſs of their occupations and render them leſs uſeful members of the community: therefore it were better for them to cultivate the qualities of honeſty and induſtry in their callings without aiming at much beſide. Some whoſe talents fit them peculiarly for the office, may do more good by improving their reaſon, purſuing ſuch ſpeculations as may produce ſomething beneficial to others; but few of theſe are wanted in the world, for one man may diſcover what will employ thouſands to uſe. The far greater part of mankind have little more work for their reaſon than to chooſe their guides and apply the directions received to their own particular occaſions, for the ſervice they do lies in action. The purpoſes of life are effected by an infinite

variety of different ways, and would be better anſwered by every one taking the taſk properly belonging to him, than by all crowding in to perform a few of the moſt important.

15. Your ſtateſmen are obſerved often to ſtand much upon punctilios, to contend ſtrenuouſly for the precedence of an ambaſſador, the ceremonial of an entry, or ſtile to be uſed in a treaty. So the moraliſt, tho' he always prefers ſubſtantials before forms, yet where the latter affect the former he will ſtickle as earneſtly for them: for he extends his view as far as it can reach, and regards not only the preſent action but the moſt diſtant conſequences attending it. When he ſees uſages and ceremonies, however inſignificant in themſelves, ſo connected in people's minds with matters of importance as that one cannot be broken thro' without endangering the others, he will conſider them as bulwarks protecting the eſſentials, and contend for them accordingly with might and main. As the inhabitants of a town exert all their efforts in defending the remparts, tho' yielding neither corn nor paſture nor accommodations for their dwelling, for this obvious reaſon, becauſe when thoſe are taken the town lies at mercy. Of this kind we may reckon the rites of burial and decencies obſerved towards the dead

which, tho' of no real avail or intrinſic value, yet find place in all civilized countries: becauſe they ſtand as barriers againſt that ſavageneſs which might otherwiſe encroach upon men's tempers and cauſe infinite miſchiefs among the living. Nor will he conſent to have his rules diſpenſed with whenever he ſees them inexpedient for the preſent, if there is a hazard of their being ſo weakened thereby as never to recover their influence again: proceeding upon my lord Coke's maxim, that the law will rather ſuffer a private injury than a public inconvenience.

16. But how anxious ſoever the man of conſummate policy may appear about niceties upon proper occaſion, there is nobody leſs hampered with ſcruples when he ſees them ſtanding in the way of his deſigns: he can throw aſide animoſities, put up with injuries, ſubmit to indignities, when it ſerves his purpoſe, and join with his bittereſt enemies when there chances to be a coalition of intereſts. Here too the man of judicious virtue will follow his ſteps, nor diſdain to employ the miniſtry of her adverſaries in promoting her deſigns, not ſcrupling to cheriſh any vice or folly that tends evidently to check the growth of others more ~~erroneous~~ enormous. 'Tis true he can ſcarce ever find occaſion to uſe his endeavours this way, for vice and folly ſprout faſt enough of

of themſelves without needing any culture, and were it poſſible it would be deſirable totally to eradicate them all, for then we might expect to reap a more plentifull crop of happineſs. But ſince evil diſpoſitions will abound, ſince they continually oppoſe one another's aims, and prevent the miſchievous effects that would flow therefrom, it behoves him to act circumſpectly, forbearing to do good when it may occaſion a greater hurt, nor attempting to reform the world in points wherein, though it may be faulty, yet a worſe evil would enſue upon ſuch reformation. Nor can it be called deſerting the intereſts of virtue to turn our backs upon her for a while in order to ſerve her more effectually, for policy requires us to do the ſame in our other purſuits: we follow pleaſure through the road of ſelf-denial, money muſt be diſburſed to purchaſe commodities that will bring in a larger return, and lowlineſs, ſays Shakeſpeare, is young ambition's ladder. So that virtue may well excuſe us for running into the enemies camp to turn his own cannon againſt him, if we have her intereſts at heart all the while and a reaſonable proſpect of promoting her ſervice in the long run by ſo doing.

17. Great pains was taken by a particular author ſome time ago to ſhow that the vices

of men tend to the benefit of the community, and though he ſeems to have made good his aſſertion in particular inſtances, yet it was an unfair concluſion to infer from thence in general that private vices were public benefits: for ſo it might be proved that diſeaſe conduces to health, becauſe the doctor ſometimes brings on a gout in order to cure other more dangerous diſtempers, or wiſhes to raiſe a fever to force away obſtructions cauſing paralytic diſorders. But diſeaſe is then only ſalutary when neceſſary to remove diſeaſe, and vices then only tolerable when they put men upon actions from which their other vices would withold them. So that the benefit of vice, when it affords any, ariſes from its hurtfulneſs: for if the vices it counteracts were not miſchievous, there would be no good in that which obſtructs their operation.

18. But it is the property of a politician to be cloſe and covert and keep his motives of action to himſelf. This the man wiſely righteous will imitate with reſpect to the doctrine abovementioned of conniving at particular vices occaſionally, which falling into unſkilfull or ill deſigning hands may prove of dangerous conſequence, as opening a door to the moſt latitudinarian practices. Therefore he will lock it up among his eſoterics for the uſe only of adepts, and think the ſacredneſs

neſs of the rules of virtue cannot be too ſtrongly inculcated upon the vulgar, who being apt to take that for good which ſuits their own humours and intereſts, would make mad work unleſs reſtrained by the authority of rules. For they do not ſtand in a ſituation to judge of the general expedience, but can only be led into it by the maxims of morality, and muſt unavoidably loſe their way the moment they take off their eye from that guidance. I have ſaid before under the article of juſtice, and repeat it here with regard to morality in general, that I like to ſee young men rather over ſcrupulous, nor would wiſh them to wear off their ſcruples but by degrees, as they arrive at a full diſcernment of their reſpective inconveniences: for it requires a conſiderable degree of ſkill and competent experience to prevent liberty from running into licentiouſneſs. Our ſchoolmaſters keep their lads ſtrictly to the rules of grammar and proſody, nor until perfect therein ever ſuffer them to launch out into poetical licences: they would whip a boy who ſhould write, like Milton, Adam the goodlieſt man of men ſince born his ſons, the faireſt of her daughters Eve; or reckon only three ſyllables in Tíreſiās, or four in Bēēlzebub, or place their accent in the middle of Proſérpine. It is the maſterpiece of moral ſcience to know when

when a fundamental rule may be diſpenſed with, nor ought great liberties ever to be taken until we have learned by long experience how to do it ſafely, and have made ſuch a proficiency in virtue as that a ſingle act of neceſſary diſreſpect cannot endanger the leſſening our cordial regard for her.

19. There is one piece of good policy very proper for the moraliſt though not at all ſuited to the cabinet, which is, to make others like himſelf and diffuſe his virtues as far and wide as he has opportunities for ſo doing. Conſidering how much of our enjoyments depends upon thoſe we converſe with, it may be made a queſtion whether it would be more for a man's eaſe to be wicked himſelf but ſurrounded with perſons juſt, prudent and benevolent, or to be ſingly good in the midſt of a corrupt and perverſe generation: but there is no need to canvaſs this point, for it muſt certainly make for his intereſt that the morals of all with whom he has any concern ſhould be improved, and he can take no likelier method for propagating good qualities elſewhere than by cultivating them firſt in himſelf. But then he muſt proceed in this culture with diſcretion, attending not only to the growth of his plants but to their aptneſs for tranſplanting, taking care to make his virtues inviting as well as genuine,

genuine, to ſet them off with ſuch appearance as may make them more eaſily catched by ſympathy, to abate of ſuch rigour and auſterity as might raiſe a diſtaſte againſt them, to forbear what is innocent when likely to give offence, remembring that things lawfull may not be expedient, and to have a view in all his actions to their exemplarineſs as well as their rectitude.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Limitation of Virtue.

I Hope what has been hitherto delivered may be found tending to recommend virtue as the moſt deſirable object a man can purſue, to reſt it upon the ſolid foundation of human nature inſtead of thoſe airy notions of an eſſential beauty wherein ſome have placed it, and to purify it from thoſe extravagancies wherewith it has been loaded by the indiſcretion of zealots. But to deal ingenuouſly and aim at truth rather than ſaving the credit of our performance, let us not ſuppreſs an exception there lies againſt it, as limiting and confining the obligation of virtue within a certain com-

compaſs which ought to extend to all caſes univerſally. For it may be urged that if ſatisfaction, a man's own ſatisfaction, be the groundwork of all our motives; if reaſon can furniſh no ends of her own, but ſerves only to diſcover methods of accompliſhing thoſe aſſigned her by ſenſe; if ſhe recommends virtue and benevolence ſolely as containing the moſt copious ſources of gratification; then are virtue and benevolence no more than means, and deſerve our regard no longer than while they conduce towards their end. So that upon an opportunity offering wherein a man may gain ſome pleaſure or advantage ſlily and ſafely without danger of after damage to himſelf, though with infinite detriment to all the world beſide and in breach of every moral obligation, he will act wiſely to embrace it.

2. I cannot deny that the conſequence follows in ſpeculation upon the caſe above ſuppoſed, but I conceive ſuch caſe can never happen in fact ſo long as a man has any proſpect of good and evil to come. For we muſt take into account, not only the advantage accruing from an action, but likewiſe the benefits or miſchiefs of the diſpoſition of mind giving birth to it: and if this will lead us into evils over ballancing the preſent profit of the action, we cannot be ſaid to do it without danger of after damage to ourſelves. The virtues belong

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to the heart rather than the head, or to ſpeak in our own ſtile, their reſidence lies in the imagination not the underſtanding; and to be compleat muſt direct our inadvertent motions as well as our deliberate, that is, muſt become appetites impelling to action without ſtanding to conſider their expedience. Now whoever reſiſts their impulſe ſoberly and premeditately upon conſideration of their being inconvenient to his private purpoſes, will thereby make ſuch a breach upon their authority and give ſuch a crooked turn to his mind as muſt unavoidably draw him into evils greater than any immediate advantage he may gain. All vice, ſays Juvenal, ſtands upon a precipice, and if we once ſtep over the brink, nobody can tell how far we ſhall go down: one of theſe two things muſt neceſſarily follow, either we ſhall continue ſliding until we fall into deſtruction, or muſt put ourſelves to infinite trouble in climbing the precipice, a trouble far exceeding the pleaſure we may have felt at firſt in the eaſe of a downhill motion. He that cheats when he can do it ſafely, will want to cheat at other times, and conſequently muſt ſuffer, either by a ſelf denial or the miſchiefs of an indulgence: ſo that it had been more for his benefit to have adhered inviolably to his rule of honeſty. The ultimate end we have aſſigned for a reaſonable creature

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to act upon was not preſent pleaſure or profit but the aggregate of enjoyments: and we have laboured, I hope not unſucceſsfully, to prove from a ſurvey of human nature that nothing adds ſo largely to that aggregate as a right diſpoſition of mind. We have indeed placed enjoyment in gratification, but then have put thoſe who will lend us an ear in mind, that gratification depends more upon bending deſire to ſuch a ply as that it may faſten upon things attainable and convenient, than upon procuring the objects of every deſire ſtarting up in our fancy. Now the habits of moral prudence and benevolence alone can bring deſire to the proper ply: but thoſe habits cannot retain their influence with him who ſhall wilfully and upon principle permit his other deſires to break in upon them. Therefore tho' the common rules of virtue may lawfully be diſpenſed with upon an honeſt regard to her intereſts and a judicious diſcernment of the greater general good, for this ſtrengthens our attachment to thoſe objects whereon the rules were founded: yet we may never infringe them upon any other conſideration of pleaſure or ſelfiſhneſs, for this would be introducing another principle of action inconſiſtent with the former. But it would be the moſt imprudent thing in the world for a man to allow himſelf in ſuch liberties as

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muſt deſtroy a principle of conduct that prudence and reaſon have recommended, ſo long as there remains any proſpect of his receiving future benefit from its influence.

3. Nevertheleſs it muſt be confeſſed that when life draws near to an end, if it ſhould be urged upon us that then the obligations to virtue muſt ceaſe, I ſhould not know what to anſwer. For ſince they ariſe from expedience, they muſt drop of courſe when there is no longer a poſſibility of that expedience taking place. We have laid down before, that a man need never deny himſelf in anything unleſs in order to pleaſe himſelf better another time, if then he ſhall never ſee that other time, there is no reaſon why he ſhould deny himſelf at all: but he may without ſcruple gratify whatever deſires he finds in his heart, ſince there is no room for any bad conſequences to follow upon them; nor need he fear their ſubverting a principle he has found all along of excellent uſe to guide him in his conduct, when he has no further courſe to run wherein that principle may direct him. Why ſhould he reſtrain his extravagance when he has enough to laſt him the little time he expects to live? why ſhould he forbear intemperance when it cannot have time to fill him with diſeaſes? why ſhould he ſcruple to cheat when he ſhall ſlip out of harm's way before a diſcovery can overtake

overtake him? why ſhould he trouble himſelf with what becomes of the world when he is upon the point of leaving it: or do anything for the benefit of others when he can receive no returns from them nor in any manner gather the fruits of his labours?

4. But notwithſtanding this conceſſion, it does not neceſſarily follow that a man muſt quit the practice of virtue when he ſees his diſſolution approaching: for this will depend upon the turn of mind he has already taken. If indeed he has purſued it hitherto by conſtraint and ſtill finds in himſelf ſtrong propenſities to gluttony, debauchery, gallantry and other inordinate deſires, I have ſuggeſted no arguments which might induce him to reſtrain them, nor offered advantages he can reap ſufficient to compenſate the trouble of a ſelf-denial. For as phyſicians permit a patient whom they have abſolutely given over to eat and drink whatever he pleaſes, becauſe when nothing can do him good nothing can hurt him: ſo the moraliſt will think it in vain to preſcribe a regimen for diſeaſes of the mind, when there is no time to work a cure nor any enjoyment of health to be expected. Our motives of action are not to be changed preſently nor can we give a new turn to deſire as eaſily as put on our cloaths, therefore when the glaſs is almoſt run out it is too late

to

to think of taking up a ſet of freſh inclinations but every one muſt be left to make the moſt of thoſe he already poſſeſſes. But this very conſideration will engage the man who has ſpent his days in a virtuous courſe to perſevere in it to the laſt: not indeed now from obligation or expedience but for the eaſe and pleaſure he finds in purſuing an habitual track. We obſerved juſt now that the virtues to be compleat muſt have fixed their reſidence in the heart, and become appetites impelling to action without further thought than the gratification of them: ſo that after their expedience ceaſes, they ſtill continue to operate by the deſire they raiſe. Nor is it unuſual in other caſes for men to continue the courſes they have been accuſtomed to after the reaſons upon which they began them are no more: I knew a mercer who having gotten a competency of fortune, thought to retire and enjoy himſelf in quiet, but finding he could not be eaſy without buſineſs, was forced to return to the ſhop and aſſiſt his former partners gratis in the nature of a journey man. Why then ſhould it be thought ſtrange that a man, long enured to the practice of moral duties, ſhould perſevere in them out of liking when they can yield him no further advantage? To tell him that he may ſquander without fear of poverty, gluttonize without danger of diſtem-

pers, and bring a ſecret miſchief upon others without hazard of its ever coming round upon himſelf, were no temptation to him: for he has no reliſh to ſuch divertiſements, his appetites having been long ſince ſet upon what is juſt and becoming and beneficent. So that though prudence has no further commands, he will employ himſelf in the ſame exerciſes ſhe uſed to enjoin, as the moſt agreable way wherein he can lay out his few remaining moments.

5. Upon this occaſion I cannot avoid entring the liſts once more on behalf of Epicurus, to vindicate him againſt a charge of inconſiſtency laid by Tully in his ſecond de Finibus, Cap. 30, 31. Epicurus it ſeems had written a letter on the laſt day of his life to one Hermachus, earneſtly recommending his pupils the children of his deceaſed friend Metrodorus to his tuition. And had directed by Will that his executors ſhould provide an entertainment yearly on his birth day, and on the like day of every month, for ſuch as uſed to ſtudy philoſophy with him, in order to preſerve alive in their minds the remembrance of himſelf and of the ſaid Metrodorus. Now this friendly concern for the name and family of Metrodorus, and this careful proviſion for keeping up the ſpirit of the ſect by bringing them together once a month,

month, Tully thinks acting out of character in one who referred all things to pleaſure and held that whatever happens after our deceaſe is nothing to us. But whoever obſerves the motions of the human mind, may ſee that many things which are nothing to us when they happen, are yet a great delight to us in the proſpect and contemplation. How often do people pleaſe themſelves with laying ſchemes for raiſing a family or ſpreading their fame to future ages, without any probable aſſurance that they ſhall enjoy the ſucceſſes of their family or have any knowledge of what the world ſhall ſay of them a hundred years hence? but the thought of what ſhall then happen affords them a preſent entertainment, and therefore they follow pleaſure as much in promoting thoſe ſchemes as they ſhould do in purſuit of any favourite diverſion. I would fain know how Tully would have had Epicurus diſpoſe of his laſt day to have acted in character: ſhould it have been ſpent in the enjoyment of nice dainties, exquiſite wines or fine women? this he might have expected had he had the ſame notion of Epicurus that we have of an epicure. La Fontaine's glutton having eaten up a whole ſalmon all but the jowl, ſo ſurfeited himſelf therewith that his phyſicians declared him paſt all hopes of a recovery: well, ſays he, ſince the caſe is

ſo, then bring me the reſt of my fiſh. Now this man we muſt own behaved conſiſtently with himſelf throughout: but why muſt other people follow his example who have not the ſame fondneſs for ſalmon? Let us give everybody their due whether we like them or not: it appears from what accounts have been handed down to us and which Tully was not ignorant of, that nobody was leſs of an epicure than Epicurus himſelf. He had carefully ſtudied the ſources of pleaſure and found nothing more conducive thereto than temperance, patience, benevolence and all the moral virtues: we may ſuppoſe he had ſo full a perſuaſion of this their tendency and ſo enured himſelf to the practice of them, that he had gotten an habitual liking to them, and could not turn his hand to anything elſe with equal reliſh. Imagine then a man of this turn arrived at the laſt morning of his exiſtence, and conſidering how to paſs his only remaining day with moſt ſatisfaction to himſelf: how could he do it better than by continuing that courſe which he had conſtantly found moſt pleaſurable and beſt ſuited to his taſte? There is no occaſion to ſuppoſe the love of probity, friendſhip and public ſpirit, to be innate: for the perpetual experience and contemplation of their advantage-

ouſneſs is enough to make them objects of deſire.

6. But tho' I have thus much to alledge in favour of Epicurus towards ſhowing that his conduct might be all of a piece when he wrote the letter and made the Will abovementioned, notwithſtanding his referring all things to pleaſure: yet I cannot ſo eaſily juſtify Regulus againſt all imputation of imprudence upon the like principle. For it is one thing to contrive how we ſhall lay out the day in a manner moſt agreable to our liking when nothing we do therein can affect us to morrow, and quite another to take our meaſures wiſely when it depends upon our preſent behaviour whether we ſhall have a morrow or no. There is nothing more glaringly evident than that the end of Being muſt put an end to enjoyment: therefore he that takes a courſe, how ſatisfactory ſoever to his own mind, which muſt deſtroy him, acts imprudently, as he conſults preſent ſatisfaction rather than the aggregate of it wherein happineſs properly conſiſts. Nor am I moved with thoſe ranting exclamations of the Stoics, that there is more joy in a day well ſpent than in years of ſenſual delights; I am ſenſible our pleaſures are not all equal in degree, but I cannot conceive how ſo much enjoyment can be crowded into a ſmall ſpace of time as to

make it worth our while to neglect years to come for the ſake of it; for our organs can neither bear nor contain ſo large a meaſure. Such outcries are in the ſtile of the diſſolute and inconſiderate, as encouraging the ſame diſregard to the future with the maxim they proceed upon, A ſhort life and a merry. But the moſt fatal miſtake men are apt to fall into, lies in their eſtimating pleaſures according to the degree of them: for it has been made appear under the article of pleaſure that we are much more beholden to thoſe of the gentler kind, as adding more largely to the aggregate of ſatisfactions, than to the intenſe. Even our common diverſions pleaſe more by the engagement of ſome purſuit they put us upon than by the joy of an acquiſition. Nor ſhall we ſee cauſe to lay ſo much ſtreſs upon the raptures of virtue when we reflect how many leſs worthy objects can give them as well for a time; a ſudden turn of good fortune, a title of honour, a ribbon, whether blue, green or red, the ſmiles of a miſtreſs, a kind word, a deluſive promiſe, the verieſt trifle, will do it in proportion to the fondneſs there is for them: ſo that a day ſpent in the accompliſhment of any eager deſire carries as much intrinſic weight, abſtracted from all conſiderations of the future, as a day ſpent in the exerciſe of virtue. Wherefore the preferableneſs of virtue does not

not ariſe ſo much from the tranſports ſhe occaſions as from the calm ſerenity and ſteddy complacence of mind ſhe enſures, the ſatisfactory reflections ſhe gives ſcope to, the attainableneſs of the deſires ſhe raiſes, their compatibleneſs with one another, and their clearneſs from miſchievous conſequences: all which regard the time to come and therefore cannot conſiſt with whatever renders us incapable of good or evil for the future.

7. Yet neither can it be certainly concluded from men's enduring patiently for a good cauſe, that they feel thoſe tranſports in ſupporting it which ſhall keep their minds in a ſtate of continual enjoyment: for we may remember that objects operate no leſs by the want than the deſire of them, by our unwillingneſs to miſs them than by the pleaſure of moving towards them; and that there is an abhorrence of vice as well as a love of virtue. When motives act this way they fall under the claſs of neceſſity, which always throws the mind into a ſtate of uneaſineſs: nor is her condition inſtantly bettered upon doing well while it is done out of obligation, nor until we can come to do it upon liking. If this were Regulus's caſe we muſt certainly pronounce him to have acted imprudently, and that Epicurus could not have done the ſame conſiſtently with his principles, ſince he gave up

all thoſe enjoyments he might have expected in a longer life without receiving even preſent pleaſure in exchange: and it had been for his benefit to have had no ſuch ſtrong attachment to his obligations. But not to derogate from the character of Regulus, let us ſuppoſe the utmoſt that can be ſuppoſed in his favour: let us allow him to have felt ſo great ſatisfaction in the nobleneſs of his conduct as drew out the ſting of every evil that could befall him, and to have ended his days in exquiſite delight amidſt all the cruel torments that were inflicted upon him. Still this delight, how high ſoever in kind, muſt neceſſarily fall ſhort in duration; and he had better have contented himſelf with ſmaller pleaſures which might have compenſated by their continuance for what they wanted in weight. Perhaps it may be ſaid he had contracted ſo ſtrong a deteſtation of treachery and abhorrence of infamy that he could not ſupport himſelf in any quiet of mind under the reflection of them: ſo that being no longer capable of enjoying life with pleaſure, he choſe to end it in a manner that might prove moſt ſatisfactory. But what brought him under this incapacity beſides his own diſpoſition of mind which could find a reliſh in nothing but what was juſt, becoming and laudable? Another who had not the ſame ſqueamiſh diſpoſition might have found

found enjoyments enow under general cenſure and ſelf-reproach to make life deſirable. Nor will it ſuffice to alledge that he had good grounds at firſt for acquiring this diſpoſition, which having once taken up it was not in his power to lay down again at pleaſure: for it is not our buſineſs to find excuſes for him in the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſuddenly change a rooted habit of acting or liking that we have long accuſtomed ourſelves to, but to enquire whether this procedure of his were a weakneſs or no. And for this purpoſe we muſt imagine to ourſelves a man who ſhould have an abſolute command over his inclinations to turn them this way or that as he ſaw proper, and conſider how ſuch a one would uſe his power in the ſituation of Regulus. We cannot well ſuppoſe otherwiſe than that ſuch a perſon would keep his eye conſtantly fixed upon the original rule of rectitude which drives ſolely at happineſs. He would eſtabliſh upon that bottom certain maxims of conduct and morality as he judged them conducive thereto: but he would never ſuffer himſelf to be enſlaved by the maxims himſelf had eſtabliſhed, nor let any ſubordinate means lead him away from his ultimate end. He would know that what is good and laudable at one time, may become miſchievous and blamable by a change of circumſtances.

cumſtances. He might encourage in himſelf a love of probity and honour as yielding the largeſt income of ſatisfaction, yet if matters came to that paſs as to make it appear they muſt have a contrary tendency, he would throw aſide his ſcruples and turn his thoughts to ſuch enjoyments as were to be had without them.

8. Upon the whole we are forced to acknowledge that hitherto we have found no reaſon to imagine a wiſeman would ever die for his country or ſuffer martyrdom in the cauſe of virtue, how ſtrong propenſity ſoever he might feel in himſelf to maintain her intereſts. For he would never act upon impulſe nor do anything without knowing why: he would cultivate a diſpoſition to juſtice, benevolence and public ſpirit, becauſe he would ſee it muſt lead him into actions moſt conducive to his happineſs, and would place ſuch confidence in his rules as to preſume they carried that tendency in particular inſtances wherein it did not immediately appear. But it is one thing not to ſee directly that meaſures have ſuch a tendency, and another to diſcern clearly that they have a contrary: and when they take away all capacity of further enjoyment, this is ſo manifeſt a proof of their inexpedience as no preſumption whatever can withſtand. Therefore he will never let his love

of

of virtue grow to ſuch an extravagant fondneſs as to overthrow the very purpoſes for which he entertained it.

9. I am apprehenſive this concluſion will give offence to many as ſeeming to undo all we had done before in the ſervice of virtue, by thus deſerting her at laſt in time of greateſt need when ſhe is entring upon her moſt arduous undertakings. Yet I know not wherein we have acted unfairly either in the choice of our premiſſes or deduction of inferences from them. We have ſearched every corner of the human breaſt, and found that all our motives derive either immediately or remotely from our own ſatisfaction and complacence of mind. Nature has given us this ſpring as the firſt mover of all our actions and ultimate object of all our contrivances. We have ſeen that reaſon cannot work upon her own bottom but muſt fetch materials from elſewhere, for there is no reaſoning unleſs from premiſſes already known before we enter upon the conſultation: therefore how far ſoever ſhe may inveſtigate her principles upon one another ſhe muſt at laſt reſt in ſuch as ſhe finds aſſigned her by ſenſe and appetite, her office being only to correct their errors in the proſecution of their aims, to take better meaſures than they do, and lead to the ſame point diſcreetly and effectually which they drive at prepoſ-

prepoſterouſly and vainly. We have ſhown that the rules of morality ſtand on the foundation of happineſs, that all notions of them which have not this baſis to reſt upon are fantaſtic and unſtable: from whence it will follow that whenever, by the unlucky circumſtances of our ſituation, this ſupport happens to be withdrawn from under them, they muſt neceſſarily fall to the ground. Thus if our premiſſes lead us to a concluſion we do not like, we may ſay with Doctor Middleton, that we cannot help it: for it was not our buſineſs to hunt for arguments in ſupport of any cauſe whatſoever, but to take a carefull ſurvey of nature without prejudice or prepoſſeſſion, and gather ſuch obſervations as ſhould appear reſulting therefrom.

10. But it will be ſaid that we have made only a partial and imperfect ſurvey; for if we had availed ourſelves of all the light nature would have afforded, we might have diſcovered that the end of life is not the end of Being, that our diſſolution is but a removal from this ſublunary ſtage to act upon ſome other, where our good works ſhall follow us and yield a plentiful harveſt of happineſs which had not time to ripen here: therefore a man does not act imprudently who perſeveres in his virtues to the very laſt, although they manifeſtly tend to cut him off from life with

with all its enjoyments, and promiſe him nothing but pain and torment for the little time he has to continue upon earth. All this, conſiſtently with the nature of my work, I can regard yet only as a ſuggeſtion, having found nothing in the progreſs of theſe reſearches to convince us of another life, or ſhew the tendency of what we do here to affect us hereafter: yet neither have I found anything to diſprove them, ſo that they remain proper matter of further enquiry. And ſince I find them maintained by perſons of the greateſt learning and judgement and almoſt univerſally received among mankind, ſince they are in themſelves matters of the utmoſt importance and we ſee the limits of virtue cannot be aſcertained without them, it would be inexcuſable to paſs them over unregarded or without a thorough and carefull examination; which not being eaſily diſpatched, ſo as to ſettle thoſe points to our ſatisfaction, I ſhall reſerve them for the ſubject of another volume. Therefore it may be conſidered that I am but in the midway of my journey, and what I may learn in the ſucceeding ſtages of it is yet uncertain; nor becauſe it is ſaid in § 4 that I have ſuggeſted no arguments to induce a vicious man near the end of his days to reſtrain his deſires, and in this ſection, that I have found

found nothing to convince us of another life, ought it to be inferred from thence that I may not in my further progreſs. He that has a good opinion of religion, as having a rational and ſolid foundation to ſtand upon, ought to believe that I ſhall find ſuch arguments and grounds of conviction as have not hitherto occurred, when profecuting the ſubject with a fair and carefull examination; and may preſume that what now appears the moſt exceptionable part of my doctrine, will then become capable of being turned to the advantage of religion, by ſhowing its abſolute neceſſity to make the ſyſtem of morality compleat. In the mean while he cannot ſurely blame me for attempting to prove that the practice of virtue is the wiſeſt courſe a man can follow to attain happineſs even in this world: and to abate the ſcandal he might take at the exception made of a perſon in Regulus's ſituation, to whom a ſtrong attachment to virtue would be a misfortune, he may pleaſe to reflect it is not unſimilar to a declaration of St. Paul's, that if in this life only we had hope we were of all men the moſt miſerable. But one who is proceeding on a courſe of enquiries can take nothing for granted beforehand, he can draw his inferences only from the premiſſes already collected, and muſt ſhape them in ſuch manner as they

they ſhall naturally lead him. So that I muſt ſtill adhere to my preſent concluſion until ſeeing a cauſe to alter it, for I cannot yield to any authority how great or general ſoever: this would be to depart from the plan I propoſed at ſetting out, which was to try what lights I could ſtrike out by the exerciſe of my reaſon without calling in foreign aids; the extent of that, be it greater or be it leſs, is the line I am to run, and when I am come to the end of this line I muſt ſtop ſhort, unleſs by another effort of reaſon I can chance to catch hold of another clue.

11. Nevertheleſs I am very loath to leave the ſcrupulous reader with an ill impreſſion of me upon him though but for a ſeaſon, and yet I don't know how to efface it myſelf but muſt truſt to his candour to do the beſt he can for me. Perhaps his good nature may ſuggeſt to him that if this concluſion I pretend to abide by were my real ultimate opinion, I ſhould not be ſo inconſiſtent with myſelf as to divulge it. For the diſcovery that a man's own ſafety will ſuperſede all obligations is of a nature not to be communicated without leſſening its value to the owner: he may believe then I ſhould have locked it carefully up as a precious depoſit to be reſerved for private uſe, that if ever the caſe ſhould ſo happen as that I cannot obey the dictates of honour and

and conſcience without endangering my perſon; I might avail myſelf of this ſecret to ſlip my own neck out of the collar: but it would certainly be for my intereſt to perſuade the world that the duties of virtue are indiſpenſible, and they ought to ſacrifice every thing for the good of the public, whereof I am a member and muſt conſequently ſhare in the fat of their ſacrifices. Therefore I think it is no unreaſonable favour to expect, that he will ſuppoſe I have already run over in my own mind the matters I am to preſent him with by and by, and foreſee ſomething will occur among them which will oblige me to recant the odious part of my doctrine and come over to his ſentiments. Let us then take leave in good hopes, that however we may part a little out of humour for the preſent, we ſhall grow better ſatisfied with one another upon our next converſation.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

SEP 13 1928

LENOX L

Bancroft
Purchas

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